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TRANSITION  IN  ILLINOIS  FROM  BRITISH 
TO  AMERICAN  GOVERNMENT 


THE 

TRANSITION  IN  ILLINOIS  FROM 

BRITISH  TO  AMERICAN 

GOVERNMENT 


BY 


ROBERT  LIVINGSTON  SCHUYLER,  Pn.D, 

Instructor  in  History  in  Yale  University 


LIBR4/ 

OF  THE 

UNIVERSITY 
>w 


NEW  YORK 

THE  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY   PRESS 
1909 

A II  rights  reserved 


Copyright,  1909 
BY  THE  COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

Printed  from  type  April,  1909 


THE    TUTTLE,    MOREHOUSE    <k    TAYLOR    COMPANY. 


To  MY  FATHER  AND  MOTHER. 


191193 


PREFACE. 

The  purpose  of  the  following  study  is  to  describe  the 
transition  from  British  to  American  government,  which 
occurred  during  the  period  of  the  Revolution,  in  that 
part  of  the  West  known  as  "the  Illinois."  It  will  be 
understood  that  the  word  Illinois  does  not  here  exactly 
correspond  in  territorial  extent  to  the  present  state  of  that 
name.  The  view  presented  is  that  the  result  of  British 
administration  in  the  West  was  a  decisive  factor  in  the 
abandonment  of  that  territory,  which,  of  course,  included 
Illinois,  by  the  English  ministry  in  1782.  Therefore  a 
discussion  of  British  policy  respecting  the  West  in  general 
forms  a  suitable  introduction  to  the  subject  in  hand.  An 
attempt  has  been  made  to  describe  conditions  in  Illinois 
during  the  period  of  British  administration,  to  trace  the 
progress  of  events  which  resulted  in  the  overthrow  of 
British  rule  and  the  substitution  for  it  of  government  by 
one  of  the  American  commonwealths,  to  show  the  operation 
of  that  government,  and  to  explain  conditions  in  the  country 
at  the  close  of  the  Revolution.  The  study  concludes  with 
a  consideration  of  the  peace  negotiations  of  1782,  so  far 
as  they  relate  to  the  West,  as  completing  the  transition  of 
which  it  treats. 

The  materials  upon  which  it  is  based  are  indicated  in  the 
footnotes  and  bibliography.  I  desire  to  express  my  obliga 
tions  to  Dr.  C.  E.  Carter  of  Illinois  College,  who  courteously 
allowed  me  to  examine  a  part  of  his  manuscript  of  a  work 
on  British  administration  in  Illinois.  That  monograph  has 
been  awarded  the  Justin  Winsor  Prize  of  the  American 
Historical  Association  for  1908,  and  will  be  published  in  due 
time.  I  gladly  take  this  opportunity  to  record  my  indebted 
ness  to  Professor  William  R.  Shepherd  of  Columbia  Uni 
versity,  under  whose  instruction  I  began  the  study  of  history 


Vlll  .         PREFACE. 

some  ten  years  ago.  His  detailed  knowledge  of  early  west 
ern  history  and  Spanish  colonial  policy  has  rendered  his 
criticisms  especially  valuable.  Professor  Herbert  L.  Osgood 
of  Columbia,  also,  has  read  my  manuscript  and  furnished 
suggestions.  The  work  of  Professor  Clarence  W.  Alvord 
of  the  University  of  Illinois  on  the  records  of  the  Illinois 
villages  has,  in  large  measure,  made  the  present  study  pos 
sible.  To  my  father  and  mother  I  am  under  a  debt  of 
gratitude  of  which  they  and  I  alone  know  the  extent. 

Yale  University,  April  2,  1909. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

BRITISH    POLICY   IN  THE   WEST. 

Colonial  charters  and  the  West — Early  Exploration — Western 
settlements  and  the  French — Western  settlements  and 
the  Fur  Trade — Importance  of  the  Fur  Trade — Trad 
ers — British  Policy  towards  western  settlements  after 
1763 — Proclamation  of  1763 — Its  objects  and  effects — 
Treaty  of  Lochabor — Possibility  of  new  colonies  in 
the  West — Vandalia — Proposed  colony  in  western  lands 
claimed  by  Connecticut — The  Quebec  Act  and  its 
effects — Illegal  settlements  in  West — Their  results — 
Trade  conditions  in  the  West — Suggested  remedies — 
Failure  of  British  Administration 1-16 

CHAPTER  II. 

ILLINOIS   UNDER  GREAT   BRITAIN. 

Boundaries  of  Illinois — Population — Villages — Indians  and 
Slaves — Occupations  of  the  people — Social  classes — 
Attitude  towards  British  government — Inauguration 
and  nature  of  British  government  in  Illinois — Com 
munication  with  the  eastern  colonies — Easterners  in  Illi 
nois —  Their  activities  —  Their  attitude  toward  the 
government  —  Trade  conditions  in  Illinois  —  Illinois 
joined  to  Canada,  but  left  to  its  own  resources — 
Troops  withdrawn — Rocheblave  as  British  Agent — His 
problems,  and  relations  with  the  eastern  element  in 
Illinois — Sympathy  for  the  revolted  colonists  among  the 
French  of  Illinois — Expectation  of  an  American  attack 
on  Illinois  early  in  the  Revolution.  .  .  .  I7~33 

CHAPTER  III. 

THE  WESTWARD  EXPANSION   OF  VIRGINIA   AND  GENESIS   OF 
THE  EXPEDITION   OF   1778. 

Western  claims  of  Virginia — Creation  of  western  counties 
before  the  Revolution  —  Western  Indians  —  Western 
emigration  —  Dunmore's  War — Transylvania — George 


X  CONTENTS. 

Rogers  Clark — Clark  in  Kentucky — Delegate  to  the 
Virginia  Assembly— Cherokee  War  of  1776— Kentucky 
organized  as  a  Virginia  county — The  Revolution  in  the 
West — Henry  Hamilton — Possibility  of  an  American 
attack  on  British  posts  in  the  Northwest — Clark's  plan — 
Interview  with  Henry — An  expedition  authorized.  .  .  34~5O 

CHAPTER  IV. 

THE   OVERTHROW    OF   BRITISH    POWER    IN    ILLINOIS. 

Recruiting — Corn  Island — French-American  Treaty — Clark's 
route  to  Kaskaskia.  The  Taking  of  Kaskaskia — Clark's 
Policy — Submission  of  the  other  Villages — Reasons  for 
Clark's  success — Difficulties  of  his  position — Clark  and 
the  Indians — Relations  with  the  Spaniards.  .  .  .  51-61 

CHAPTER  V. 

HAMILTON    AND    CLARK. 

Hamilton  plans  to  recover  Illinois — He  leads  an  expedition 
from  Detroit  for  that  purpose — His  route — Clark  misled 
concerning  Hamilton's  movements — Hamilton  captures 
Vincennes— His  further  plans— Clark  learns  that  Ham 
ilton  is  at  Vincennes — He  decides  to  attack  Hamilton — 
He  captures  Vincennes — Effect  of  the  capture  of  Ham 
ilton  on  the  Indians — Clark  plans  to  attack  Detroit,  but 
is  unable  to  do  so— He  takes  up  his  headquarters  at  the 
Falls  of  the  Ohio -  62-76 

CHAPTER  VI. 

ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA,    1778-1783. 

Illinois  under  Clark— Clark's  popularity  with  the  inhabitants- 
County  government  for  Illinois  established  by  Virginia — 
Todd  appointed  County-Lieutenant—Henry's  instruc 
tions  to  him,  to  Clark,  and  to  Montgomery — Inauguration 
of  civil  government  by  Todd — Establishment  of  courts — 
Paper  money  —  Land  speculation  —  Support  of  the 
troops_Difficulties  of  Todd's  position— He  leaves  Illi 
nois — Characteristics  of  American  frontiersmen — Griev 
ances  of  the  people  of  Illinois — Emigration  of  the  better 
class  from  Illinois— De  la  Balme  episode— Expedition 
against  St.  Joseph — Fear  of  British  and  Indian  attacks 
on  Illinois— Plan  to  establish  a  fort  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Ohio— Attack  on  Cahokia  and  St.  Louis— Fort 


CONTENTS.  XI 

Jefferson — Rogers,  Bentley  and  Dodge — Inhabitants  of 
Illinois  left  to  their  own  resources — Decline  of  Virgin 
ia's  interest  in  Illinois — Further  activities  of  Bentley — 
Their  results — Clark  instructed  to  lead  an  expedition 
against  Detroit — Failure  of  the  plan — Possibility  of 
restoring  British  authority  in  Illinois — Views  of 
Gerardin — Virginia  retains  nominal  possession  of  Illi 
nois  till  1784 77-1 1 1 

CHAPTER  VII. 

THE   PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS   AND   THE   WEST. 

The  Transition  in  Illinois  completed  by  the  Treaty  of  Paris — 
Rockingham  Ministry — Appointment  by  Congress  of 
Peace  Commissioners — Franklin  and  Oswald  begin 
informal  negotiations — Views  of  Congress  respecting 
the  West — Letter  of  Livingston — Instructions  to  Jay — 
Franklin  and  Canada — Fox  and  the  Negotiations — 
Shelburne's  Ministry  —  The  Policy  of  Spain  —  The 
Problem  before  the  American  Commissioners — Prom 
inence  of  Jay  in  the  Negotiations — Franklin's  Conditions 
of  Peace — Aranda — Rayneval — Policy  of  Vergennes — 
Jay's  independent  move — Shelburne's  response — Sepa 
rate  negotiation  between  England  and  the  United 
States — Arrival  of  Adams  in  France — His  attitude — A 
theory  of  French  policy — Provisional  Treaty — Explana 
tion  of  the  abandonment  of  the  West  by  Great 
Britain.  .  112-140 


CHAPTER  I— INTRODUCTION. 

BRITISH    POLICY   IN   THE   WEST. 

The  expression  "the  West"  is  here  used  specifically  to 
designate  the  territory  between  the  Alleghanies  and  the 
Mississippi,  the  Great  Lakes  and  the  Floridas.  This  terri 
tory  did  not  become  important  in  English  colonial  history 
until  the  eighteenth  century.  It  was  included,  however,  at 
least  nominally,  in  one  or  another  of  the  colonial  charters 
which  emanated  from  the  English  crown  in  the  seventeenth 
century.  By  the  Virginia  charter  of  1609  the  territory  of 
that  province  was  declared  to  extend  "from  sea  to  sea." 
The  grant  made  to  the  New  England  Council  in  1620,  the 
Connecticut  charter  of  1662,  the  charter  to  the  Lords 
Proprietors  of  Carolina  in  1663,  and  the  Georgia  charter 
of  later  date,  contained  similar  provisions.  The  Massa 
chusetts  charter  of  1691  declared  that  the  territory  of  that 
province  should  extend  "towards  the  South  Sea,  or  west 
ward  as  far  as  Our  colonies  of  Rhode  Island,  Connecticut, 
and  the  Narragansett  country."  With  the  exception  of  the 
Georgia  grant  these  charters  were  issued  at  a  time  when  the 
vaguest  and  most  inaccurate  ideas  prevailed  regarding  the 
configuration  of  the  North  American  continent.  The  South 
Sea  was  supposed  to  be  not  very  remote  from  the  Atlantic, 
and  the  crown  was  quite  ignorant  of  the  real  extent  of 
territory  embraced  in  the  grants.  In  many  cases  they  over 
lapped,  and  conflicting  claims  resulted. 

During  the  last  quarter  of  the  seventeenth  century,  the 
French  discoveries  and  explorations  upon  which  Louis  XIV 
based  his  claim  to  sovereignty  over  the  Mississippi  valley 
advanced  geographical  knowledge  and  disclosed  something 
of  the  true  extent  of  the  continent.  Claimed  by  France, 
the  West  assumed  a  real  importance  in  the  minds  of  British 
statesmen. 

The  small  beginnings  of  English  colonial  exploration 
west  of  the  Alleghanies  date  from  the  seventeenth  century. 


2  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

The  journal  of  a  party  of  Virginians  sent  in  1671  to  dis 
cover  "the  ebbing  and  flowing  of  the  water  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Mountains,  in  order  to  the  discovery  of  the 
South  Sea,"  has  been  preserved.1  They  probably  reached 
the  Kanawha  river.  In  the  seventeenth  century,  also,  the 
possibilities  of  the  fur  trade  were  beginning  to  be  realized, 
especially  in  New  York.  In  1686  traders  under  license 
from  Governor  Dongan  went  to  the  Great  Lakes.2 

Governor  Spotswood  of  Virginia  took  an  intelligent 
interest  in  the  West  and  understood  the  danger  from  the 
French  power  in  Canada,  on  the  Lakes,  and  on  the  Mis 
sissippi.  He  saw  that  it  virtually  surrounded  the  English 
settlements,3  and  believed  that,  if  unchecked,  it  could  not 
only  monopolize  the  whole  fur  trade,  but  actually  conquer 
the  English  colonies.4  In  view  of  this  menace  he  deemed 
it  of  the  greatest  importance  that  settlements  should  be 
made  on  the  Great  Lakes,  and  possession  acquired  of  those 
passes  over  the  mountains  necessary  to  safeguard  com 
munication  with  them.5  From  what  he  learned  while  on 
an  expedition  over  the  Blue  Ridge  in  1716,  he  believed  that 
the  plan  was  practicable.  Basing  himself  on  the  charter  of 
1609,  he  asserted  that  "most  of  the  Lakes  and  great  part 
of  the  head  branches  of  Mississippi"  were  included 
within  the  limits  of  Virginia,  while  the  French  settlements 
on  the  lower  Mississippi  fell  within  the  boundaries  of  South 
Carolina.6 

So  long  as  the  French  power  existed  in  the  West  the 
British  government  was  disposed  to  favor  western  settle 
ments,  to  urge  that  their  charters  carried  the  colonies 
indefinitely  westward,  and  to  assert  that  the  French  were 
trespassing  on  English  territory.7  In  1748,  in  connection 

1  Fernow,  The  Ohio  Valley  in  Colonial  Days,  220  et  seq. 

2  Ibid.,  66-67. 

8  Collections   of   the    Virginia   Historical   Society,   new    scries,    II, 
329-330. 
'Ibid.,  2$6. 

6  Ibid.,  296-297. 
•Ibid.,  295. 

7  Force,  American  Archives,  4th  scries,  I,  182. 


BRITISH    POLICY    IN    THE    WEST.  3 

with  a  proposed  grant  in  the  West  to  the  Ohio  Company, 
the  Lords  of  Trade  reported  that  "the  settlement  of  the 
country  lying  to  the  westward  of  the  Great  Mountains  in  the 
colony  of  Virginia,  which  is  the  center  of  all  His  Majesty's 
provinces,  will  be  for  His  Majesty's  interest  and  advan 
tage  ....  inasmuch  as  his  Majesty's  subjects  will  be  thereby 
enabled  to  cultivate  a  friendship  and  carry  on  a  more  exten 
sive  commerce  with  the  nations  of  Indians  inhabiting  those 
parts,  and  such  settlements  may  likewise  be  a  proper  step 
towards  disappointing  the  views  and  checking  the  encroach 
ments  of  the  French."8  The  claim  that  charters  extended 
the  colonies  to  the  South  Sea,  and  the  assertion  that  the 
French  claim  to  the  Mississippi  was  not  just,  were  made  by 
J:he  president  of  the  Virginia  Council  in  1749.®  Governor 
Dinwiddie  in  1756  advanced  the  most  extensive  territorial 
claims  for  his  province.  Virginia,  he  said,  was  supposed 
to  include  all  lands  west  of  the  Alleghanies  between  the 
northern  boundary  of  Carolina  and  the  southern  boundary 
of  Canada.10  He  was  willing,  however,  to  consider  settle 
ments  which  had  been  made  near  the  Ohio  as  "the  present 
boundary  to  the  westward."11  He  was  convinced  of  the 
necessity  of  erecting  forts  as  a  barrier  against  the  French.12 
Governor  Pownall  desired  the  establishment  of  western 
colonies  for  the  same  purpose.13  This,  also,  was,  no  doubt, 
the  purpose  of  the  recommendation  made  by  the  colonial 
commissioners  assembled  at  Albany  in  1754  that  measures 
should  be  taken  for  the  establishment  of  Protestant  settle 
ments  in  the  West.14  It  was  in  Franklin's  mind  when  in 
the  Albany  Plan  of  Union  he  proposed  the  founding  of 
western  colonies. 

8  Fernow,  op.  cit.,  245-246. 

9  Ibid.,  259-260. 

10  Colls.  Va.  Hist.  Soc.,  new  series,  IV,  339. 

11  Ibid.,  Ill,  381. 
11  Ibid.,  IV,  339- 

18  Pownall,  Administration  of  the  Colonies,  2d  ed.,  London,  1765 ; 
appendix,  47-48, 
14  O'Callaghan,  Documentary  History  of  New  York,  II,  356. 


4  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

Western  settlements  were  favored  not  only  as  a  barrier 
against  the  French,  but  also  because  it  was  believed  that 
they  would  aid  in  the  development  of  the  fur  trade.  This 
feature  of  western  colonization  was  referred  to  by  Spots- 
wood  early  in  the  century.  It  was  dwelt  upon  by  Governor 
Gooch  of  Virginia  in  1747,  in  connection  with  the  grant  to 
the  Ohio  Company,  already  referred  to.ir>  Dinwiddie  was 
fully  aware  of  the  possible  profits  of  the  fur  trade,  and 
believed  that  it  would  be  stimulated  by  western  settlements.16 
But  he  thought  that  if  the  French  remained  in  possession  of 
the  Ohio,  the  English  would  be  entirely  deprived  of  the 
trade.17 

The  problem  which  confronted  the  British  government 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  Seven  Years'  War  was  not  easy. 
By  the  Treaty  of  Paris  in  1763  Great  Britain  came  into 
possession  of  the  great  peltry-bearing  regions,  Canada  and 
the  West.  The  belief,  indeed,  seems  later  to  have  been 
common  among  her  revolted  colonists  that  the  desire  to 
control  the  fur  trade  had  been  a  leading  object  of  her 
policy  in  prosecuting  the  French  war.18  An  immense  waste 
of  uninhabited  country  was  a  profitable  acquisition  only  by 
reason  of  its  trade.19  From  this  standpoint  it  was  felt  by 
the  nation  to  be  an  asset  of  distinct  value.20  The  ministry, 
moreover,  had  preferred  the  possession  of  Canada  and  the 
West  to  that  of  the  French  West  India  islands.  For  politi 
cal  reasons  their  choice  had  to  be  justified.21  The  new 
possessions  must  be  made  profitable.  This  could  be  done 
•only  by  the  monopolization  and  development  of  their  sole 
immediate  source  of  wealth,  the  fur  trade.  Furs  could  be 
secured  in  large  quantities  only  by  traffic  with  the  Indians. 
They  belonged  to  the  class  of  "enumerated"  articles,  which 
could  legally  be  exported  from  British  colonies  only  to  a 

15  Fcrnow,  op.  cit.,  241. 

10  Colls.  Va.  Hist.  Soc.,  new  scries.  Ill,  94-95. 

"Ibid.,  217. 

18  Collections  of  the  New  York  Historical  Society  for  1886,  272. 

18  Annual  Register  for  1763,  6th  cd.,  18. 

20  Ibid.,  18-19. 

21  Ibid.,  19. 


OF  THE 

(f  UNIVERSITY 


BRITISH    POLICY    IN    THE    WEST.  $ 

British  port.  If,  therefore,  the  tribes  refused  to  do  business 
with  English  traders,  or  if  the  latter  illegally  exported  their 
goods  to  foreign  ports,  the  objects  of  mercantilist  policy 
would  be  frustrated.  No  benefit  would  be  secured  by  the 
British  treasury,  British  manufacturers,  British  shipping 
interests,  or  by  the  consuming  public.  The  possession  of 
the  peltry-bearing  regions  would  be  of  no  value. 
-  A  tactful  and  conciliatory  attitude  towards  the  Indians 
became,  therefore,  a  necessary  policy  for  Great  Britain. 
The  success  of  the  French  traders  had  been  mainly  due  to 
their  consideration  for  the  savages.  Unfortunately,  from 
the  British  point  of  view,  English  traders  had  long  since 
acquired  a  bad  name  with  the  Indians.  This  seems  to  have 
been  chiefly  due  to  the  bad  character  of  the  average  trader.22 
As  early  as  the  administration  of  Governor  Spotswood 
there  is  evidence  that  the  Indians  were  being  maltreated  by 
English  traders.23  In  1756  Dinwiddie  attributed  friction 
with  the  Indians  mainly  "to  the  traders  among  them,  who 
are  the  most  abandoned  wretches  in  the  world,  and,  in 
respect  to  society,  as  uncivilized  as  the  Indians  themselves, 
and  less  to  be  trusted  in  regard  to  truth  and  probity.24  The 
Albany  commissioners  in  1754  dwelt  upon  the  evils  of 
unregulated  traffic  with  the  Indians,25  and  Franklin's  Plan 
sought  to  place  Indian  affairs  under  collective  control.26 
In  the  opinion  of  the  commissioners  the  trade  should  be 
made  subservient  to  public  rather  than  to  private  interests.27 
The  abuses  practised  by  traders  on  the  Indians  were 
referred  to  by  Lieutenant-Governor  Golden  in  1764  as  of 
long  standing.28  The  necessity  for  a  comprehensive  Indian 
policy  which  would  remove  the  evils  of  unregulated  traffic, 

"Collections  of  the  New  York  Historical  Society,  Publication 
Fund  Series,  IX,  383.  For  a  statement  of  the  reasons  for  the 
hostility  of  the  Indians  towards  the  English  see  Beer,  British 
Colonial  Policy,  1754-1765,  253,  255. 

23  Colls.  Va.  Hist.  Soc.,  new  series,  II,  145. 

24  Ibid.,  IV,  340. 

25  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  355. 
*Ibid. 

27  Ibid.,  356. 

"Colls.  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.,  Pub.  Fund  Series,  IX,  383. 


0  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

and  extend  British  influence  over  the  tribes,  was  felt  several 
years  before  the  end  of  the  Seven  Years'  War.20 

,By  1763  British  policy  regarding  western  settlements  had 
undergone  a  decided  change.  One  cause  of  the  previous 
desire  for  their  establishment  no  longer  existed.  The 
French  power  having  been  overthrown,  such  settlements 
ceased  to  be  needed  as  a  barrier  for  protection.  The  prin 
cipal  motive  in  causing  the  government  to  alter  its  policy 
related,  however,  to  the  fur  trade.30  Everything  that  would 
antagonize  the  Indians  must  be  avoided. 

As  early  as  1756  Sir  William  Johnson  informed  the  Board 
of  Trade  that  the  advance  of  white  settlements  was  an 
eyesore  to  the  Indians,  and  "infected  them  with  jealousy 
and  disgust  towards  the  English."31  The  Board  showed 
itself  awake  to  this  danger.32  The  probability  that  advanc 
ing  settlements  would  cause  trouble  with  the  Indians,  and 
.prove  injurious  to  the  fur  trade,  was  a  commonplace  among 
British  officials.  "It  does  appear  to  us,"  wrote  Hills- 
borough,  president  of  the  Board  of  Trade,  in  a  well-known 
report  in  1772,  "that  the  extension  of  the  fur  trade  depends 
entirely  upon  the  Indians  being  undisturbed  in  the  posses 
sion  of  their  hunting-grounds ;  and  that  all  colonization 
does  in  its  nature  and  must  in  its  consequences  operate  to 
the  prejudice  of  that  branch  of  commerce."33  Towards  the 
close  of  the  war  the  Board  of  Trade  proposed  that  the 
king  should  issue  a  proclamation  establishing  an  Indian 
reservation  "within  certain  fixed  bounds,"  such  lands  to 
be  reserved  for  the  Indians  and  for  purposes  of  trade.34 
From  the  British  imperial  point  of  view,  then,  unrestricted 
western  settlements  and  unregulated  trade  with  the  Indians 
were  evils  which  must  be  guarded  against. 

29  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  401,  409,  454. 

50  Cf.  Farrand,  "The  Indian  Boundary  Line,"  American  Historical 
Review,  X,  782  et  seq. 

81  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  419. 

*Ibid.,  453- 

33  For  the  report  see  The  Works  of  Franklin,  Sparks'  ed.,  IV,  303 
et  seq. 

84  Documents  Relative  to  the  Colonial  History  of  the  State  of  New 
York,  VII,  535-536. 


BRITISH    POLICY    IN    THE    WEST.  7 

Soon  after  the  Seven  Years'  War  the  British  government 
addressed  itself  to  the  administration  of  its  new  territorial 
acquisitions.  On  October  7,  1763,  a  royal  proclamation  was 
issued  creating  civil  governments  for  the  four  new  British 
provinces  of  Quebec,  East  Florida,  West  Florida,  and 
Grenada.  Under  this  proclamation  civil  government  was 
inaugurated  in  Quebec,  the  most  important  of  the  new 
provinces,  in  1764,  and  this  document  served  as  its  con 
stitution  till  the  Quebec  Act  went  into  operation  in  I775.35 
.But  the  West  was  not  then  included  within  the  limits  of  any 
province  or  provided  with  any  form  of  civil  government.  It 
was  reserved  temporarily  for  the  use  of  the  Indians.  In  it 
settlements  and  individual  purchases  from  the  Indians  were 
forbidden,  and  the  governors  of  the  eastern  colonies  were 
ordered  not  to  grant  warrants  of  survey,  or  pass  patents 
for  lands  beyond  the  sources  of  the  rivers  which  empty 
into  the  Atlantic.  Governors  of  the  new  provinces  were 
not  to  suffer  any  extension  of  settlements  beyond  their 
respective  limits.  The  serious  consequences  of  Indian 
hostility  were  forcibly  impressed  upon  British  officials  by 
the  uprising  associated  with  the  name  of  Pontiac.  It  was 
constantly  asserted  in  the  English  newspapers  that  this 
uprising  had  been  caused  by  maltreatment  of  the  Indians.36 
Had  an  attempt  been  made  in  1763  to  extend  civil  govern 
ment  over  the  West,  the  result  might  have  been  disastrous. 
If  the  English  were  to  enjoy  profits  from  the  fur  trade,  if 
the  possession  of  the  West  was  to  be  made  lucrative, 
measures  of  conciliation  were  imperative.  This  considera 
tion,  it  is  believed,  explains  to  a  large  extent  those  parts 
of  the  proclamation  which  relate  to  the  West  and  to  the 
Indians.  The  proclamation  attempted,  moreover,  to  prevent 
the  evil  consequences  of  unregulated  traffic  with  the  savages. 
Trade  was  declared  to  be  open  upon  license  to  all  British 
subjects.  But  traders  were  required  to  give  security  that 
they  would  observe  such  regulations  as  the  crown  or  its 

35  Coffin,     "The    Province   of    Quebec    and    the    Early    American 
Revolution,"    Bulletin  of  the   University  of  Wisconsin,  Economics, 
Political  Science  and  History  Series,  I,  275-277. 

36  Colls.  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.,  Pub.  Fund  Series,  IX,  270. 


8  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

commissioners  might  make.  The  proclamation  was  thus  an 
outgrowth  of  British  experience  and  policy. 

It  had,  however,  other  objects  than  those  which  per 
tained  to  the  Indians  and  to  the  fur  trade.  In  the  report 
referred  to,  llillsborough  mentions  as  purposes  of  the  proc 
lamation,  "the  confining  the  western  extent  of  settlements 
to  such  a  distance  from  the  seashore  as  that  those  settle 
ments  should  be  within  reach  of  the  trade  and  commerce  of 
this  kingdom  ....  and  also  of  the  exercise  of  that  authority 
and  jurisdiction  which  was  conceived  to  be  necessary  for 
the  preservation  of  the  colonies  in  a  due  subordination  to 
and  dependence  upon  the  Mother  Country."  According 
to  Dartmouth,  it  was  the  invariable  policy  of  the  govern 
ment  to  prevent  settlements  where  they  would  provoke  the 
Indians,  and  where  the  settlers  would  be  beyond  the  reach 
of  British  control  and  protection/0'7  Grenville's  view,  as 
given  by  Franklin/18  that  the  king's  purpose  would  be  accom 
plished  as  soon  as  the  western  lands  were  properly  pur 
chased  from  the  Indians,  seems  improbable.  A  possible 
purpose  of  the  proclamation  in  restricting  settlements  was 
to  discredit  the  charter  claims  of  the  colonies  to  the  West. 
It  was  coming  to  be  felt  that  imperial  interests  demanded 
an  abridgement  of  these  indefinite  and  often  conflicting 
claims,  but  no  certainty  was  yet  felt  as  to  where  the  western 
boundary  of  the  colonies  should  be  established.39 

Hillsborough  thought  that  the  proclamation  line,  that  is, 
the  Alleghany  watershed,  should  be  permanently  main 
tained  as  the  western  limit  of  colonial  settlements,40  but 
the  government  did  not  follow  this  policy.  The  proclama 
tion  line,  confessedly  temporary,  involved  a  restriction  of 
settlements,  but  did  not  establish  an  ultimate  boundary.41 

37  Collections  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Societv,  4th  scries, 
X,  725- 
3S  Works  of  Franklin,  Sparks'  ed.,  IV,  339-340. 

39  Annual  Register  for  1763,  20-21. 

40  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  577. 

41  Attempts  were  later  made  to  show  that  the  proclamation  made 
the  Alleghanies  the  western  boundary  of  the  Atlantic  colonies.     Cf. 
Sparks,    Diplomatic    Correspondence   of    the    American    Revolution, 
VIII,    156-160;     Correspondence   and   Public   Papers    of   John    Jay, 


BRITISH    POLICY   IN    THE    WEST.  9 

-Washington's  view  that  it  was  a  temporary  expedient  to 
quiet  the  Indians,  which  did  not  extinguish  the  claims  of  the 
colonies  to  the  West,  probably  represents  the  better  type  of 
colonial  opinion  on  the  subject.  He  thought  that  the 
restriction  of  settlements  would  be  removed  when  the 
Indians  consented  to  the  occupation  of  their  lands.42  There 
is  abundant  evidence  that  the  colonies  were  considered  by 
good  authority  to  extend  west  of  the  Alleghanies  after 
I763.43  The  Board  of  Trade,  it  is  true,  advocated  in  1768 
a  permanent  boundary  line  between  the  colonies  and  the 
western  Indians,44  but  it  does  not  seem  to  have  been  the 
policy  of  the  government  permanently  to  reserve  the  whole 
territory  between  the  Alleghanies  and  the  Mississippi  for 
the  use  of  the  Indians,  as  Burke  in  a  rhetorical  flourish 
implied. 

.  After  the  Treaty  of  Fort  Stanwix  in  1768,  by  which  the 
Six  Nations  ceded  to  the  crown  their  claim  to  lands  south 
of  the  Ohio  as  far  as  the  Tennessee  river,  then  called  the 
Cherokee,45  the  government  was  willing  to  allow  settle 
ments  under  authority  of  Virginia  west  of  the  Alleghanies. 
By  the  Treaty  of  Lochabor  in  1770,  it  was  stipulated  that 
settlements  under  Virginia  should  be  bounded  on  the  west 
by  a  line  from  the  mouth  of  the  Kanawha  to  some  point 
on  the  northern  boundary  line  of  North  Carolina.46  This 
new  line  was,  of  course,  much  further  west  than  the  line 
of  1763.  Dunmore  favored  settlements  even  beyond  the 
new  line,  but  was  instructed  not  to  allow  them.47 

It  is  probable  that  but  for  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution 
new  colonies  would  have  been  established  in  the  West  under 

Johnston's  ed.,  II,  390;  Works  of  Franklin,  Sparks'  ed.,  IV,  324, 
367 ;  Writings  of  Thomas  Paine,  Conway's  ed.,  II,  52. 

0  Writings   of    Washington,   Ford's    ed.,    II,   396,   and   Maryland 
Historical  Society,  Fund  Publications,  No.  n,  73. 

43  Archives  of  Maryland,  XIV,  381,  479;    O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II, 
577- 

44  Docs.  Rel  Col.  Hist.  St.  of  N.  Y.,  VIII,  22. 

45  For  the  treaty  see  ibid.,  HI  et  seq. 

46  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  543.    Colls.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  4th  series, 
X,  725-726. 

47  Ibid.,  726-727. 


10  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

royal  charters.  Both  in  the  eastern  colonies  and  in  England 
a  growing"  interest  was  felt  in  the  country  beyond  the 
mountains.  George  Croghan,  Sir  William  Johnson's 
deputy,  who  was  in  London  in  1764,  reported  that,  at  that 
time,  there  was  talk  of  the  establishment  of  a  colony  near 
the  mouth  of  the  Ohio.48  Proposals  were  later  made  look 
ing  towards  the  founding  of  colonies  in  Illinois,  at 
Detroit,  and  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio,  but  the  Board  of 
Trade  opposed  these  schemes,  and  they  were  dropped.49 
One  reason  for  the  Board's  opposition  w^as  that  such 
colonies  would  be  injurious  to  the  fur  trade.50  That  the 
Board  was  willing,  however,  to  open  up  portions  of  the 
West  for  settlement  is  shown  by  the  proceedings  relating 
to  the  proposed  colony  of  Vandalia.51  This  project 
encountered  much  opposition.  Hillsborough's  attitude  is 
well  known.  He  felt  that  it  was  opposed  to  all  sound 
policy.52  Dunmore  had  written  to  him  that  a  colony  at  such 
a  distance  could  benefit  neither  the  eastern  colonies  nor 
England.  No  commercial  communication  with  it  would  be 
possible.  Emigration  thither,  said  Dunmore,  would  reduce 
the  value  of  lands  in  the  eastern  colonies.  The  establish 
ment  of  the  colony,  moreover,  \vould  probably  involve  an 
Indian  war.5"  Nevertheless  the  Board  approved  the  petition 
for  the  Vandalia  grant,54  and  the  charter  had  all  but  passed 
the  seals,  when  political  agitation  in  the  colonies  made  it 
expedient  to  pause.  Care,  however,  had  been  taken  to 
establish  such  boundaries  for  the  proposed  colony  as  would 
not  offend  the  Indians.55  It  is  altogether  unlikely  that  the 
government  would  have  allowed  western  settlements  to 

^Fernow,  op.  cit.,  177-178. 

48  Ibid.,  181,  and  Aldcn,  "New  Governments  West  of  the  Alle- 
ghanies  before  1780,"  Bui.  Univ.  of  Wis.,  EC.,  Pol.  Sci.  and  Hist. 
Series,  II,  17-19. 

60  Docs.  Rcl.  Col.  Hist.  St.  of  N.  Y.,  VITT,  27  ct  scq. 

51  For  the  Vandalia  proceedings  see  Aldcn,  <>/».  cit. 

62  Works  of  Franklin,  Sparks'  ed.,  IV,  303  ct  scq. 

63  Fernow,  op.  cit.,  276-277. 

64  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  578  ct  scq. 

65  Colls.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  4th  series,  X,  726. 


BRITISH    POLICY    IN    THE    WEST.  II 

interfere  with  the  fur  trade.  The  sentiment  expressed  in 
Hillsborough's  report  continued  by  many  of  the  British  to 
be  regarded  as  the  proper  solution  of  the  problem :  "Let 
the  savages  enjoy  their  deserts  in  quiet.  Were  they  driven 
from  their  forests,  the  peltry  trade  would  decrease."  A 
distinction  has  been  suggested  between  the  territory  north 
and  that  south  of  the  Ohio.  It  may  have  been  the  govern 
ment's  policy  permanently  to  reserve  the  former  for  the 
Indians.56 

On  the  eve  of  the  Revolution  an  attempt  was  made  to 
establish  a  new  settlement  in  the  nature  of  a  commonwealth 
in  that  part  of  the  Northwest  claimed  by  Connecticut.  On 
April  2,  1774,  Pelatiah  Webster  of  Philadelphia,  who  under 
stood  the  potential  value  of  the  West  and  prophesied  that 
its  population  would  in  the  future  control  the  continent, 
wrote  to  Silas  Deane  of  Connecticut,  pointing  out  the  impor 
tance  of  the  territory  near  the  Great  Lakes  which  was 
claimed  by  Connecticut.57  At  about  the  same  time  Deane, 
who  had  already  become  interested  in  the  West,  wrote  to 
Ebenezer  Hazard  of  New  York  and  Samuel  H.  Parsons 
of  Philadelphia,  who  were  likewise  interested.58  In  the 
letter  to  Parsons,  he  suggested  a  settlement  on  the  south 
west  corner  of  Lake  Erie  or  on  the  Mississippi.  It  would 
be  secure,  he  thought,  whatever  the  result  of  the  dispute 
between  England  and  the  colonies.  If  arbitrary  measures 
were  pursued,  many  would  flee  to  this  new  asylum.  In  the 
same  year  Hazard,  Parsons,  and  Deane  formed  an  associa 
tion,  the  rules  of  which  were  drawn  up  by  Hazard.  To 
this  others  were  to  be  admitted  on  payment  of  a  small  sum. 
The  money  raised  was  to  be  used  to  purchase  from  the 
Connecticut  Assembly  a  quitclaim  or  release  of  all  the  rights 
of  that  colony  to  lands  between  the  western  boundary  of 
Pennsylvania  and  the  Mississippi.  Every  member  was  to 
be  entitled  to  one  two-thousandth  of  the  lands  granted  by 

56  Coffin,  op.  cit.,  428-429. 

"Hinman,  A  Historical  Collection  from  Official  Records,  Files, 
etc.,  of  the  Part  Sustained  by  Connecticut  during  the  War  of  th\e 
Revolution,  536. 

68  Collections  of  the  Connecticut  Historical  Society,  II,  131-133. 


12  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

Connecticut  to  the  association.  Each  was  to  pay  his  share 
for  defending  the  claim  under  authority  of  that  colony  if 
it  should  be  disputed,  and  to  contribute  his  proportion  of 
money  necessary  to  purchase  the  Indian  title  and  to  make 
a  settlement.  Hazard,  who  was  prepared  to  invest  heavily, 
went  to  Hartford  in  1774  to  procure  the  quitclaim,  but  his 
petition  was  rejected59  and  the  plan  collapsed.  The  interest 
of  these  men  in  the  West,  however,  continued,  and  Deane 
was  one  of  the  first  of  the  revolutionists  to  advocate  Con 
gressional  control  over  it.60 

The  year  which  witnessed  this  unsuccessful  attempt  at 
western  colonization  marked  the  passage  by  Parliament  of 
the  Quebec  Act,  which  involved  the  most  serious  attack 
ever  made  by  the  British  government  on  charter  claims  to 
the  West.  The  act  included  all  the  Northwest,  between 
the  Ohio,  the  Great  Lakes,  and  the  Mississippi  in  the 
government  of  Quebec.  The  main  purpose  of  this  extension 
of  the  limits  of  that  province  will  be  discussed  later. 
It  had  the  effect,  of  course,  of  nullifying  all  charter  claims 
of  the  eastern  colonies  to  this  territory.  As  was  foretold 
by  the  Opposition  in  the  House  of  Commons,  the  bill 
angered  the  colonists.  Though  it  was  not  necessarily  con 
nected  with  the  coercive  acts  affecting  Massachusetts  passed 
at  the  same  session  of  Parliament,  the  most  unfavorable 
interpretation  was  placed  upon  it  in  the  colonies.  The  Con 
tinental  Congress  declared  it  to  be  a  violation  of  colonial 
rights  and  demanded  its  repeal.61  An  unsuccessful  attempt 
was  made  in  the  Lords  the  following  year  to  secure  this. 
The  act  was  said  to  have  unduly  extended  the  limits  of 
Quebec  and  prevented  the  expansion  of  the  eastern 
colonies.02  Since,  however,  it  constituted  one  of  the  griev 
ances  of  the  revolutionist  party,  its  nullification  of  colonial 
claims  to  the  Northwest  was  by  them  considered  invalid.63 

"Colls.  Conn.  Hist.  Soc.,  II,  133-134. 
80  Colls.  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.  for  1886,  383-385. 
61  Force,  Am.  Archives,  4th  scries,  I,  912. 
*  Ibid.,  1823-1824,  1826. 

m  Sparks,  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American  Revolution, 
III,  268  ct  sc<j. 


BRITISH    POLICY    IN    THE    WEST.  13 

During  the  Revolution,  therefore,  the  states  continued  to 
assert  claims  to  this  territory  on  the  basis  of  their  old 
colonial  charters. 

By  many  of  the  colonists,  and  especially  by  the  frontiers 
men,  the  proclamation  of  1763  had  been  regarded  as  an 
unjust  attempt  to  deprive  them  of  lands  for  which  they  had 
fought.  Its  restrictive  policy  furnished  one  of  the  counts 
which  were  later  made  against  the  home  government  by 
the  revolutionists.84  The  character  of  the  American 
frontiersmen  was  such  that  they  could  not  be  restrained 
from  hunting  and  building  cabins  in  the  forbidden  terri 
tory.65  Even  the  recollection  of  the  horrors  of  Pontiac's 
War  did  not  deter  them.66  Among  the  squatters  were  men 
of  low  character  who  persisted  in  selling  rum  to  the  sav 
ages.67  The  imperial  machinery  for  enforcing  the  proc 
lamation  was  wanting.  British  sovereignty  in  the  West, 
it  is  true,  was  represented  by  garrisons  stationed  at  a  few 
posts  on  the  Great  Lakes  and  on  the  Mississippi,  and  the  sug 
gestion  was  made  that  these  forces  should  be  employed  to 
punish  squatters  and  destroy  their  cabins.68  But  the  number 
of  troops  in  the  West  was  quite  inadequate  to  perform  this 
work.  Some  of  the  governors,  indeed,  seem  to  have  con 
scientiously  tried  to  prevent  illegal  settlements.69  But  many 
officials  took  a  lax  view  of  their  duties.70 

Friction  with  the  western  tribes  caused  by  these  violations 
of  the  proclamation  was  justly  regarded  as  a  matter  of 
imperial  concern,  since  it  was  likely  to  involve  a  general 
Indian  war.  Sir  William  Johnson  warned  General  Gage 
of  the  danger  of  the  continued  illegal  settlements  and 

64  Colls.  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.  for  1886,  270. 

65  For  evidence  of  the  violation  of  the  proclamation  see  Archives 
of  Md.,  XIV,  468,  and  Writings  of  Washington,  Ford's  ed.,  II,  221, 
note. 

66  Archives  of  Md.,  XIV,  211. 

67  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  503. 

68  Archives  of  Md.,  XIV,  362. 

69  Ibid.,  199,  362. 

70Wharton,  Revolutionary  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the 
United  States,  V,  88;  American  State  Papers,  "Public  Lands,"  II, 
208. 


14  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

trade.71  -In  1766  the  latter,  then  commander-in-chief  of  the 
British  forces  in  North  America,  was  instructed  to 
cooperate  with  the  civil  power  in  enforcing-  the  proc 
lamation  ;  and  colonial  officials  were  urged  to  take  every 
measure  to  remove  squatters  and  to  conciliate  the  Indians.72 

In  the  administration  of  the  West  the  policy  of  Great 
Britain  continued  to  be  determined  by  the  fur  trade.  To 
develop  this  at  the  least  expense,  as  advocated  by  Gage,73 
represented  the  attitude  of  the  government.  To  prevent 
unlicensed  trading-  and  smuggling  in  this  vast  territory,  the 
police  power  which  the  few  troops  in  the  West  could 
exercise  was  so  inadequate  as  to  be  virtually  negligible. 
The  results  of  these  conditions,  so  far  as  they  relate  to 
Illinois,  will  be  considered  in  the  next  chapter. 

Pontiac's  War  did  not  make  the  Indians  more  inclined 
to  trade  with  the  English.  Their  preference  to  do  business 
with  the  French  who  remained  in  the  Northwest  after  1763 
was  known  to  British  officials.74  It  was  hoped,  however, 
that  the  establishment  of  British  garrisons  at  the  western 
posts  would  do  something  to  destroy  French  influence.75 
In  the  Northwest,  competition  between  French  and  English 
traders  was  sharp,  and  the  former,  many  of  whom  carried 
on  unlicensed  trade,  enjoyed  an  advantage  in  the  goodwill 
of  the  Indians,  and  were  able  to  go  freely  among  the 
tribes  where  Englishmen  were  not  suffered.  In  short,  the 
area  of  English  trade,  as  compared  with  the  French,  was 
restricted,  and  mainly  confined  to  the  established  posts.70 

•  But  more  important  from  the  British  standpoint  \vas  the 
attitude  of  the  English  traders  themselves.  The  natural 
emporium  for  the  commerce  of  the  Mississippi  valley  was 
New  Orleans.  La  Salle  had  first  developed  a  plan  to  ship 
furs  to  Europe  from  the  upper  Mississippi  down  the  river, 

71  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  498,  503. 

'-Archives  of  Md.,  XIV,  328-329,  and  Colls.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  4th 
series,  X,  655. 

73  Gage  to  Hillsborough,  TO  Nov.,  1/70,  Carter,  MSS.  Thesis. 

74  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  476;    Colls.  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.,  Pub.  Fund 
Series,  IX,  443. 

7D  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  476. 
70  Ibid.,  551,  and  Carter,  op.  cit. 


BRITISH    POLICY    IN    THE    WEST.  15 

instead  of  by  way  of  the  St.  Lawrence.77  This  port,  how 
ever,  was  in  the  possession  of  a  foreign  power,  and  hence 
all  shipments  of  fur  to  it  were  illegal.  General  Gage 
thought  that,  while  some  British  manufactures  might  be 
disposed  of  in  the  West,  so  long  as  furs  commanded  a  high 
price  in  the  New  Orleans  market,  no  peltry  exchanged  for 
those  manufactures  would  ever  reach  a  British  port.78  His 
observations  induced  him  to  believe  that  the  Indian  trade 
would  "always  go  with  the  stream."  It  would  all  go  either 
down  the  Mississippi  or  down  the  St.  Lawrence.79  Sir 
William  Johnson  shared  Gage's  views.80  Unless  the  natural 
course  of  western  trade  could  be  diverted  from  New  Orleans 
up  the  Ohio,  or  down  the  St.  Lawrence,  British  possession 
of  the  West  would  be  a  flat  failure. 

In  order  to  check  smuggling  and  enforce  payment  of  the 
duties  various  measures  were  suggested.  Golden  outlined  a 
plan  to  the  Board  of  Trade  in  1764.  In  his  opinion  the 
export  duties  on  peltry  ought  to  be  paid  in  kind  at. a  fixed 
rate  at  the  posts  where  the  furs  were  procured.  A  certifi 
cate  of  the  duty  paid  should  be  carried  with  every  pack  of 
peltries  and  finally  lodged  in  the  customhouse  of  the  port 
from  which  they  were  exported.  The  goods  thus  paid  in 
kind  as  duty  should  be  sent  once  a  year  to  the  customhouse 
and  sold  at  public  vendue.  This  method,  Golden  thought, 
would  effectually  prevent  evasions  of  the  duty.81 

Sir  William  Johnson  thought  that  illicit  traffic  with  New 
Orleans  might  be  prevented,  if  the  northern  trade  were 
strictly  confined  to  the  posts  in  communication  with  the 
Great  Lakes.  In  that  way,  he  thought,  the  furs  would  go 
down  the  St.  Lawrence.  As  for  the  trade  of  the  Mississippi, 
it  might  be  possible  to  divert  that  from  New  Orleans  to 
the  British  province  of  West  Florida,  where  French  traders 
were  known  to  be  well  supplied  with  goods  for  barter.82 

77  Winsor,  The  Mississippi  Basin,  21. 

78  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  485,  486. 

79  Ibid.,  486. 

80  Ibid.,  488. 

81  Colls.  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.,  Pub.  Fund  Series,  IX,  384. 

82  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  488. 


1 6  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

Gage  believed  that  the  traders  ought  to  be  restrained  by 
law.  The  only  way  to  enforce  regulations,  in  his  opinion, 
was  to  invest  the  officers  commanding  at  the  several  posts 
with  judicial  power  to  see  that  they  were  put  in  operation. 
Something  could  be  done,  he  thought,  by  erecting  posts,  at 
the  mouths  of  the  Ohio  and  Illinois  and  preventing  all  boats 
from  descending  those  rivers.  The  establishment  of  an 
adequate  number  of  posts  and  forts,  however,  would  be 
difficult  and  expensive.83  Ilillsborough  expressed  the  same 
opinion.84 

A  possible  means  of  preventing  smuggling  lay  in  the 
capture  of  New  Orleans  from  the  Spaniards.  If  this 
became  an  English  port,  the  problem  of  western  trade 
would  be  solved.  At  the  time  of  the  dispute  between  Spain 
and  England  over  the  Falkland  Islands,  when  war  seemed 
likely,  Hillsborough  instructed  Gage  to  mobilize  an  army 
and  prepare  to  attack  New  Orleans  by  way  of  the  Ohio  and 
Mississippi.85  But  the  controversy  was  settled  without  \var, 
and  New  Orleans  was  not  molested. 

By  1767  officials  most  conversant  with  conditions  in  the 
West  had  concluded  that  British  possession  of  that  territory 
would  be  unprofitable  unless  the  illicit  New  Orleans  trade 
could  be  prevented.86  "If  our  traders  do  not  return  with 
the  produce  of  their  trade  to  the  northward  provinces  by 
way  of  the  Ohio  or  the  Lakes,"  wrote  Gage,  "it  will  not 
answer  to  England  to  be  at  much  expense  about  the 
Mississippi.''87  By  1770,  Hillsborough  had  entirely  aban 
doned  hopes  of  immediate  commercial  benefit  from  the 
West.ss  It  is  significant  that  the  possession  of  the  West 
has  never  been  profitable  to  any  European  nation.89 

83  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  486,  488. 

S4  Hillsborough  to  Gage,  31  July,  17/0,    Carter,  op.  cit. 

85  Public  Record  Office,  Am.  and  IVvst  Indies,  vol.  127,  Carter, 
op.  cit. 

M  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  486,  499. 

"  Ibid.,  485- 

88  Ilillsborough  to  Gage,  31  July,  1770,  Carter,  op.  cit. 

**  Shepherd,  "The  Cession  of  Louisiana  to  Spain,"  Political 
Science  Quarterly,  XIX,  439,  452. 


CHAPTER  II. 

ILLINOIS    UNDER    GREAT    BRITAIN. 

As  a  geographical  expression  in  common  usage  "the 
Illinois"  referred  to  a  part  of  the  territory  which  had  been 
ceded  by  France  to  England  at  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years' 
War.  Under  French  rule  it  had  formed  a  district  of  the 
province  of  Louisiana,  and  then  included  territory  on  both 
sides  of  the  Mississippi  between  the  lines  of  the  Illinois  and 
Ohio  rivers.1  After  the  Seven  Years'  War  the  part  west 
of  the  Mississippi  was  known  as  Spanish  Illinois,  since  it 
was  included  in  the  territory  ceded  during  the  war  by 
France  to  Spain.  - 

British  Illinois  itself  was  regarded  as  bounded  by  the 
Illinois  river  on  the  north,  the  Wabash  on  the  east,  the 
Ohio  on  the  south,  and  the  Mississippi  on  the  west.2  It 
included  the  central  and  southern  part  of  the  present  state 
of  Illinois,  and  some  of  northwestern  Indiana.  In  the  fol 
lowing  narrative  frequent  mention  will  have  to  be  made 
of  the  Wabash  posts,  particularly  Vincennes,  and  though 
not  usually  considered  as  part  of  Illinois,  they  will  here  be 
treated  as  such. 

There  was  a  considerable  decrease  of  the  white  population 
in  eastern  or  British  Illinois  following  the  cession  of  the 
country  to  England  in  1763,  and  many  French  Creoles,  pre 
ferring  Spanish  to  British  government,  crossed  the  Mis 
sissippi  into  Spanish  territory.  St.  Louis,  founded  by 
Laclede  in  1764,  as  a  post  for  the  Missouri  river  trade, 
though  in  Spanish  territory,  remained  under  the  control  of 
Laclede  and  a  French  successor  till  1770,  when  the  first 
Spanish  commandant  arrived.  This  post  and  its  neighbor- 

1Alvord,  "Illinois  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,"  Bulletin  of  the 
Illinois  State  Historical  Society,  I,  No.  i,  8. 

2  Pittman,  Present  State  of  th\e  European  Settlements  on  the 
Mississippi,  reprint  of  the  original  edition,  London,  1770;  Hodder's 
ed,  99- 


1 8  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

ing  settlements  gained  much  in  population  from  the  emigra 
tion  of  the  French  from  British  Illinois.  Laclede  desired 
to  make  St.  Louis  a  refuge  for  them,  and  later  the  Spanish 
authorities  offered  inducements  to  attract  immigrants.3 
Another  reason  for  this  emigration  from  British  Illinois 
may  have  been  the  attitude  of  the  Indians,  who  appear  to 
have  become  lawless  after  the  removal  of  French  control.4 
The  exodus  alarmed  British  officials,  who  feared  that  the 
Spanish  villages  would  monopolize  the  Mississippi  trade.5 
The  decrease  in  the  population  was  partly  offset,  however, 
by  the  entrance  into  the  country  of  eastern  traders  and  land 
speculators. 

Throughout  the  British  period  the  French  inhabitants, 
scattered  among  several  villages,  remained  the  largest  ele 
ment  in  the  population.  The  seat  of  government  under  the 
French,  and  under  the  British  till  1/72,  was  Fort  Chartres 
on  the  Mississippi,  reputed  "the  most  commodious  and  best 
built  fort  in  North  America."6  In  1772  it  was  so  badly  dam 
aged  by  the  waters  of  the  Mississippi  that  it  was  abandoned, 
and  thenceforth  Kaskaskia,  situated  on  the  river  of  that 
name,  about  six  miles  above  its  confluence  with  the  Mis 
sissippi,  became  the  military  and  governmental  capital  of 
British  Illinois.7  It  was  the  most  important  village.  At 
the  beginning  of  the  period  of  British  occupation  it  con 
tained,  however,  only  about  fifty  families,8  besides  slaves 
and  a  few  transient  merchants.  Prairie  du  Rocher,  about 
seventeen  miles  north  of  Kaskaskia,  at  this  time  boasted  of 
only  twelve  dwelling  houses,  while  farther  north  St. 
Philippe  was  practically  deserted.  Still  farther  north 

3  Chittenden,   Fur   Trade  in   the  Far   West,   I,    100,    102;    Houck, 
History  of  Missouri,  I,  302,  304. 

4  Transactions  of   the  Illinois  State  Historical  Society  for  1907, 
204. 

BFernow,  op.  cit.,  179. 

6  Pittman,  op.  cit.,  89. 

1  Collections  of  the  Illinois  State  Historical  Library,  I,  291.  For 
the  history  of  Fort  Chartres  see  Mason,  Chapters  from  Illinois 
History,  212-249. 

8  Trans.  III.  St.  Hist.  Soc.,  1907,  217. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER    GREAT    BRITAIN.  19 

was  Cahokia,  situated  on  the  Mississippi  about  eighteen 
miles  south  of  the  mouth  of  the  Missouri.  Though 
smaller  than  Kaskaskia,  it  was  important  for  its  Indian 
trade.9  On  the  lower  Wabash  was  the  village  of  Vincennes, 
with  a  population  probably  somewhat  larger  than  that  of 
Kaskaskia.10  It,  too,  was  an  important  post,  since  it  was  on 
the  chief  commercial  route  between  Canada  and  Illinois.11 
Farther  north  on  the  Wabash  was  the  small  trading  station 
of  Ouiatanon.  There  were  one  or  two  small  posts,  also, 
on  the  Illinois  river. 

A  recent  writer  on  Illinois  history  places  the  number  of 
whites  in  the  villages  near  the  Mississippi  at  the  close  of  the 
British  period  at  something  less  than  one  thousand.12 
Dwelling  in  the  neighborhood  of  Kaskaskia  and  Cahokia 
were  some  four  or  five  hundred  Indians,  regarded  as  more 
or  less  debauched  and  degenerate.13  Along  the  Wabash 
dwelt  the  brave  and  warlike  tribes  of  the  Kickapoos, 
Piankeshaws,  and  Menomenies.14  There  were  also  some 
negro  slaves  in  Illinois,  especially  in  Kaskaskia.15  The 
large  extent  of  territory,  and  the  small  number  of  settle 
ments,  are  thus  facts  of  cardinal  importance  in  a  study  of 
this  country. 

The  chief  occupations  of  the  people  were  trade,  hunting, 
and  agriculture.  The  only  place  where  agriculture  was 
pursued  to  any  extent  was  Kaskaskia.  The  land  along 
the  Mississippi,  from  the  mouth  of  the  Kaskaskia  to  that 
of  the  Missouri,  was  and  is  exceedingly  fertile,  since  it 
receives  the  alluvial  deposits  washed  down  by  the  Missouri. 
The  soil  yielded  all  kinds  of  European  grains  and  fruits, 

"For  a  description  of  these  villages  see  Pittman,  op.  cit.,  84-94. 
For  their  populations  in  1765,  see  Trans.  III.  St.  Hist.  Soc.,  1907,  217. 

10  Fernow,  op.  cit.,  180. 

11  Benton,   "The  Wabash  Trade  Route  in  the  Development  of  the 
Old     Northwest."      The    Johns    Hopkins     University    Studies    in 
Historical  and  Political  Science,  XXI,  7. 

12  Alvord,  Colls.  Ill  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xv. 

13  Ibid.,  xvi;    Pittman,  op.  cit.,  97. 

14  Michigan  Pioneer  and  Historical  Society  Collections,  III,  16. 

15  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xlviii. 

3 


20  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

and  some  produce  had  been  shipped  from  Kaskaskia  to  New 
Orleans  during  the  French  period.10  The  Creoles,  however, 
judged  by  English  colonial  standards,  were  not  enterprising 
agriculturists.17  The  excitement  of  the  fur  trade  and  of 
the  chase  exercised  greater  fascination  over  their  minds  than 
the  routine  pursuits  of  the  farm.  Most  of  them  belonged 
to  the  "habitant"  or  "coureur  de  bois"  classes,  resembling 
in  all  essentials  their  Canadian  brethren  familiar  to  us  in 
the  pages  of  Parkman.  They  had  come  mainly  from 
Canada,  few  from  New  Orleans  and  the  lower  Mississippi.18 
The  social  classes  and  distinctions  of  the  old  world  were 
not,  of  course,  reproduced  in  Illinois,  but  neither  was  there 
the  complete  social  equality  that  existed  among  the  Amer 
ican  backwoodsmen.  There  were  some  prosperous  and  edu 
cated  men,  traders  and  landowners,  who  constituted  the 
natural  aristocracy  of  the  country.  The  lower  classes,  no 
doubt,  were  illiterate  and  superstitious,19  but  less  brutal  than 
the  American  frontiersmen. 

Accustomed  as  they  had  been  to  despotic  rule,  the  people 
of  Illinois  were  wholly  unversed  in  the  practices  of  self- 
government  and  unfitted  for  the  acceptance  of  democratic 
institutions.  While  France  held  the  country,  they  had  been 
happy  under  the  absolutism  of  their  commandant,  and  the 
spiritual  domination  of  the  Jesuit  priest,  the  most  venerated 
man  among  them.  At  the  close  of  the  Seven  Years'  War 
they  saw  themselves  abandoned  by  their  king,  but  they  did 
not  cease  to  love  him.  They  never,  indeed,  felt  any  attach 
ment  for  the  new  government,  which  they  always  regarded 

1GThwaites,  France  in  America,  85.  Collins,  "History  of  Ken 
tucky,"  R.  H.  Collins'  ed.,  I,  15. 

17  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  X,  266.  For  an  account  of  the  agricul 
tural  possibilities  of  Illinois,  as  well  as  of  the  unenterprising 
character  of  the  people,  see  a  pamphlet  written  by  a  Kaskaskian, 
published  in  Philadelphia,  in  1772.  It  is  reprinted  in  Alvord  and 
Carter,  Invitation  Scricnsc  aux  Habitants  dcs  Illinois,  by  [sic]  Un 
Habitant  dcs  Kaskaskias. 

lf  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xvii.  note  2. 

19  Alvord  and  Carter,  op.  cit.,  15. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER    GREAT    BRITAIN.  21 

as  a  "foreign  yoke."20  They  hoped  that  they  would  some 
day  be  restored  to  France,  but  their  habits  of  obedience 
were  such  that  they  never  organized  a  revolt. 

The  uprising  of  Pontiac,  following  the  war  with  France, 
postponed  the  occupation  of  the  country  by  British  forces 
till  1765.  It  was  believed  by  some  that  the  Indian  parties 
which  ravaged  the  colonial  frontiers  during  Pontiac's  War 
were  supplied  with  ammunition  by  the  French  at  Fort 
Chartres.21  The  French  in  Illinois  were  supposed  to  be 
reaping  great  profit  from  their  trade  with  the  Indians,22  and 
it  was  expected  that  they  would  not  give  up  the  country 
without  a  struggle.23  It  was  regarded  as  very  important 
that  the  influence  exerted  by  them  over  the  Indians  should 
be  brought  to  an  end,24  and  it  was  hoped  that  the  British 
occupation  of  the  country  would  accomplish  this  result.25 
Sir  William  Johnson  considered  Fort  Chartres  an  important 
settlement  for  purposes  of  trade,26  and  Golden  thought  it 
necessary  that  a  British  post  should  be  maintained  there.27 

In  1765  the  last  French  commandant  at  Fort  Chartres 
formally  surrendered  the  post  to  his  British  successor.28 
Thereafter,  until  the  whole  Northwest  had  been  joined  by 
the  Quebec  Act  to  the  province  of  Quebec,  the  troops  at 
Fort  Chartres,  and  later  at  Kaskaskia,  represented  the 
British  government  in  Illinois.  The  local  commandant, 
subject  to  the  commander-in-chief  of  the  British  forces  in 
North  America,  ruled  the  country  as  despotically  as  his 
French  predecessor  had  done.29 

*"An  Address  to  Congress  from  the  French  Inhabitants  of  Post 
Vincennes,  Kaskaskia,"  etc.,  1788;  Papers  of  the  Continental 
Congress,  Library  of  Congress. 

21  Colls.  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.,  Pub.  Fund  Series,  IX,  336. 

22  Ibid. 

23  Ibid. 

24  Ibid.,  443- 

25  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  476. 

26  Ibid.,  478. 

"Colls.  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.}  Pub.  Fund  Series,  IX,  380. 

28  Trans.  III.  St.  Hist.  Soc.,  for  1907,  211;    Mason,  Chapters  from 
III.  Hist.,  235. 

29  Pittman,  op.  cit.,  88. 


22  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

As  soon  as  Illinois  passed  under  British  control,  eastern 
colonists  were  attracted  thither  by  the  alluring  prospects  of 
fur  trade  and  land  speculation.  A  new  element  was  added 
to  the  population.  Communication  was  established  between 
the  eastern  colonies  and  Illinois.30  The  easiest  and  most 
customary  route  was  from  Fort  Pitt  down  the  Ohio,31  and 
boats  were  kept  on  that  river  to  maintain  communication.32 
Another  possible  route  was  by  Lake  Erie,  up  the  Maumee, 
and  down  the  Wabash  to  the  Ohio.33  The  all-water  route 
by  New  Orleans  was  too  long  and  expensive  to  be  followed. 
Eastern  firms,  anxious  to  participate  in  the  profits  of  the 
fur  trade,  established  branches  in  the  French  villages  and 
sent  out  agents.  Speculation  in  Illinois  land  proved  equally 
congenial  to  their  commercial  instincts.  Land  companies 
were  formed  and  several  tracts  were  bought  from  the  north 
western  tribes.  In  1773,  apparently  with  the  consent  of 
Captain  Lord,  then  British  commandant  at  Kaskaskia,  the 
Illinois  Land  Company  purchased  a  large  tract  from  the 
Indians.  Another  extensive  purchase  was  made  in  1775 
by  the  Wabash  Land  Company,  in  which  Lord  Dumnore, 
then  governor  of  Virginia,  was  interested.34  These  pur 
chases,  in  violation  of  the  proclamation  of  1763,  were,  of 
course,  illegal.  Consequently  some  of  them  were  annulled 
by  General  Gage.35  The  military  authorities,  indeed,  made 
a  genuine  effort  to  force  the  traders  to  deal  fairly  with  the 
Indians  ;3G  and  their  attitude  discouraged  similar  enter 
prises.  The  incorporation  of  the  Northwest  into  the 
province  of  Quebec  tended  to  lessen  communication 
between  Illinois  and  the  eastern  colonies.  But,  although  the 
number  of  eastern  traders  declined  after  the  Quebec  Act 
went  into  operation  in  1775,  some  remained.  They  played 

80  Alvord  and  Carter,  op.  cit.,  7-8. 

31  Colls.  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.,  Pub.  Fund  Series,  IX,  381. 

82  Colls.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  4th  scries,  X,  724. 

33  Colls.  N.  Y.  Hist.  Soc.,  Pub.  Fund  Series,  IX,  381. 

34  American  State  Papers,   "Public  Lands,"    I,  27. 

85  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  IT,  xxx;    Report  on  Canadian  AreJik'es, 
1885,  201. 
"Ibid.,  213;   ibid.,  1886,  512. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER    GREAT    BRITAIN.  23 

a  part  in  Illinois  history  before  the  Revolution  similar  to 
that  played  in  Canada  by  the  "old  subjects,"  as  the  English 
inhabitants  of  the  province  were  called,  in  distinction  to 
the  French,  the  "new  subjects."  In  Illinois,  as  in  Canada, 
this  class  was  in  the  main  in  sympathy  with  the  spirit  which, 
in  the  eastern  colonies,  was  soon  to  break  out  in  open  revolt. 
Their  opposition  to  the  military  government  can  be 
explained  partly  by  the  fact  that  it  stood  for  the  principles 
of  the'  proclamation  of  1763,  which  conflicted  with  their 
trading  and  speculating  enterprises.  In  Canada,  the  "old 
subjects"  clamored  for  an  assembly.37  In  Illinois,  the 
easterners  protested  against  the  evils  of  military  and  urged 
the  establishment  of  civil  government.38  A  memorial  was 
submitted  in  1770  by  Daniel  Blouin,  a  French  Creole,  setting 
forth  the  disadvantages  of  the  military  regime,  and  request 
ing  the  establishment  of  a  civil  government  like  that  enjoyed 
by  Connecticut.  It  was  probably  inspired,  however,  by 
English  colonial  merchants  and  traders  in  the  country. 
Gage  regarded  Blouin  not  as  a  representative  of  the  people 
of  Illinois,  but  as  a  mouthpiece  of  the  "republican"  faction 
there.39  The  majority  of  the  French  inhabitants  of  Canada 
certainly  did  not  desire  the  establishment  of  an  assembly, 
and  it  could  hardly  be  supposed  that  the  Illinois  French 
would  demand  one.  The  attempt  to  secure  civil  government 
at  this  time  failed.40  The  easterners,  however,  exercised  an 
importance  out  of  proportion  to  their  numbers,  for  they 
were  more  intelligent,  shrewd  and  enterprising  than  most 
of  their  Creole  neighbors.  Their  presence  in  Illinois  dur 
ing  the  decade  1765-1775  made  possible  correspondence 
between  that  country  and  the  Atlantic  colonies,  and  prepared 
some,  at  least,  of  the  inhabitants  for  the  reception  of 
American  ideas,  and,  if  they  should  come,  of  American 
troops.41 

37  Coffin,  op.  cit.,  319. 

38  Alvord  and  Carter,  op.  cit.,  xviii. 
38  Rept.  on  Can.  Archives,  1884,  61. 

40  Alvord  and  Carter,  op.  cit.,  xxiii. 

41  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xxxi. 


24  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

Most  of  the  opposition  to  the  government  of  Illinois  dur 
ing  the  decade  of  military  rule  emanated  from  the  English- 
speaking-  element.  In  1765  Captain  Stirling,  the  first  British 
commandant,  brought  a  proclamation  from  General  Gage 
which  served  as  a  sort  of  constitution  for  ten  years.4-  By 
the  terms  of  this  the  liberty  of  the  Catholic  religion  was 
granted  to  the  inhabitants  of  Illinois,  as  it  had  been  granted 
to  those  of  Canada;  all  who  chose  were  allowed  to  leave 
the  country,  and  those  who  remained  and  became  British 
subjects  were  to  enjoy  all  the  rights  and  liberties  of  the 
king's  "old  subjects."  They  were  required  to  take  an  oath 
of  fidelity  and  obedience,  and  to  assist  the  British  troops 
to  take  peaceable  possession  of  the  country. 

The  task  of  the  military  commandant  during  the  British 
period  was  evidently  difficult.  He  was  called  upon  to  pre 
side  over  the  old  French  and  the  new  English  inhabitants 
of  Illinois,  two  classes  as  inharmonious  as  could  be 
imagined.  The  French  had  knowledge  only  of  their  own 
law,  the  "coutume  de  Paris."  The  easterners  desired  the 
establishment  of  English  judicial  institutions.  In  Novem 
ber,  1/68,  a  court  on  the  English  model  was  set  up  at  Fort 
Chartres,  consisting  of  seven  judges,  with  civil  jurisdiction. 
Juries  were  not  employed.43  At  first,  the  majority  of  the 
judges  were  eastern  colonists  who  had  recently  come  into 
the  country.  Soon,  however,  the  majority  were  French, 
but  the  court  continued  to  be  presided  over  by  one  of  the 
most  influential  of  the  eastern  traders,  and  it  became  the 
mouthpiece  of  the  faction  which  was  opposed  to  the  military 
regime.  In  1/70,  it  ventured  to  protest  against  the  arbitrary 
actions  of  the  commandant,  Colonel  Wilkins,  who  responded 
by  dissolving  it.44  The  origin  of  an  anti-governmental 
party  in  Illinois  during  the  period  of  British  rule,  therefore, 

42  Am.  St.  Papers,  "Public  Lands,"  II,  209;    or  Brown,  History  of 
Illinois,  212-213. 

43  Alvord,   Illinois   in    tJic   Eighteenth   Century,   21.     The   colonial 
French  seem  always  to  have  been  opposed  to  juries;    see  Force,  Am. 
Archives,  4th  series,  I,  icSo,. 

44  Alvord  and  Carter,  of>.  cit.,  xix. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   GREAT    BRITAIN.  25 

is  traceable  to  the  presence  of  this  eastern  element.  Most 
of  the  influential  French  inhabitants,  though  not  all,  were 
passively  on  the  side  of  the  government.  Gabriel  Cerre, 
for  example,  who  was  decidedly  the  leading  merchant  of 
Illinois,  supported  it.45  According  to  the  testimony  of 
Captain  Lord,  the  people  in  general  were  opposed  to  the 
establishment  of  civil  government.46 

Throughout  the  period,  conditions  on  the  Wabash  were 
little  short  of  anarchical.  It  was  felt  necessary  that  some 
government  should  be  established  there,47  but  no  official 
came  to  exercise  authority  till  I77/.48 

The  failure  of  British  administration  in  the  West  has 
already  been  discussed,  and  its  causes  shown.  The  govern 
ment  hoped  that  the  former  commercial  intercourse  between 
Illinois  and  New  Orleans  would  be  terminated,  and  that 
the  Illinois  trade  would  be  turned  up  the  Ohio,  by  which 
channel  it  would  reach  the  eastern  colonial  ports.  But  the 
English  traders  in  Illinois  followed  lines  of  least  resistance 
and  greatest  profit.  They  sent  their  furs  to  New  Orleans, 
because  it  was  far  easier  than  to  ship  them  to  New  York 
or  Philadelphia,  and  because  prices  were  higher  than  in 
English  colonial  markets.  Gage  was  aware  of  this  contra 
band  trade  as  early  as  I766.49  It  was  his  opinion  that 
practically  no  peltries  from  Illinois  reached  eastern  ports, 
that  none  ever  would  which  passed  through  New  Orleans, 
and  that  nothing  but  force  or  greater  profits  could  change 
the  natural  course  of  trade.50  It  was  estimated  by  a  con 
temporary  that  between  500  and  1,000  packs  of  peltries  were 
shipped  annually  from  Illinois  to  New  Orleans.51  The  Mis 
souri  river  trade,  moreover,  which,  during  the  French 
period,  had  centered  at  Cahokia,  was  now  diverted  to  the 
Spanish  posts  across  the  Mississippi. 

45  Trans.  III.  St.  Hist.  Soc.,  1903,  275  et  seq. 

46  Rept.  on  Can.  Archives,  1886,  519. 
47Fernow,  op,  cit.,  181. 

48  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  I,  313- 

49  Carter,  op.  cit. 

50  Ibid. 

51  Ibid. 


26  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

In  1768  Captain  Forbes,  then  commandant  at  Fort 
Chartres,  made  an  effort  to  prohibit  the  New  Orleans  trade 
by  forcing  traders  to  give  a  bond  of  £200  to  ship  their 
furs  to  a  British  port,5-  but  he  was  unable  to  stop  the 
illicit  traffic.  Sir  William  Johnson,  in  1767,  -complained  of 
the  expense  involved  in  the  administration  of  Illinois,  which, 
he  said,  was  vastly  more  than  he  had  expected.53 

The  British  government  came  to  feel  that  the  Northwest 
must  be  annexed  to  some  province.54  Some  provision  had 
to  be  made  for  the  French  villages.55  To  leave  them  with 
out  any  government,  or  to  establish  separate  colonies  for 
them,  was  felt  to  be  unwise.50  Political  considerations  made 
it  inadvisable  to  join  that  area  to  any  of  the  eastern  colonies, 
for  this  was  the  era  of  the  Boston  Tea  Party  and  the 
Committees  of  Correspondence.  It  seemed  most  expedient, 
therefore,  to  annex  it  to  the  province  of  Quebec.  This, 
according  to  Lord  North,  was  the  motive  of  the  Lords  in 
passing  the  Quebec  Bill.57 

The  province  of  Quebec,  including  the  whole  Northwest, 
as  established  by  the  act  of  1774,  was  a  crown  colony,  with 
a  governor  and  legislative  council  appointed  by  the  king.58 
On  account  of  the  small  number  of  English  inhabitants 
no  provision  was  made  for  an  assembly.59  General  Guy 
Carleton,  who  had  been  serving  as  governor  of  Quebec, 
was  retained  in  office.  The  chief  post  in  the  "upper 
country,"  as  the  Northwest  was  called  by  the  authorities 
at  Quebec,  was  Detroit.  Subordinate  to  Carleton,  Lieu- 
tenant-Governor  Henry  Hamilton  was  sent  to  take  com 
mand  of  that  post,  where  he  arrived  in  November,  I775-60 
The  Quebec  Act,  however,  made  little  change  in  the  govern- 

52  Carter,  up.  cit. 

68  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  499. 

54 Rcpt.  on  Can.  Archives,  1884,  59,  61 ;    ibid.,  1885,  232. 

"Annual  Register,  for  1774,  76. 

58  Force,  Am.  Archives,  4th  series,  I,  181. 

67  Ibid. 

58  Coffin,  op.  cit.,  278. 

59  Parliamentary  History  of  England,  XVII,  1358. 
w  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  X,  265. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER    GREAT    BRITAIN.  27 

ment  of  Illinois,  and  the  troops  were  retained  there  until 
1776. 

The  American  invasion  of  Canada  in  1775,  and  the  sub 
sequent  course  of  the  Revolution,  made  it  impossible  for  the 
Quebec  authorities  adequately  to  provide  for  the  govern 
ment  and  defense  of  the  whole  province.  Though  Carleton 
always  sought  to  keep  himself  informed  of  general,  and 
particularly  of  military  conditions  in  the  Northwest,  the 
posts  in  that  territory  were  left  largely  to  their  own 
resources  and  self-defense.61 

When  the  Quebec  Act  went  into  operation,  Captain  Lord 
was  acting  as  commandant  of  the  British  troops  at 
Kaskaskia.  The  next  year  they  were  withdrawn  to  Detroit, 
as  a  result  of  the  American  invasion  of  Canada,  and  also 
to  save  expense.62  This  event  may  be  regarded  as  the 
termination  of  military  government  in  Illinois.  Upon  leav 
ing  the  country  Captain  Lord  suggested  Rocheblave  as  a 
suitable  person  to  represent  British  interests.  Rocheblave 
was  a  Frenchman  who  had  come  to  Canada  about  1748, 
taken  up  his  abode  in  Illinois  between  1770  and  1776,  and 
become  a  British  subject.63  He  tells  us  that  Lord  appointed 
him  "judge  and  commander,"  with  orders  to  keep  the 
Indians  faithful  to  Great  Britain.64  Carleton,  however, 
stated  that  he  employed  Rocheblave  "to  have  an  eye  on  the 
proceedings  of  the  Spaniards  and  the  management  of  the 
Indians  .  .  .  ,"65  As  military  government  had  ceased,  and 
as  Rocheblave  had  no  troops  to  command,  we  are  to  regard 
him  not  as  Lord's  successor,  but  merely  as  a  British  agent. 
The  establishment  under  the  Quebec  Act  of  formal  civil 
government  for  Illinois  was  prevented  by  the  outbreak  of 
the  Revolution.66  Rocheblave  was  allowed  to  draw  a  small 

"Kid.,  IX,  343-344- 

62  Mason,  Early  Chicago  and  Illinois,  407  ;  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  IX,  350. 

63  For  a  sketch  of  Rocheblave  see  Mason.  Early  Chic,  and  III, 
360-381. 

"Ibid.,  396. 


"Captain  Mathew  Johnson  was  appointed  lieutenant-governor  of 
Illinois,  and  nominally  held  that  position  from   1775  to   1781.     A 


28  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

sum  on  the  treasurer  at  Quebec  for  necessary  expenses,67 
but  he  was  inadequately  provided  for.  Left  in  charge  of 
a  country  without  troops  or  money,  it  is  small  wonder  that 
he  did  not  succeed. 

The  brief  period  of  Rocheblave's  residence  as  British 
agent  in  Illinois  (1776-1778)  was  that  in  which  the  way 
was  prepared  for  the  overthrow  of  British  rule  in  the 
country.  He  had  a  high  opinion  of  the  possibilities  and 
strategic  importance  of  Illinois,  and  thought  that,  if  better 
known,  it  could  be  made  a  rich  and  prosperous  colony.  But 
he  feared  that  it  would  become  the  center  of  communication, 
by  way  of  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi,  between  the  eastern 
rebels  and  the  Spaniards  on  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  and  in 
Upper  Louisiana.68  Though  affecting  a  position  of  neutral 
ity  in  the  early  Revolution,  Spain  was  secretly  helping  the 
colonists,69  and  Spanish  officials  in  Louisiana  were  lending 
aid  to  them.70  Rocheblave  kept  setting  forth  the  danger 
of  this  communication,  and  it  was  understood  by  the 
authorities  at  Quebec.71  But  they  could  not  furnish  the  aid 
which  he  asked  for.  His  requests  for  troops  were  unheeded, 
and  many  of  his  drafts  were  protested.72 

The  disposition  of  the  Indians,  upon  which  the  fate  of 
Illinois  to  a  large  extent  depended,  was  a  matter  of  great 
concern  to  the  British  agent.  He  was  expected  to  keep 
them  friendly,  and  to  prevent  them  from  being  seduced 
by  rebel  and  Spanish  agents.  The  only  means  of  accom 
plishing  this,  as  he  well  knew,  was  a  liberal  and  continuous 
bestowal  of  presents.  Without  adequate  supplies,  and  with 
no  troops,  he  found  great  difficulty  in  dealing  with  them.73 

warrant  for  his  salary  for  these  six  years  was  issued  by  the 
authorities  at  Quebec,  but  he  never  exercised  the  functions  of  the 
office.  Rcpt.  on  Can.  Archives,  1885,  337-338. 

fl'  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III.,  382. 

^Ibid.,  407. 

c"  Floridablanca  to  Marquis  D'Ossun,  17  Oct.,  1777;  Stevens, 
Facsimiles  of  Manuscripts  in  European  Archives  Relating  to 
America,  1773-1783,  XIX. 

""  Houck,  op.  cit.,  T.  303. 

"'Mich.  r.  Colls.,  IX,  344. 

"Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  111.,  371,  407. 

73  Ibid.,  417. 


ILLINOIS   UNDER   GREAT   BRITAIN.  29 

In  attempting  to  check  the  evils  produced  by  the  sale  of 
liquor  to  the  Indians,  Rocheblave  seems  to  have  aroused 
ill-feeling  among  the  English-speaking  party.  The  danger 
caused  by  the  presence  in  the  villages  of  disorderly  and 
intoxicated  savages  is  obvious.  The  only  power,  however, 
which  he  could  invoke  was  public  opinion.  He  accordingly 
called  an  assembly  of  the  people  in  April,  1776,  to  discuss 
Indian  relations.  It  was  decided  to  place  them  under  col 
lective  control,  and  the  inhabitants  agreed  not  to  sell  intoxi 
cants  to  the  savages.  The  agreement  was  signed  by  most 
of  the  influential  among  the  French,  but  by  only  one  of 
the  English-speaking  party.7* 

Further  friction  developed  between  the  agent  and  this 
element  of  the  population.  They  accused  him  of  having 
taken  oaths  of  allegiance  successively  to  France,  Spain  and 
Great  Britain,75  and  doubtless  hated  him  as  a  renegade 
Frenchman,  who  was  representing  a  government  from 
which  their  friends  and  relatives  in  the  east  were  revolting. 
They  were  eager  to  thwart  him  whenever  possible.  They 
constantly  complained  of  his  tyranny.  They  accused  him 
of  siding  with  the  French  against  them  in  disputes,  and  of 
even  acting  as  their  counsel.  They  said  that  he  paid  no 
attention  to  protests  and  appeals,  and  was  not  an  English 
man's  friend.  They  even  addressed  a  petition  to  the 
governor  of  the  province  concerning  his  iniquities.76 
According  to  the  terms  of  the  Quebec  Act  the  French 
inhabitants  of  the  province  were  to  have  their  old  law  in  civil 
cases,  but  in  criminal  cases  the  English  law  was  to  prevail.77 
Political  and  judicial  conditions  during  Rocheblave's 
agency,  however,  were  almost  chaotic.  He  acted  as  judge, 
and  tells  us  that  demands  were  constantly  made  that  the 
English  law  should  be  followed,  if  it  happened  to  favor 
the  litigant,  who  might  the  very  next  day  demand  the 

74  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xxxii. 

75  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  XIX,  324. 

76  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III,  385-388. 

77  Coffin,  op.  cit.,  278. 


30  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

French  law,  if  advantageous  to  him.78  He  complained  bit 
terly  of  the  "reckless  spirits,"  who  thought  that  the  govern 
ment  owed  them  everything  while  they  owed  the  govern 
ment  nothing.79 

In  the  legitimate  performance  of  his  duties  the  agent 
came  into  further  conflict  with  the  disaffected  party  over 
the  question  of  aid  given  to  the  eastern  rebels  by  the 
Spaniards  at  New  Orleans  and  St.  Louis.  Boats  laden  with 
supplies  came  up  the  Mississippi  and  Ohio  to  Fort  Pitt,  then 
held  by  Virginia,  and  Governor  Galvez  at  New  Orleans  was 
on  very  friendly  terms  with  Oliver  Pollock,  an  agent  of 
Virginia  and  the  United  States  in  that  city.  The  anti- 
British  party  in  Illinois  knew  of  this  communication  and 
beheld  it  with  joy  ;so  and  they  themselves  traded  and  cor 
responded  with  the  rebels.81 

Even  among  the  French  of  Illinois  sympathy  for  the 
Americans  existed.82  A  condition  somewhat  similar  is  to 
be  found  in  lower  Canada,  during  the  period  of  the  early 
Revolution.  In  spite  of  the  anti-Catholic  sentiments  of  the 
revolutionary  party  in  the  colonies,  there  was  a  decided 
feeling  of  sympathy  among  the  Canadians,  especially  the 
lower  class,  for  the  "rebels,"  and  some  of  the  Jesuits,  even, 
sympathized.  Of  the  inhabitants  of  Illinois  who  were 
inclined  to  favor  the  Americans,  the  most  important,  on 
account  of  his  great  influence,  was  Father  Pierre  Gibault, 
the  priest  of  Kaskaskia,  who  had  instructed  himself  some 
what  in  the  questions  at  issue  in  the  Revolution.8" 
Evidently  the  British  hold  on  Illinois  at  the  beginning  of 
the  Revolution  was  not  strong. 

From  about  1776  the  pro- American  party  was  expecting, 
and  Rocheblave  was  fearing,  an  American  expedition  into 

78  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III,  391. 
''*lbid.,  416. 

80  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xxxiii. 

81  Ibid.,  I,  299;   Mich.  P.  Colls.,  XIX,  324;    Refit,  on  Can.  Archives. 
1890  (State  papers),  92. 

KMich.  P.  Colls.,  XIX,  417. 

"For  information  concerning  Gibault  see  English,  Conquest  of  the 
Country  Northwest  of  the  River  Ohio  and  Life  of  Gen.  George 
Rogers  Chirk,  I,  184  ct  seq. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   GREAT    BRITAIN.  31 

the  country,84  from  the  direction  of  Fort  Pitt.  This  strate 
gic  point,  at  the  confluence  of  the  Alleghany  and  Monon- 
gahela  rivers,  "the  gateway  of  the  West,"  had  been 
evacuated  by  order  of  General  Gage  in  October,  1772,  but 
had  been  re-garrisoned  two  years  later  by  Major  John 
Connolly  under  instructions  from  Dunmore.85  Connolly  was 
in  command  at  Fort  Pitt  when  the  Revolution  broke  out. 
He  speculated  on  the  possibility  of  a  body  of  rebels  going 
down  the  Ohio  and  up  the  Mississippi  to  attack  Kaskaskia, 
and  wrote  a  letter  to  Captain  Lord,  then  in  command  at 
that  post,  warning  him  of  this  danger.  The  letter,  however, 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  Americans,  and  probably  called 
attention  to  the  possibility  of  such  an  attack,86  though  this 
could  scarcely  fail  to  suggest  itself,  since  intercourse 
between  Fort  Pitt  and  New  Orleans  had  become  frequent. 
In  July,  1775,  the  garrison  at  Fort  Pitt  was  disbanded,  and 
Virginia  militia  took  possession  in  September  of  the  same 
year.87  Their  position,  and  the  American  hold  on  the  Fort 
Pitt  region,  were  greatly  strengthened  by  a  treaty  of  friend 
ship  made  in  1775  with  the  Indians  of  the  upper  Ohio  by 
commissioners  of  Congress  and  Virginia.88 

In  April,  1776,  Congress  appointed  George  Morgan  agent 
for  Indian  affairs  in  the  Middle  Department,  which 
included  the  West,  with  headquarters  at  Fort  Pitt.89  He 
was  to  cultivate  the  friendship  of  the  Indians,  and  to  do 
everything  in  his  power  to  attach  them  to  Congress. 
Morgan  had  been  one  of  the  first  of  the  eastern  traders  and 

84  Colls.    III.    St.    Hist.    Lib.,    II,    xxxv ;     see    also    An    Address 
to    Congress    from    the    French    Inhabitants    of    Post    Vincennes, 
Kaskaskia,  etc.,  1788. 

85  Thwaites  and  Kellogg,  Documentary  History  of  Dunmore' 's  War, 
53,   note;    Thwaites   and   Kellogg,    The  Revolution   on   the    Upper 
Ohio,  17. 

86  Butterfield,  History  of  George  Rogers  Clark's  Conquest  of  the 
Illinois  and  the  W abash  Towns,  1778  and  1779,  8. 

87  Thwaites  and  Kellogg,  Rev.  on  the  U.  Ohio,  20. 

88  Ibid.,  25  et  seq. 

89  Journals    of    the    Continental    Congress,   Ford's    ed.,    IV,    268; 
Morgan's  commission  is  in  MSS.  of  the  Library  of  Congress,  Letters 
to  Morgan. 


^J  TRANSITION     IN     ILLINOIS. 

speculators  to  140  to  Illinois,  where  he  had  lived  tor  several 
years. 'v  He.  ot"  eoiu.se.  luul  friends  aiul  associates  in  !xas- 
kaskia.  with  whom  he  maintained  correspondence  after  his 
appointment  as  Indian  assent.5'1  lie  \vas  in  communication, 
also,  with  the  .  \meriean  party  in  Pet  roil,  and  with  Governor 
lialve/  of  New  Orleans/1-'  lie  probably  knew  more  about 
the  \Yest  than  any  other  man  in  the  service  of  the  I'mted 
States.  The  American  party  m  Illinois  expected  that 
Morgan  would  lead  an  expedition  into  the  country.**3  It 
was  this  that  Roeheblave  teared.  In  a  letter  written  in 
Inly,  1770.  to  one  ot  his  friends  in  Kaskaskia,  Morgan 
desired  "to  know  the  exact  situation  of  atYairs  at  the  Illinois, 
and  what  quantity  of  tlour  and  beef  you  could  furnish  a 
company  or  two  of  men  with  at  Kaskaskia  the  twenty-fifth 
of  next  Pcccmhcr."1"  Roehehlave  was  thinking  of  such 
an  attack  when  he  wrote  in  July.  1777.  lo  Stuart.  Uritish 
a^cut  amou^  the  southern  Indians,  that  he  had  learned  that 
a  number  of  boats  were  bcin^  prepared  at  Fort  Fitt  for  the 
purpose  of  embarking  a  force,  which  could  be  intended  only 
for  IVtroit.  or  for  the  banks  of  the  Mississippi. !0  As  early 
as  the  spring  of  1770.  indeed,  I'on^rcss  did  contemplate  an 
expedition  against  Pctroit.1'1'  In  view  of  the  disaffection 
in  Illinois,  the  well-known  attitude  of  the  Spanish  power 
on  the  Mississippi,  and  the  uncertainty  felt  about  the 
Indians,  it  is  not  strange  that  Rochchlavc  concluded  that 
his  position  was  undesirable  and  his  task  doomed  to  failure. 
In  May,  1777.  Pavid  Abbott,  a  British  commandant, 
arrived  at  Yinccnncs.1'7  lie  tried  to  brins;  order  out  of 
chaos,  formed  militia  companies,  and  erected  a  stockade. 

*\V//.f.  //.'.  vVf.  Hist.  Lib..  11.  xxviii;  for  his  activity  in  the  fur 
trade  in  Illinois  see  Kt'ft.  en  din.  Archi:'i's.  1880.  six). 

"'Ceils.  ///.  .V/.  Hist.  Lib..  11.  xxviii.  note  j. 

*:  Houck.  ef.  a!..  11.  uxj. 

**t'ij.V«Jjr  ef  rirginiii  St<itt'  }\ift-rs.  11.  075;  Cells.  111.  St.  Hist. 
Lib..  II.  xxxv. 

!i4  UmUTUeKl.  ef.  »•»/..  518 -510. 

**  Kvx-heblavo  to  Stuart.  4  Inly.  1777 :  l\:ncreft  MSS..  X.  V.  Pub. 
Lib. 

"Jetirtiiils  Cent.  Ceng..  l:ord's  ed..  l\'.  v;7^. 

*T  Buttertield,  ef>.  cit..  49  and  his  authorities. 


ILLINOIS  UNDER  CHEAT  BRITAIN,  33 

known  as  Fort  Sackvi)J<      r 

his  superior  and  wanted  him  to  come  to  Kaskaskia  and 
assume  command  as  Captain  I>ord's  successor.**  Abbott 
seems  to  have  been  welcomed  by  the  French  inhabitant*  of 
Vincennes,  But  the  neighboring  tribes  had  been  tampered 
with  by  rebel  emissaries,  and  his  efforts  to  secure  their 

ffW  nd'  hij>     ••'.-'     no!    v  ry        -  <       ,:     .  '  '       .:  :<     „;          .-  ;.:,  «     tO 

make  the  necessary  presents,  and,  to  save  expense,  returned 
to  Detroit  in  February,  1778.'**  On  his  departure  he  left 
Legras,  a  French  creole,  in  command  of  the  Vincennes 
militia,1*1 

While  Rocheblave  was  fearing  a  rebel  attack  on  Illinois, 
British  Indian  agents  in  the  south  were  expecting  similar 
attacks  on  Pensacola  and  along  the  southern  Mississippi,1** 
When  he  learned  of  the  expedition  of  Captain  James  Will 
ing,  who  had  been  sent  in  the  spring  of  1778  to  attack  the 
British  posts  in  that  quarter,  he  feared  a  comprehensive 
plan  of  the  enemy  to  sweep  the  British  power  from  the  Mis 
sissippi  valley,  A  rumor  reached  him  in  March  that  a  party 
of  rebels  was  building  a  fort  on  the  lower  Ohio,  "This 
being  true/'  he  wrote,  "we  are  on  the  eve  of  great  events 
in  this  country,"1** 

"  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  ///,,  391, 
*  Bottcrfield,  <?A  «*.,  50, 


Btttterfield,  <//>,  «'*,,  50, 

Rr/§  §  to  Stuart,  New  Odcam,  5  Mar^  1778,  Bancroft  MSS, 
Early  Chic,  and  III,  409, 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE    WESTWARD   EXPANSION    OF   VIRGINIA   AND   GENESIS   OF 
THE    EXPEDITION    OF    1778. 

The  western  claims  of  Virginia,  based  on  her  old  charter 
of  1609,  have  been  referred  to.  This  charter,  it  is  true,  was 
revoked  in  1624  when  Virginia  became  a  royal  province, 
and  all  ungranted  and  unsettled  lands  in  royal  provinces 
were  subject  to  any  disposition  which  the  crown  might  see 
fit  to  make.1  Extensive  areas,  carved  out  of  the  territory 
included  within  the  boundaries  of  the  grant  of  1609,  had 
been  regranted,  and  removed  from  the  jurisdiction  of 
Virginia.  This  was  the  case  with  the  provinces  of  Mary 
land,  Carolina  and  Pennsylvania.  But  the  Old  Dominion, 
though  proud  of  its  connection  with  the  crown,  cherished 
with  tenacity  the  claims  which  were  supposed  to  be  derived 
from  the  charter,  and  regarded  all  territory  included  in  the 
old  grant,  except  those  parts  which  had  been  specifically 
regranted,  as  rightfully  within  its  jurisdiction.  It  was  on 
this  hypothesis  that  Virginia  maintained  her  claims  to  the 
West  before  and  during  the  Revolution.2 

In  1720,  the  General  Assembly  took  the  first  step,  in  the 
sphere  of  legislative  action,  in  what  may  be  called  the  move 
ment  of  westward  expansion.  As  already  explained,  the 
presence  of  the  French  on  the  Great  Lakes  and  on  the  Mis 
sissippi  aroused  interest  in  the  country  beyond  the  moun 
tains.  In  that  year,  partly  as  a  measure  of  defense  against 
the  French,  Spotsylvania  and  Brunswick  counties  were 
established,  including  passes  over  the  mountains  within 
their  boundaries.3  In  1734,  a  division  of  Spotsylvania  was 
made  by  the  assembly  to  take  effect  the  next  year.  The 

1  Osgood,  The  American  Colonies  in  the  Seventeenth  Century,  III, 
91-92. 

2  Secret  Journals  of  the  Acts  and  Proceedings  of  Congress,  III, 
169;    Herring,  Statutes  at  Large,  X,  527. 

3  Herring,  op.  cit.,  IV,  77. 


WESTWARD    EXPANSION    OF   VIRGINIA.  35 

western  part  was  formed  into  Orange  County,  which  was 
bounded  on  the  west  by  "the  utmost  limits  of  Virginia."4 
As  early  as  1738  settlers  from  Virginia  had  crossed  the 
Blue  Ridge.  This  expansion  of  settlements  was  viewed  with 
favor  by  the  Virginia  authorities  as  tending  to  safeguard 
the  frontier.  In  that  year  all  of  Orange  extending  north, 
west  and  south,  beyond  the  Blue  Ridge  "to  the  utmost 
limits  of  Virginia,"  was  separated  from  the  rest  and  erected 
into  two  counties.  The  northern  was  named  Frederick, 
the  southern  Augusta.  Each  was  to  remain  part  of  Orange 
till  it  contained  a  sufficient  number  of  inhabitants  to  warrant 
the  appointment  of  justices  of  the  peace  and  the  creation 
of  county  courts.5  As  has  been  shown,  the  proclamation 
of  1763  temporarily  forbade  settlements  beyond  the  Alle- 
ghanies.  But  in  1770,  by  the  Treaty  of  Lochabor,  the  line 
of  permitted  settlements  was  extended  to  the  Kanawha. 
Beyond  this  river,  however,  the  British  government  refused 
to  permit  the  frontiers  to  be  advanced.6  Nevertheless  in 
1769  the  Virginia  Assembly  divided  Augusta  into  two 
counties,  the  northern  to  retain  the  name  of  Augusta,  while 
the  southern  was  called  Botetourt  County,7  and  settlements 
"on  the  waters  of  the  Mississippi"  were  mentioned  as 
lying  in  Botetourt.  These,  the  assembly  declared,  would 
probably  soon  be  formed  into  a  separate  county.8  Dunmore 
himself  favored  the  extension  of  settlements  beyond  the 
Lochabor  line,  but  his  conduct  in  the  matter  called  forth 
a  reprimand  from  the  home  government.9  In  1772,  Fred 
erick  was  divided  into  three  counties,  known  as  Frederick, 
Berkeley  and  Dunmore,10  while  Botetourt  was  curtailed  by 
the  formation  of  its  western  part  into  the  county  of 
Fincastle.11 

4  Ibid.,  450. 

5  Ibid.,  V,  78-79- 

6  Colls.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  4th  series,  X,  727. 

7  Hening,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  395-396. 
6  Ibid.,  398. 

9  Colls.  Mass.  Hist.  Soc.,  4th  series,  X,  726-727. 

10  Hening,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  597-598. 

11  Ibid.,  600. 

4 


36  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

In  the  policy  of  restricting1  western  settlement.  Great 
Britain  was  aided  by  the  presence  in  the  country  beyond 
the  mountains  of  formidable  Indian  tribes.  To  the  colonists 
these  furnished  a  more  potent  argument  against  westward 
expansion  than  nullified  edicts  and  unenforcible  boundary 
lines.  Between  the  Tennessee  river  and  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
were  the  so-called  Appalachian  confederacies.  Of  these, 
the  two  most  powerful  and  most  exposed  to  the  white 
advance  were  the  Cherokees,  dwelling  in  what  is  now  east 
ern  Tennessee,  northeastern  Alabama  and  northwestern 
Georgia,  and  the  Creeks,  their  southern  neighbors.  North 
west  of  the  Ohio  dwelt  the  Algonquin  tribes,  less  civilized 
but  more  warlike  than  the  Cherokees.  They  were  generally 
hostile  to  the  southern  Indians,  and  the  uninhabited  land 
between  the  Ohio  and  the  Tennessee  wras  in  dispute  between 
the  two.  Before  the  colonists  could  cross  the  mountains 
and  settle  in  numbers,  the  Indian  claims  had  to  be 
extinguished. 

The  Treaty  of  Fort  Stanwix  was  an  important  event 
in  the  westward  expansion  of  Virginia.  Into  the  country 
to  which  the  Six  Nations  ceded  their  claims,  Virginia 
pioneers  found  their  way.  The  first  cabin  on  the  Watauga 
is  said  to  have  been  built  in  1/69.  The  first  attempt  to 
colonize  Kentucky  was  made  by  Daniel  Boone  in  17/3, 12 
and  the  following  year  a  settlement  was  made  at  Harrods- 
burg.  The  Kentucky  country  was  at  this  time  included  in 
Fincastle  County.  Before  its  settlement  could  progress, 
however,  the  inevitable  conflict  between  the  frontiersmen 
and  the  Indian  tribes  had  to  be  fought  out.  In  1772,  Hills- 
borough  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  extension  of  settle 
ments  beyond  the  line  of  1763  would  probably  cause  a 
general  Indian  war,  since  the  right  of  the  Six  Nations  to 
cede  territory  south  of  the  Ohio  was  denied  by  other 
tribes.  ™ 

As  early  as  1768  persons  from  the  different  colonies, 
many  apparently  of  dubious  character,  had  made  settlements 

12  Ranck,  "Boonesborough,"  Filson  Club  Publications,  Xo.  16,  146. 
"O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  577. 


WESTWARD    EXPANSION    OF    VIRGINIA.  37 

on  Redstone  creek,  an  affluent  of  the  Monongahela,  which 
were,  of  course,  in  violation  of  the  proclamation  of  I763.14 
From  Fort  Pitt  as  a  center  backwoodsmen  began  restlessly 
pushing  down  the  Ohio.  Acquiring  no  attachment  to 
localities,  they  imagined  that  distant  lands  were  better  than 
those  which  they  had  reached.  "The  established  authority 
of  any  government  in  America,  and  the  policy  of  Govern 
ment  at  home,"  wrote  Dunmore,  "are  both  insufficient  to 
restrain  the  Americans."15  Removed  from  the  restrictions 
of  civilization,  the  frontiersmen  could  not  be  brought  to 
entertain  a  belief  in  the  sanctity  of  treaties  made  with  the 
savages,  whom  they  considered  "as  but  little  removed  from 
the  brute  creation."16  The  enmity  of  the  Indians,  which  had 
not  completely  subsided  since  Pontiac's  War,  was  revived.17 
The  Shawnees  were  especially  dissatisfied  with  the  Treaty 
of  Fort  Stanwix,  and  asserted  claims  to  lands  above  the 
Kanawha  south  of  the  Ohio.18  Conditions  along  the  west 
ern  border  were  critical ;  it  behooved  the  Virginia  author 
ities  to  assume  a  tactful  attitude. 

Fort  Pitt,  as  already  explained,  had  been  evacuated  in 
1772,  but  was  reestablished  in  1774.  Connolly,  Dunmore's 
agent  in  the  West,  was  denounced  by  the  home  government 
for  his  supposed  unauthorized  activities  there.19  It  was 
learned  with  alarm  that  Virginians  were  injuring  the 
Indians  and  arousing  their  resentment.20  Affairs  at  Fort 
Pitt,  indeed,  were  in  dire  confusion.  Pennsylvania,  claim 
ing  that  it  lay  within  her  limits,21  attempted  to  extend  her 
authority  over  it  by  the  creation  of  Westmoreland  County. 
The  authority  of  Virginia,  also,  was  extended  over  it  in 
I774.22  Both  claims  were,  of  course,  based  on  charters. 

"Archives  of  Md.,  XIV,  468. 

15Thwaites  and  Kellogg,  Doc.  Hist,  of  Dunmore 's  War,  371. 

16  Ibid. 

"Ibid.,  373- 

18  O'Callaghan,  op.  cit.,  II,  577. 

19  Force,  Am.  Archives,  4th  series,  I,  774. 
"Ibid. 

21  Ibid.,  260. 

22  Ibid.,  271. 


38  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

Connolly  was  arrested  by  the  Pennsylvania  authorities,23 
but  the  latter  were  unpopular  with  the  settlers,  and  in  May, 
1774,  between  five  and  six  hundred  of  them  petitioned 
Virginia  to  take  them  under  its  protection.24  Though  the 
country  was  finally  awarded  to  Pennsylvania,  the  home 
government  was  at  this  time  inclined  to  favor  Virginia's 
claim-5  and  it  was  some  years  before  the  dispute  was 
settled. 

In  the  spring  of  1774,  rumors  of  a  general  Indian  war 
were  rife  all  along  the  frontiers.  The  panic  became  general 
when  Connolly  issued  a  circular  asserting  that  a  state  of 
war  existed  and  calling  the  borderers  to  arms.20  On  the 
last  day  of  April  occurred  the  murder  of  the  family  of 
the  famous  Mingo  chief,  Logan;  and  on  June  10,  Governor 
Dunmore  issued  a  circular  letter,  calling  on  the  county- 
lieutenants  in  the  western  counties  to  mobilize  the  militia.27 
In  the  same  month  he  started  for  Fort  Pitt  to  make  an 
armed  demonstration  among  the  hostile  tribes,  for  by  this 
time  the  Shawnees  of  the  Scioto  valley  had  taken  up  the 
hatchet.28  He  wrote  to  Colonel  Andrew  Lewis,  com- 
mander-in-chief  of  the  southwestern  militia,  to  meet  him 
at  the  mouth  of  the  Great  Kanawha,  or  at  Wheeling,  with 
as  many  men  as  possible.20  Early  in  October,  Lewis  arrived 
at  Point  Pleasant,  near  the  mouth  of  the  Great  Kanawha, 
where,  on  October  10,  the  decisive  battle  of  the  war  was 
fought.  On  both  sides  the  losses  were  heavy,  but  the 
Shawnees,  who  had  crossed  the  Ohio  to  attack  Lewis,  were 
forced  to  retire.30  This  battle  was  won  by  the  western 
militia,  not  by  British  troops,  and  it  was  later  believed,  or 
at  least  stated,  by  members  of  the  revolutionary  party  in 
Virginia,  that  Dunmore  had  not  been  pleased  at  the  fron- 

23  Force,  Am.  Archives,  4th  series,  I,  275. 

24  Ibid.,  275-276. 

25  Ibid.,  252  ct  seq. 

28Thwaites  and  Kellogg,  Doc.  Hist,  of  Dunmore' s  War,  xiii. 
"  Ibid.,  33-35- 

28  /&«</.,  383-385. 

29  Ibid.,  97-98. 

30  For  descriptions  of  the  battle  by  participants  see  ibid.,  253  ct  scq. 


WESTWARD    EXPANSION    OF   VIRGINIA.  39 

tiersmen's  victory.31  The  Shawnees  gave  hostages,  and 
agreed  to  regard  the  Ohio  as  their  southern  boundary.  A 
greater  idea  of  colonial  prowess  was  impressed  upon  their 
minds,  and  the  victory  had  the  important  effect  of  keeping 
the  northwestern  tribes  quiet  during  the  early  years  of  the 
Revolution  and  making  possible  the  settlement  of  Kentucky. 
That  it  "extinguished  the  rancor"  felt  by  the  frontiersmen 
towards  the  Indians,  as  Dunmore  hoped,32  there  is  little 
reason  to  believe. 

The  Six  Nations  and  the  Shawnees  having  thus  aban 
doned  all  claims  to  territory  south  of  the  Ohio,  the  way 
was  paved  for  the  enterprise  associated  with  the  name  of 
Richard  Henderson  of  North  Carolina.  In  March,  1775, 
the  Transylvania  Company,  of  which  he  was  the  leading 
member,  negotiated  a  treaty  with  the  Cherokees,  by  which 
the  latter  ceded  their  claims  to  an  extensive  tract  between 
the  Tennessee  and  the  Ohio,  comprising  a  large  part  of  the 
present  state  of  Kentucky.33  The  name  Transylvania  was 
given  to  this  purchase,  and  Henderson's  desire  was  to  erect  a 
proprietary  colony,  with  a  legislature  representing  the  inhabi 
tants.34  The  Transylvania  "House  of  Delegates"  actually 
met  in  May,  1775,  at  the  new  settlement  of  Boonesborough, 
and  its  journal  has  been  preserved.35  Land  was  sold  by 
the  company.36  Transylvania,  however,  did  not  enjoy  a 
long  existence.  Before  Henderson's  treaty  with  the  Chero 
kees,  the  proposed  purchase  had  been  denounced  as  illegal 
by  the  governors  of  Virginia  and  North  Carolina.37  The 
company  petitioned  the  Continental  Congress  to  add  the 
colony  of  Transylvania  to  the  thirteen  original  colonies,  and 
a  delegate  was  actually  sent  to  Philadelphia,38  but  Congress 

31  Bland  Papers,  I,  42. 

32Thwaites  and  Kellogg,  Doc.  Hist,  of  Dunmore' s  War,  386. 

33  The  deed  made  by  the  Cherokees  is  in  Ranck,  op.  cit.,  151-156. 
For  the  Transylvania  enterprise,  see  Alden,  op.  cit.,  49  et  seq. 

34  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  I,  307. 

35  Ranck,  op.  cit.,  196-212. 

36  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  I,  282. 

37  Ranck,  op.  cit.,  147-150,  181-182. 

38  Colls.  Conn.  Hist.  Soc.,  II,  318,  note. 


40  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

could  not  grant  such  a  request  without  exceeding-  its 
powers  and  angering  Virginia,  which  claimed  most  of  the 
territory  in  question.  The  petition  was  accordingly  refused. 
The  Virginia  Assembly  later  declared  Henderson's  purchase 
null  and  void,™  though  it  was  held  to  be  valid  as  against 
Indian  claims.  The  company,  ho\vever,  had  performed  some 
real  service  in  employing  Boone  to  open  up  a  route,  the 
famous  Wilderness  Road,  to  the  banks  of  the  Kentucky. 
This  long  remained  one  of  the  most  important  lines  of 
communication  between  the  country  east  and  wrest  of  the 
mountains.  And  in  helping  to  extinguish  Indian  claims  to 
Kentucky,  they  facilitated  the  western  movement.  Most 
of  the  Transylvania  purchase  was  soon  organized  in  the 
new  county  of  Kentucky. 

Among  the  Virginia  pioneers  in  the  Ohio  valley  was  a 
youth  about  to  play  an  important  role  in  the  annals  of 
the  West.  George  Rogers  Clark  was  born  on  November 
19,  1752,  near  Monticello,  in  Albemarle  County,  Virginia.40 
He  had  a  taste  for  mathematics,  and  his  fondness  for  sur 
veying  exercised  an  important  influence  over  his  career ; 
for  it  opened  to  him  a  calling  in  great  demand  at  a  time 
when  settlement  was  rapidly  expanding,  and  one  calculated 
to  bring  him  closely  in  touch  with  the  westward  march  of 
civilization.  He  did  not  attend  William  and  Mary,  and 
from  the  standpoint  of  the  tide-water  planter  he  was  a  man 
of  little  cultivation.  Indeed,  the  comparative  culture  of  the 
older  settlements  had  little  attraction  for  him.  He  was  by 
nature  a  pioneer  and  a  pathfinder.  His  first  journey  west 
occurred  in  1772,  when  he  remained  for  several  weeks  as 
a  member  of  an  exploring  party  in  the  upper  Ohio  valley.41 
Much  of  his  time  during  the  next  few  years  was  spent  in 
this  region,  where  he  devoted  himself  to  surveying,  hunting, 
fishing,  and  locating  for  himself  a  tract  of  land  near  the 
modern  city  of  Wheeling.  By  1773  pioneers  were  settling 
as  far  down  the  Ohio  as  the  mouth  of  the  Scioto.42  Clark 

::"  Ranck,  «/>.  cit..  253. 

411  For  Clark's  early  life  see  English,  t>/>.  cit.,  I,  ch.  2. 

41  Ibid.,  60  ct  sc<j. 

^  Ibid.,  63. 


WESTWARD    EXPANSION    OF   VIRGINIA.  41 

became  an  expert  with  ax  and  rifle,  and  his  craft  as  a  woods 
man  was  nearly  equal  to  that  of  the  Indian.  Though  he 
frequently  visited  the  East,  his  real  home  was  the  wilder 
ness,  and  his  career  became  yoked  with  that  of  the  new 
country.  He  was  involved  in  some  of  the  disturbances 
which  led  to  Dunmore's  War;  and  he  joined  the  force  led 
by  the  governor  in  person,  in  which  he  held  a  position  of 
some  importance. 

In  1775,  after  the  war,  Clark  went  to  Kentucky,  in  the 
forefront  of  the  tide  of  western  migration.  He  was  much 
impressed  with  the  beauty  of  the  blue-grass  country,  then 
virtually  an  unbroken  wilderness,  and  with  the  fertility  of 
the  soil  in  the  valley  of  the  Kentucky  river,  and  predicted 
a  rapid  growth  of  settlement.  Becoming  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  the  whole  region,  he  determined  to  make  it 
his  home,  and  returned  east  in  the  autumn  of  1775  to  settle 
up  his  affairs  there.  In  Virginia  he  found  the  Transylvania 
enterprise  viewed  askance,  and  also  heard  doubts  expressed 
whether  Virginia  could  properly  claim  Kentucky.  He  was 
opposed  to  the  company,  and  believed  that  their  purchase 
from  the  Cherokees  was  worthless  since,  in  his  opinion,  the 
latter  had  possessed  no  valid  claim  to  the  country.  The 
company  had  opened  a  land  office  at  Boonesborough,  and 
were  beginning  to  raise  the  price  of  land,  which  caused 
dissatisfaction  among  the  settlers.4V 

Clark  returned  to  Kentucky  in  the  spring  of  1776.  That 
he  played  as  important  a  part  in  frontier  politics  as  his 
memoir,  written  by  him  years  later,  would  lead  one  to 
infer,44  may  reasonably  be  doubted ;  for  Clark,  in  this  docu 
ment,  was  anxious  to  emphasize  his  own  share  in  the  events 
described.  The  majority  of  the  Kentucky  settlers,  in  the 
conflict  which  had  begun  between  England  and  the  colonies, 
were  strongly  on  the  patriot  side.45  If  the  settlements  were 
to  survive,  immediate  measures  for  their  defense  were 

43  Clark's  Memoir,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  457. 

44  See   Butterfield,   op.   cit.,  546-557,   for  the  reliability  of   Clark's 
Memoir. 

45  See  Petition   of  the  Committee  of   West  Fincastle,   Butterfield, 
op.  cit.,  29. 


42  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

imperative.  A  meeting  of  the  Kentucky  pioneers  was  held 
at  the  settlement  of  Harrodsburg  in  June,  1776.  Delegates 
were  chosen  to  petition  the  Virginia  Assembly  to  take  the 
Kentucky  settlements  under  their  protection.  Clark,  though 
he  says  that  he  "appointed"  it,  did  not  take  an  active  part 
in  the  meeting.  He  tells  us  that  he  desired  the  appointment 
of  "deputies"  to  treat  with  Virginia,  and,  if  favorable 
terms  were  not  secured,  the  establishment  of  "an  indepen 
dent  government."46  If  this  was  really  his  desire,  he  made 
no  serious  effort  to  have  his  plan  adopted.47  He  and  John 
Gabriel  Jones  were  selected  as  delegates  to  the  Virginia 
Assembly,  and  soon  started  east  for  Williamsburg,  where 
that  body  was  in  session. 

They  arrived  in  the  East  only  to  learn  that  the 
assembly  had  adjourned.  Clark  remained  to  interview  the 
governor,  Patrick  Henry.  Jones  returned  west  to  the 
Watauga  and  Holston  settlements,  to  take  part  in  an  Indian 
war  which  was  just  beginning. 

The  growth  of  these  settlements  angered  and  alarmed 
the  Cherokees,  who  replied  by  ravaging  the  American  fron 
tier,  even  invading  Georgia  and  South  Carolina.  They 
were  driven  back,  however,  and  their  attacks  on  the 
Watauga  and  Holston  were  defeated  by  forces  under  James 
Robertson  and  John  Sevier.  The  Cherokees  ceded  most 
of  their  claims  between  the  Cumberland  and  the  Tennessee : 
and  Kentucky  was  thus  secured  from  Indian  attacks  from 
the  south.  This  war  of  1776,  like  that  of  1774,  stimulated 
the  western  movement. 

Governor  Henry  lay  sick  at  Hanover,  and  thither  Clark 
repaired  with  his  credentials. 4S  He  asked  for  a  supply  of 
gunpowder,  the  article  most  immediately  needed  in  Ken 
tucky.  The  governor,  realizing  the  importance  of  defending 
the  Kentucky  settlements,  wrote  to  the  executive  council 
on  the  subject.  The  council  hesitated  to  grant  Clark's 
request,  which  would  have  been  exceeding  their  powers. 

46  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  458. 

47  Ibid. 

**  Clark's  Memoir,  ibid.,  461-462. 


WESTWARD    EXPANSION    OF   VIRGINIA.  43 

Clark  informed  them  that  the  situation  in  Kentucky  was 
critical  in  view  of  probable  Indian  attacks,  and  that  the 
settlements  might  be  destroyed  for  want  of  the  powder. 
Further  hesitation  on  their  part  led  to  his  blunt  state 
ment  that  a  country  which  was  worth  claiming  was 
worth  protecting.  The  council  finally  yielded,  and  ordered 
five  hundredweight  of  powder  to  be  sent  to  Fort  Pitt, 
delivered  to  the  officer  commanding  there,  and  by  him 
delivered  to  Clark  or  his  order  for  the  defense  of 
Kentucky.49 

The  revolutionary  government  of  Virginia  had  now 
acknowledged  its  responsibility  for  the  defense  of  Ken 
tucky.  In  spite  of  opposition  from  various  sources,  that 
territory,  with  its  present  boundaries,  was  erected  into  a 
county  of  Virginia  in  October,  I776.50  Henceforth  it  was 
entitled  to  representation  in  the  Virginia  Assembly,  the  laws 
of  Virginia  were  extended  to  it,  and  it  was  included  in  the 
military  and  judicial  systems  of  the  state.  A  county  court 
was  commissioned  by  the  governor  of  Virginia  to  take 
charge  of  internal  administration.  For  the  work  of  defense, 
Colonel  John  Bowman  was  commissioned  county-lieuten 
ant.51  Clark  was  commissioned  major  of  the  Kentucky 
militia  and  had  it  enrolled  by  March  5,  I777.52  He  was 
thus  closely  identified  with  the  founding  of  Kentucky. 

So  far  as  the  Revolution  on  the  western  frontier  was  con 
cerned,  the  conflict  was  between  the  American  pioneers  and 
the  Indian  tribes  in  alliance  with  the  British  government. 
Stuart,  British  agent  among  the  Indians  of  the  Southern 
District,  with  headquarters  at  Pensacola,  was  actively  and 

40  For  the  order  of  the  council  see  Henry,  Patrick  Henry,  Life, 
Correspondence  and  Speeches,  I,  472.  For  Clark's  relations  with  the 
council  see  his  Memoir,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  462. 

60  At  the  same  time  the  rest  of  Fincastle  was  formed  into  the 
counties  of  Washington  and  Montgomery,  and  the  name  Fincastle,  as 
applied  to  a  county,  became  extinct.  Hening,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  600,  note. 

51  For  the  county  organization  of  Kentucky,  see  Roosevelt, 
Winning  of  the  West,  I,  322. 

62  Clark's  Diary,  English,  op.  cit..,  I,  579. 


44  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

successfully  negotiating1  with  the  southern  tribes, 5:!  with 
whom  American  agents  also  had  endeavored  to  treat.54 
But  the  leader  in  the  work  of  arousing  and  instigating  the 
western  Indians  against  the  rebel  frontiers  was  Lieutenant- 
Governor  Hamilton  at  Detroit.  The  task  imposed  upon  him 
was  to  keep  the  northwestern  tribes  firm  in  their  attachment 
to  England.  But  his  zeal  carried  him  further  than  this, 
and  he  suggested  the  employment  of  the  tribes  to  harass 
the  American  frontiers.  The  British  government  author 
ized  such  use  of  the  Indians  against  the  frontiers  of  Vir 
ginia  and  Pennsylvania  in  March,  1777  ;r'5  and  Stuart  was 
instructed  to  instigate  the  Creeks  to  attack  the  frontiers  of 
Georgia  and  the  Carolinas.5H  The  British  government  thus 
hoped  to  destroy  all  the  American  settlements  west  of  the 
mountains.  The  belief  that  this  policy  of  employing 
savages  was  favored  by  only  a  few  of  the  most  truculent 
of  the  British  officers  and  officials  is  an  error.  Even  so 
humane  an  officer  as  General  Howe  favored  it.57 

Early  in  September,  1777,  Hamilton  had  more  than  eleven 
hundred  warriors  dispersed  over  the  frontiers,  seven  hun 
dred  of  whom  received  ammunition  from  Detroit. r>s  About 
this  time  the  management  of  the  war  upon  the  northwestern 
frontier  was  taken  out  of  the  hands  of  Carle-ton,  then  gov 
ernor  of  Quebec,  and  intrusted  directly  to  Hamilton,  in 
whom  the  British  government  reposed  great  confidence.59 

•'""'Germain  to  Stuart,  7  Feb.,  1777,  Bancroft  MSS. 

M  Stuart  to  Knox,  10  March,  1777,  ibid. 

'MMich.  P.  Colls.,  IX.  346-348- 

•"'"Germain  to  Stuart,  2  Apr.,   1777,  Bancroft  MSS. 

'"'  Howe  to  Stuart,  13  Jan.,  1777.  Bancroft  MSS.  He  says,  ".  .  . 
the  general  revolt  of  the  colonies  justifies  every  measure  that  can 
be  used  to  annoy  and  humble  them,  and,  though  I  point  out  circum 
stances  under  which  I  more  particularly  think  the  Indians  should 
be  brought  to  act,  you  must  not  infer  from  thence  that  I  would  have 
them  restrained  on  any  occasion  when  the  propriety  of  such  measures 
shall  appear  to  His  Majesty's  Governor  and  yourself."  Governor 
Tryon  also  favored  this  policy.  See  Tryon  to  Germain,  Q  Apr.,  1777, 
Kancroft  MSS. 

5S  Butterfield,  <>/>.  cit.,  ^6. 

KtMich.  f\  Colls.,  IX,  351. 


WESTWARD    EXPANSION    OF    VIRGINIA.  45 

In  June,  1777,  he  read  a  proclamation  to  the  savages  assem 
bled  at  Detroit,  setting  them  against  the  rebel  frontiers. 
The  first  fruit  of  his  activity  was  an  Indian  attack  in 
September,  1777,  upon  Fort  Henry  at  Wheeling,  which 
greatly  alarmed  the  whole  frontier  and  threatened  the 
annihilation  of  American  settlements  in  the  West.60 

The  nature  of  the  revolting  business  upon  which  Ham 
ilton  was  engaged  is  revealed  by  unimpeachable  evidence, 
two  letters  of  his,  one  to  Carleton,  and  the  other  to  Carle- 
ton's  successor,  General  Haldimand.  In  the  first  of  these 
Hamilton  reported  that  the  Indians  had  "brought  in  73 
prisoners  alive,  20  of  which  they  presented  to  me,  and  129 
scalps."  In  the  second  he  stated  that  from  May  to  Sep 
tember,  1778,  "the  Indians  in  the  district  have  taken  34 
prisoners,  17  of  which  they  delivered  up,  and  81  scalps."81 
Among  all  the  British  officers  in  the  Revolution  none  was 
so  universally  execrated  by  the  frontiersmen  as  Hamilton, 
nicknamed  the  "Hair-Buyer,"  because  he  was  supposed 
to  reward  his  Indian  myrmidons  according  to  the  number 
of  scalps  they  brought  in.62 

Early  in  the  course  of  the  Revolution,  Congress,  as 
already  stated,  was  impressed  with  the  desirability  of  send 
ing  an  expedition  against  Detroit,63  and  realized  that  only 
by  destroying  British  influence  over  the  northwestern  tribes 
could  the  frontiers  enjoy  peace.64  In  November,  1777, 
Congress  seriously  considered  such  an  enterprise.65  The 
Indians  of  the  upper  Ohio,  who  had  remained  quiet  since 
the  Treaty  of  Fort  Pitt  in  1775,  were  becoming  restless. 
The  Americans  could  not  furnish  the  articles  necessary  for 

60  Butterfield,  Washington-Irvine  Correspondence,  13. 

n  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  IX,  476  et  seq.  The  installment  of  Haldimand 
Papers  printed  in  this  volume  give  a  clear  idea  of  how  Hamilton 
managed  the  Indians. 

62  For  the  general  and  correct  belief  in  Hamilton's  responsibility 
for  Indian  outrages  along  the  frontiers,  see  Journals  Cont.  Cong., 
Ford's  ed.,  IX,  942-944;  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  I,  321-324. 

"3  Journals  Cont.  Cong.,  Ford's  ed.,  IV,  373. 

"Ibid.,  IX,  942-944. 

03  Ibid. 


46  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

trade,  and  consequently  the  majority  of  the  tribes  would  not 
fight  the  British,  but  waited  to  see  which  party  would  gain 
the  upper  hand.66  General  Hand,  the  Continental  officer 
placed  in  command  at  Fort  Pitt  in  1777,  was  instructed  to 
mobilize  a  militia  force  and  attack  those  tribes  that  were 
hostile  to  the  United  States  ;  but  a  conflict  of  Congressional 
and  state  action  arose  and  nothing  was  effected.67  The 
possibility  and  desirability  of  an  American  expedition  into 
the  Northwest  were  thus  generally  understood  early  in  the 
Revolution. 

The  year  1777  was  critical  in  the  history  of  the  infant 
Kentucky  settlements.  The  fury  of  the  Indian  attacks  was 
such  that  the  less  resolute  abandoned  the  country  and 
crossed  the  mountains  to  the  east.  The  few  that  remained 
held  out  bravely  in  the  blockhouse  forts  at  Harrodsburg, 
Boonesborough,  and  a  few  smaller  stations.  Their  work, 
incessant  and  intense,  consisted  in  defense,  procuring  provi 
sions,  caring  for  the  wounded  and  burying  the  dead.  Clark, 
who  remained  in  Kentucky  through  the  terrible  autumn  of 
1777,  considered  the  possibility  of  saving  the  country  by  a 
counter  attack  on  the  British  posts  in  the  Northwest.  While 
in  eastern  Virginia  in  1776,  he  may  have  learned  of  the 
intercepted  letter  written  by  Connolly  to  Lord,68  and  this 
may  have  first  suggested  to  him  an  expedition  into  the 
Northwest.  It  is  just  possible,  too,  that  on  his  journey 
west  in  1776  he  had  talked  with  Morgan,  since  he  is  known 
to  have  gone  by  way  of  Fort  Pitt.69  It  is  not  likely,  how 
ever,  for  if  he  had,  he  would  almost  certainly  have  known 
later  much  more  about  conditions  in  Illinois.  But  he  did 
know  as  well  as  Congress  that  the  motive  power  directing 
and  impelling  the  Indian  raids  on  Kentucky  was  British 
influence,  and  that  it  was  from  Detroit,  Michilimackinac, 

ocHand  to  Yeates,  Fort  Pitt,  12  July,  1777.  Emmet  MSS.,  N.  V. 
Public  Library. 

CT  Henry,  op.  cit.,  I,  569  ct  scq. 

w  See  Butterfield,  History  of  George  Rogers  Clark's  Conquest,  58. 

89  Clark's  Memoir,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  463.  For  the  view  that  he 
had  talked  with  Morgan,  sec  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  58. 


WESTWARD    EXPANSION    OF   VIRGINIA.  47 

Niagara  and  Kaskaskia  that  England's  forest  allies  were 
directed.  And  he  knew  that  the  salvation  of  Kentucky 
depended  upon  checking  the  Indian  raids. 

He  had  apparently  begun  to  think  seriously  of  an  attack 
on  the  British  posts  in  the  spring  of  1777,  for  in  the  early 
summer  of  that  year  he  sent  two  members  of  the  Kentucky 
militia  as  spies  to  the  Illinois  villages,  without  disclosing 
his  motives.  These  men  went  to  Kaskaskia  and  returned 
with  valuable  information.70  They  told  Clark  that  the 
militia,  consisting  mainly  of  French  Creoles,  officered  by 
Englishmen,  were  trained  and  in  good  order;  that* pains 
were  taken  to  inflame  the  inhabitants  against  the  "rebels," 
but  that  traces  of  goodwill  towards  the  latter  were  to  be 
discerned,  and  that  there  was  no  expectation  of  an  American 
invasion.71  Clark,  encouraged  by  their  report,  continued 
speculating  on  the  possibility  of  attacking  the  Illinois 
villages. 

It  has  been  asserted  that  he  had  got  no  further,  while  in 
Kentucky  in  1777,  than  to  think  an  expedition  against 
Illinois  would  be  possible;  that  when  he  went  east,  as  he 
did  in  the  autumn  of  that  year,  he  had  no  developed  plans 
in  that  direction,  and  that  it  was  not  till  he  had  been  east 
some  time  that  he  decided  to  encourage  such  an  expedi 
tion.72  There  is  extant,  however,  a  letter  of  his,  written 
probably  to  Governor  Henry  not  later  than  the  autumn 
of  1777,  which  seems  to  place  the  conception  of  the 
definite  plan  to  conquer  Illinois  in  the  period  before 
he  went  east  in  October.73  In  this  letter  he  wrote, 
"According  to  promise  I  haste  to  give  you  a  descrip 
tion  of  the  town  of  Kuskuskies  [Kaskaskia],  and  my 
plan  for  taking  it The  town  of  Kuskuskies  con- 

70  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  60  and  his  authorities. 

71  The  spies  were  misinformed  in  regard  to  this  last  fact  (see  above, 
ch.  II,  30  et  seq.),  and  they  probably  failed  to  get  into  communication 
with  the  pro-American  party  in  Illinois. 

72  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  69,  71,  73. 

"October  is  the  date  given  in  Clark's  Memoir,  and  seems  more 
probable  than  that  given  in  his  Letter  to  Mason.  See  Butterfield, 
op.  cit.,  69. 


48  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

tains  about  one  hundred  families  of  French  and  English. 
....  On  the  commencement  of  the  present  war  the  troops 

were  called  off  to  reen force  Detroit In  June  last  I 

sent  two  young  men  there.     The  principal  inhabitants  are 

entirely  against  the  American  cause If  it   [Kaskas- 

kia]  was  in  our  possession  it  would  distress  the  garrison 
at  Detroit  for  provisions,  it  would  fling  the  command  of 
the  two  great  rivers  into  our  hands,  which  would  enable 

us    to   get    supplies   of   goods    from   the    Spaniards 

I  have  always  thought  the  town  of  Kuskuskies  to  be  a  place 
worthy  of  our  attention,  and  have  been  at  some  pains  to 
make  myself  acquainted  with  its  force,  situation  and 

strength Was  I  to  undertake  an  expedition  of  this 

sort  and  had  authority  from  Government  to  raise  my  own 
men  ....  I  should  make  no  doubt  of  being  in  [posses 
sion]  by  April  next I  am  sensible  that  the  case 

stands  thus — that  [we  must]  either  take  the  town  of  Kus 
kuskies,  or  in  less  than  a  twelve-month  send  an  army  against 
the  Indians  on  Wabash,  which  will  cost  ten  times  as  much, 
and  not  be  of  half  the  service."74 

Clark  had  several  reasons  for  going  east  in  the  autumn 
of  1777.  There  were  some  accounts  of  the  Kentucky 
militia  to  settle,  some  private  business  to  attend  to,  and  the 
expedition  to  the  Northwest  to  discuss.75  He  reached  Wil- 
liamsburg  early  in  November.  After  settling  the  militia 
accounts  and  visiting  his  father's  home,  he  developed  his 
plans  to  a  few  leading  men  in  the  capital.  These  gentle 
men  approached  the  governor,  but  it  was  not  till  December 

"Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  VTTT,  491-494. 

7r>  For  an  extended  discussion  of  Clark's  motives  for  going  east  see 
Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  546-557.  T  cannot  accept  Buttcrfield's  opinion 
that  Clark,  when  he  went  cast,  had  no  serious  thoughts  of  leading  an 
expedition  to  Illinois,  and  that  his  desire  to  do  so  was  partially 
caused  by  the  alarming  nature  of  the  situation  he  found  in  the  East. 
Butterfield  bases  his  opinion  upon  Clark's  Letter  to  Mason  (English, 
op.  cit.,  T,  411-412).  This  account,  however,  should  be  modified  by 
the  conflicting  one  which  Clark  gives  in  his  Memoir  (ibid.,  468).  Tn 
reality,  the  state  of  affairs  in  the  East,  in  the  autumn  of  1/77,  was 
better,  not  worse,  than  Clark  had  supposed,  for  Burgoync's  surrender 
had  just  taken  place. 


WESTWARD    EXPANSION    OF   VIRGINIA.  49 

10  that  Clark  had  his  first  interview  with  Henry.  The 
governor  was  impressed  with  the  possibilities  of  the  plan.76 
He  appreciated,  however,  the  danger  of  dispatching  a  force 
to  so  great  a  distance  and  he  understood  the  necessity  of 
absolute  secrecy.  It  would  be  unsafe  to  have  the  project 
discussed  in  the  assembly,  for  in  that. case  it  would  soon 
be  talked  of  on  the  frontiers,  and  prisoners  taken  by  the 
Indians  would  be  sure  to  divulge  it  to  the  British.77  An 
act  passed  in  the  autumn  of  1777  gave  the  governor  power, 
with  the  advice  of  the  council,  to  order  out  the  militia  in 
an  expedition  against  the  western  enemies.78  Henry  asked 
the  advice  of  a  few  prominent  men  who  were  members 
of  the  assembly  but  not  in  the  council,  George  Mason, 
George  Wythe  and  Thomas  Jefferson.  This  informal  com 
mittee  deliberated  over  Clark's  proposals  and  studied  his 
plans  of  operation.  Particular  stress  was  laid  upon  the  pos 
sibility  of  a  retreat  from  Illinois  in  case  of  disaster  to  the 
Spanish  settlements  across  the  Mississippi79  where,  it  was 
believed,  Americans  would  be  well  received.80  The  informal 
committee  decided  in  favor  of  the  expedition,  and  on  Jan 
uary  2,  1778,  the  plan  was  communicated  to  the  council. 
They  advised  Henry  to  authorize  the  expedition  as  quickly 
and  secretly  as  possible,  to  issue  his  warrant  on  the  state 
treasurer  for  £1,200  payable  to  Clark,  and  to  prepare 
instructions  for  him.81 

These  instructions  were  delivered  to  Clark  on  the  same 
day.  There  were  two  sets,  one  public,  and  the  other 
private.82  By  the  former  he  was  authorized  to  enlist  with- 

76  English,  op.  tit.,  I,  468. 

77  Ibid. 

78  Henry,  op.  cit.,  I,  583-584.     For  text  of  this  act,  see  Hening, 
op.  cit.,  IX,  374-375- 

79  Clark's  Memoir,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  468. 

80  The   correspondence   between   Henry   and   Governor    Galvez   of 
New  Orleans  shows  that  the  two  were  on  friendly  terms.     Tran 
scripts  of  these  letters  are  in  the  Bancroft  MSS. 

81  Henry,  op.  cit.,  I,  585. 

82  Both  are  printed  in  the  appendix  to  Clark's  Sketch  of  His  Cam 
paign  in  the  Illinois,  Cincinnati,  1869. 


50  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

out  loss  of  time  seven  companies,  to  be  recruited  from  any 
of  the  counties  of  Virginia.  They  were  to  proceed  to 
Kentucky  and  obey  his  orders  for  the  period  of  three 
months.  If  they  remained  on  duty  longer,  they  were  to 
receive  compensation.  These  instructions  conveyed  the 
impression  that  the  recruits  were  for  the  defense  of  Ken 
tucky  only.  The  private  instructions  were  longer.  In 
these  Clark  was  authorized  to  apply  to  the  commanding 
officer  at  Fort  Pitt  for  transportation  down  the  Ohio,  and 
to  attack  Kaskaskia,  but  he  was  to  keep  his  real  destina 
tion  secret.  "Its  success  depends  upon  this."  Kaskaskia 
was  claimed  as  within  the  lawful  boundaries  of  Virginia. 8* 
Clark  was  to  show  humanity  to  British  subjects,  and,  if 
possible,  to  conciliate  them.  His  troops  were  to  receive  the 
pay  of  Virginia  militia.  The  establishment  of  a  post  near 
the  mouth  of  the  Ohio  was  stated  as  in  contemplation.  In 
a  letter  writter  by  the  governor  to  Clark  a  few  days  later, 
the  latter  was  authorized  to  extend  his  operations  from 
Kaskaskia  to  the  enemy's  settlements  "above  or  across,  as 
you  may  find  it  proper/'  The  reference  was  probably  to 
Detroit  and  Vincennes.  He  was  also  advised  to  consult 
with  Colonel  David  Rogers,  who  was  on  his  way  to  New 
Orleans  with  a  letter  from  Henry  to  Galvez,  and  who  had 
an  extensive  knowledge  of  conditions  in  the  West.84  The 
government  of  Virginia  was  thus  committed  to  the  support 
of  Clark's  plan. 

On  January  3,  a  letter  was  written  to  him  by  the 
informal  committee,  and  signed  by  Wythe,  Mason  and 
Jefferson.  In  this  the  conquest  of  territory  was  clearly  in 
view.  English  and  Indian  aggressions  were  to  be  punished 
"by  carrying  the  war  into  their  own  country."  Clark  was 
congratulated  upon  his  appointment,  and  rewards  were 
virtually  promised,  in  case  of  success,  to  officers  and  men.85 

83  The  reference  is  to  Virginia's  charter  claims. 
H  Am.  Hist  Rev.,  VIII,  494-    A  transcript  of  the  letter  from  Henry 
to  Galvez  is  in  the  Bancroft  MSS. 

86  A  facsimile  of  this  letter  is  given  in  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  102-103. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

THE   OVERTHROW   OF   BRITISH    POWER   IN   ILLINOIS. 

Clark,  with  the  rank  of  lieutenant-colonel,  immediately 
left  Williamsburg  and  hastened  to  the  frontier.1  Clothed 
with  large  discretionary  power,  in  possession  of  £1,200  in 
depreciated  Virginia  paper  currency,  a  request  for  powder 
and  lead  addressed  to  General  Hand,  and  an  authorization 
to  draw  for  extra  funds  on  Oliver  Pollock  at  New  Orleans, 
he  set  about  the  work  of  recruiting.2  Before  the  end  of 
January  he  had  recruiting  parties  along  the  frontier  from 
Fort  Pitt  to  North  Carolina.3  He  advanced  £150  to  Major 
William  B.  Smith  to  recruit  on  the  Holston  in  the  expecta 
tion  that  Smith  would  join  him  in  Kentucky.4  Captain 
Leonard  Helm  of  Fauquier  County,  and  Captain  Joseph 
Bowman  of  Frederick  County,  were  each  to  raise  a  company 
and  meet  Clark  at  Redstone  on  the  Monongahela,  where  he 
arrived  early  in  February.5 

Clark  and  his  recruiting  officers  experienced  many  diffi 
culties.  As  already  explained,  the  country  about  Fort  Pitt 
was  in  excitement  over  the  rival  claims  to  jurisdiction  of 
Virginia  and  Pennsylvania,  and  there  was  much  opposition 
in  that  vicinity  to  the  recruiting  of  troops  who  were  to  be 
used,  judging  from  Clark's  public  instructions,  for  the 
defense  of  a  Virginia  county.  Helm  reported  that  in  his 
county  there  was  opposition,  "as  no  such  service  was  known 

1  Probably  on  Jan.  4,   1778,  as  he  says  in  his  Memoir,  English, 
op.  tit.,  I,  469,  not  Jan.  18,  as  he  says  in  the  Letter  to  Mason.     See 
Butterfield,  op.  tit.,  86. 

2  Butterfield,    op.    tit.,    85-86.      The    statement    in    the    Memoir 
(English,  op.  tit.,  I,  468),  that  he  had  an  "order"  on  Hand  is  incor 
rect,  for  Governor  Henry  could  not  issue  orders  to  a  Continental 
officer. 

8  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  tit.,  I,  413. 

4  Clark's  Memoir,  ibid.,  469. 

5  Ibid. 


52  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

by  the  Assembly."6  While  at  Redstone,  Clark  had  word 
from  Smith  that  he  would  join  him  at  the  Falls  of  the  Ohio 
with  200  men.  By  the  middle  of  April  he  thought  that 
six  companies  had  been  recruited,  in  addition  to  those  of 
Helm  and  Bowman,  which  had  joined  him  at  Redstone,  and 
that  he  would  have  his  "full  quota."7  On  May  12,  he  left 
Redstone  with  about  150  men,  divided  into  three  companies, 
and  "set  sail"  for  the  Falls  of  the  Ohio,  General  Hand 
having  furnished  him  with  all  necessities.8  At  Fort  Ran 
dolph,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Great  Kanawha,  he  was  joined 
by  a  few  Virginians  under  Captain  James  O'Hara.9  He 
next  touched  at  the  mouth  of  the  Kentucky,  where  dis 
appointing  news  awaited  him.  Smith  had  experienced 
great  difficulties  from  desertion,  and  from  a  Continental 
draft  which  interfered  with  his  recruiting,  and  only  a  very 
few  of  the  men  he  had  promised  had  arrived  in  Kentucky.10 
Clark  feared  this  would  prove  fatal  to  his  plans.  He 
immediately  wrote  to  County-Lieutenant  John  Bowman 
at  Harrodsburg,  asking  him  to  join  the  expedition  at  the 
Falls  with  all  the  men  he  could  spare.11  Towards  the  close 
of  May,  Clark  encamped  his  little  force  on  Corn  Island  in 
the  Ohio,  opposite  the  modern  city  of  Louisville,  where  the 
channel  of  the  river  was  interrupted  by  falls.  His  object 
in  choosing  this  island  for  a  camp  was  better  to  control  his 
troops  and  check  desertion.12  Here  he  was  joined  by  a  few 
men  whom  Bowman  could  spare  from  Kentucky,  under 
Captain  Montgomery,13  and  by  a  few  of  Smith's  men  from 
Holston  under  Captain  Dillard.14  He  now  made  known 
his  real  destination.  In  spite  of  precautions,  one  lieutenant 

c  Memoir,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  469,  Letter  to  Mason,  ibid.,  413. 

7  Clark  to  Hand,  Redstone,  17  Apr.,  1778.    Emmet  MSS. 

8  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  413. 

9  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  96. 

10 Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  VIII,  496;    Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit., 
I,  414,  and  Memoir,  ibid.,  471. 
11  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  98. 
^'Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  414. 
13  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  III,  441. 
"Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  414. 


OVERTHROW    OF    BRITISH    POWER    IN    ILLINOIS.  53 

and  a  few  men  of  Dillard's  company  made  good  their 
escape;15  but  the  sentiment  of  the  majority  was  revealed 
by  burning  the  lieutenant  in  effigy.16  A  number  of  families, 
who  had  followed  Clark  for  the  sake  of  protection,  were 
found  useful  in  guarding  a  blockhouse  which  he  erected 
on  the  island.17 

While  here  Clark  acquired  a  piece  of  information  most 
valuable  to  him  in  the  coming  campaign.  He  received  a 
letter  from  Fort  Pitt  announcing  the  treaties  which  had 
recently  been  concluded  between  France  and  the  United 
States.18  The  advantages  which  the  French  treaty  would 
give  him  in  dealing  with  the  French  of  Illinois  are 
obvious.19 

On  June  24,  Clark's  little  army  left  Corn  Island,  shooting 
the  Falls  at  a  moment  when  the  sun  was  in  nearly  total 
eclipse,  an  incident  "which  caused  various  conjectures 
among  the  superstitious."20  His  whole  force  was  about  180, 
including  officers.21  The  men  were  divided  into  four  com 
panies,  commanded  by  Captains  John  Montgomery,  Joseph 
Bowman,  Leonard  Helm  and  William  Harrod.22  This 
number  fell  far  short  of  the  "seven  companies"  which 
Governor  Henry  had  authorized  him  to  raise. 

Speed  and  secrecy  alone,  Clark  believed,  could  make  up 
for  his  numerical  weakness.  Accordingly,  he  rowed  down 
the  Ohio  as  quickly  as  possible  till  he  reached  an  island  in 
the  mouth  of  the  Tennessee.  Here  he  landed  on  June  28 

"Ibid. 

™  Memoir,  ibid.,  473. 

17  The  presence  of  these  families  can  scarcely  be  said  to  have  given 
Clark's   expedition  a  migratory  character,  as   stated  by  Roosevelt, 
Winning  of  the  West,  II,  39. 

18  Memoir,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  474;    Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  VIII,  497. 

18  Professor  Alvord  (Colls.  Ill  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xlv)  calls  the 
French  treaty  Clark's  "trump  card." 

20  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  159-160,  473. 

31  Bowman  to  Brinker,  July  30,  1778,  says,  "about  175";  English, 
op.  cit.,  I,  558.  Governor  Henry  says,  "one  hundred  and  seventy 
or  eighty,"  ibid.,  245.  See  also,  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  582. 

22  Clark's  Memoir,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  473. 


54  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

to  prepare  for  an  overland  march  to  Kaskaskia.23  The 
water  route  down  the  Ohio  to  its  mouth  and  up  the  Mis 
sissippi  would  have  been  easier.  But  it  could  not  have 
been  followed  with  secrecy,  for  the  Mississippi  was 
patrolled.  Clark  understood  the  importance  of  delivering 
his  attack  from  an  unexpected  quarter,  and  decided  to  fol 
low  the  Ohio  only  as  far  as  the  site  of  old  Fort  Massac, 
near  the  mouth  of  the  Tennessee,  thence  to  march  overland 
in  a  northwesterly  direction  and  enter  Kaskaskia  by  the 
back  door.  While  in  the  mouth  of  the  Tennessee,  his  men 
seized  a  boatload  of  strangers.  They  turned  out  to  be 
hunters,  who  had  recently  been  at  Kaskaskia,  and  they 
seemed  to  favor  the  American  cause.  Their  intelligence 
was  not  specially  favorable  to  Clark,  but  they  took 
an  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States  and  joined 
the  expedition.24  In  the  evening  of  the  twenty-eighth 
Clark  ran  his  boats  into  a  creek  near  Fort  Massac,  and  the 
next  morning  started  on  the  trail  for  Kaskaskia,  one  hun 
dred  and  twenty  miles  distant.25  He  had  no  wagons,  pack- 
horses,  or  artillery.  John  Fiske's  account  of  the  early  part 
of  this  campaign  is  singularly  inaccurate.  "Clark,"  he  says, 
"had  a  hard  winter's  work  in  enlisting  men,  but  at  length 
in  May,  1778,  having  collected  a  flotilla  of  boats  and  a  few 
pieces  of  light  artillery,  he  started  from  Pittsburg  with 
1 80  picked  riflemen,  and  rowed  swiftly  down  the  Ohio 
river  a  thousand  miles  to  its  junction  with  the  Missis 
sippi."20  He  had  no  artillery,  did  not  start  from  Pittsburg 
with  1 80  men,  and  did  not  row  down  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Ohio. 

For  about  fifty  miles  the  march  was  difficult  and  fatigu 
ing.  Clark's  men  then  reached  the  open,  level  prairies, 
where  his  greatest  fear  was  the  likelihood  of  detection, 

13  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  105. 

24  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  415. 

25  For  Clark's  route  to  Kaskaskia  see  Hulbert,   "Military  Roads  of 
the  Mississippi  Basin,"   Historic  Highways  of  America,  VIII,  18,  25 
et  sec].    Also  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  591-594. 

MFiske,  American  Revolution,  II,  105. 


OVERTHROW   OF    BRITISH    POWER    IN    ILLINOIS.  55 

which  would  have  spoiled  his  plans.27  The  march,  however, 
was  uneventful,  save  that  once  the  guide  lost  his  way. 
Towards  the  end,  food  gave  out,  but  the  spirit  of  the  men 
remained  excellent.28  On  the  evening  of  July  4,  after  a 
six  days'  march,  they  reached  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Kas- 
kaskia  river,  opposite  the  village.  Taking  possession  of 
a  farmhouse,  they  found  plenty  of  boats,  and  in  two  hours 
were  all  transported  across  the  river.29  Clark  learned  that 
there  had  been  some  suspicion  in  Kaskaskia  of  an  Ameri 
can  attack,  but  that  the  people,  having  made  no  discoveries, 
had  "got  off  their  guard."30 

The  story  of  how  he  surprised  the  gay  Creoles  at  a  dance 
is  mythical.  Clark  himself  thus  baldly  describes  the  taking 
of  Kaskaskia:  "I  immediately  divided  my  little  army  into 
two  divisions.  Ordered  one  to  surround  the  town.  With 
the  other  I  broke  into  the  fort  ....  secured  the  governor, 
Mr.  Rocheblave ;  in  fifteen  minutes  had  every  street 
secured  ;  sent  runners  through  the  town  ordering  the  people, 
on  pain  of  death,  to  keep  close  to  their  houses,  which  they 
observed,  and  before  daylight  had  the  whole  town  dis 
armed."31  One  of  his  captains  describes  the  capture 
as  follows :  "About  midnight  we  marched  into  the  town 
without  ever  being  discovered.  We  pitched  for  the  fort 
and  took  possession.  The  commanding  officer  we  caught 
in  bed,  and  immediately  confined  him."32  The  fort  men 
tioned  was  Fort  Gage,  the  residence  of  Rocheblave.  It  was 
now  renamed  Fort  Clark.33  With  Rocheblave  were  captured 
the  instructions  and  papers  which  he  had  received  from 
Detroit  and  Quebec.34 

"Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  415. 
29  Bowman  to  Brinker,  ibid.,  559. 

29  Letter  to  Mason,  ibid.,  416.    Professor  Alvord  suggests   (Colls. 
III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xlii,  note)  that  these  boats  may  have  been  placed 
here  by  members  of  the  pro-American  party  in  Kaskaskia,  in  expec 
tation  of  an  American  attack. 

30  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  416. 

31  Ibid. 

32  Bowman  to  Brinker,  ibid.,  559. 

33  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  138. 

34  English,    op.    cit.,    I,    559,    564;     Alvord,    The    Old    Kaskaskia 
Records,  43. 


56  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

Clark  describes  in  vivid  but  probably  exaggerated  lan 
guage  the  abject  terror  of  the  Kaskaskians.35  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  an  American  attack  was  not,  as  we  have  seen, 
unexpected.  Persons  friendly  to  the  Americans  supplied 
Clark's  hungry  troops  with  food,  and  urged  the  French  to 
submit.36  He  himself  was  not  long  in  learning  of  a  pro- 
American  sentiment  in  the  town.37 

The  policy  adopted  by  Clark  in  treating  with  the  towns 
men  shows  that  he  was  gifted  with  true  diplomatic  insight. 
He  summoned  the  leading  citizens  to  a  conference,  told 
them  he  was  sorry  they  had  entertained  so  bad  an  opinion 
of  Americans,  and  explained,  after  a  fashion,  the  nature 
of  the  dispute  between  England  and  the  United  States. 
It  was  the  American  principle,  he  said,  to  make  men  free, 
not  slaves,  and  if  they  would  espouse  the  American  cause, 
they  should  at  once  enjoy  all  the  privileges  of  American 
government ;  but  this  favor  was  made  to  appear  as  a 
privilege  extended  to  a  people  who,  by  the  fate  of  war, 
were  at  his  mercy.38  Equally  tactful  was  his  treatment  of 
the  most  influential  inhabitants.  Cerre,  the  leading  mer 
chant  of  Kaskaskia,  who  had  been  strongly  opposed  to  the 
American  cause,  happened  to  be  in  Spanish  Illinois  on  busi 
ness.  In  spite  of  accusations  made  by  his  enemies,  Clark 
gave  him  a  hearing.  Cerre  took  an  oath  of  allegiance  and, 
says  Clark,  "became  a  most  valuable  man  to  us."  :1°  Father 
Gibault  became  a  zealous  "Clark  man"  when  informed  that 
the  church  would  be  protected,  and  that  under  the  laws  of 
Virginia  all  religions  enjoyed  equal  privileges.40  The  atti 
tude  taken  by  Clark,  and  the  information  he  gave  of  the 
French  treaty,  brought  the  town  completely  to  his  feet.41 

55  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  416-417 ;  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist. 
Lib.,  II,  xliv. 

36  See,  e.  g.,  Col.    Fa.   St.   Papers,  II,  675,   and   Clark's  Memoir, 
English,  op.  cit.,  I,  478. 

37  Ibid.,  477- 

38  Letter  to  Mason,  ibid.,  417. 

"Clark's  Memoir,  ibid.,  484-487;  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  VIII,  498-500. 
For  a  sketch  of  Cerre,  see  Trans.  III.  St.  Hist.  Soc.,  1903,  275  ct  seq. 

40  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  418. 

41  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  536,  and  Letter  to  Mason.  English, 
op.  cit.,  I,  417. 


OVERTHROW    OF    BRITISH    POWER    IN    ILLINOIS.  57 

It  may  well  be  that  hopes  of  a  speedy  restoration  to  France, 
the  only  government  for  which  the  Illinois  Creoles  felt  any 
real  attachment,  partially  explain  the  tameness  of  the  sur 
render  of  Kaskaskia.42  With  a  few  exceptions,  Clark 
allowed  any  who  chose  to  leave  the  country. 

On  July  5,  Bowman,  with  a  detachment  of  thirty  mounted 
men,  and  accompanied  by  a  number  of  Kaskaskians,  was 
sent  to  take  possession  of  the  northern  towns  of  Prairie  du 
Rocher  and  St.  Philippe.43  They  surrendered  immediately, 
and  without  resistance.44  Within  ten  days  about  three  hun 
dred  of  the  inhabitants  of  these  northern  towns  took  an 
oath  of  fidelity,  and  appeared  to  be  attached  to  the 
American  cause.45 

Clark  now  turned  his  attention  to  the  reduction  of  Vin- 
cennes.  In  the  case  of  this  town,  a  repetition  of  the  attack 
on  Kaskaskia  was  not  possible,  for  the  inhabitants  were 
aware  of  his  proximity  and  could  not  be  surprised.46 
Gibault's  friendship  was  now  found  to  be  of  the  utmost 
service.  His  spiritual  jurisdiction  extended  over  Vincennes, 
and  he  offered  to  win  the  town  for  Clark  by  peaceful  means. 
Though  he  had  nothing  to  do  with  temporal  business,  he 
said,  he  would  give  the  people  such  hints  in  the  spiritual 
way  as  would  be  "very  conducive  to  the  business."47  The 
priest,  in  company  with  Dr.  Laffont,  the  principal  of  the 
Jesuit  school  at  Kaskaskia,  and  a  few  others,  soon  started  for 
Vincennes,  taking  with  him  a  proclamation  from  Clark  to  the 
people.48  His  "hints"  were  effective.  No  resistance  was 
made  to  the  transfer  of  allegiance  from  England  to  the 

42  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  536. 

43  This  party  was  mounted  on  Illinois  horses ;    Clark  had  brought 
none  with  him. 

44  Bowman  to  Brinker,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  559;    Bowman  to  Kite, 
ibid.,  564-565 ;   Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  536. 

45  Bowman  to  Brinker,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  560;    Bowman  to  Kite, 
ibid.,  565. 

46  Letter  to  Mason,  ibid.,  419. 

47  Ibid.    For  Gibault's  services  to  Clark  see  Am.  St.  Papers,  "Public 
Lands,"  I,  21. 

48  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  419,  and  Trans.  Ill  St.  Hist. 
Soc.f  1907,  271  et  seq.     See  also  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  XIV,  544  et  seq. 


58  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

United  States,  and  in  a  few  days  an  oath  of  fidelity  was  taken 
by  the  people.49  They  had  even  less  reason  than  the  Kaskas- 
kians  to  feel  attachment  to  Great  Britain,50  and  their 
acquiescence  in  a  change  of  masters  is  neither  difficult  to 
understand  nor  discreditable.  Legras,  who  had  been  left 
by  Abbott  in  command  of  the  Vincennes  militia,  seems  to 
have  done  nothing  to  stem  the  tide  of  pro-American  senti 
ment,  and  was  later  accused  of  treason  by  Hamilton.51  The 
post  of  Ouiatanon  soon  followed  the  example  of  Vincennes, 
and  came  under  American  control.52  Clark  placed  Captain 
Helm  in  charge  at  Vincennes  as  commandant  and  super 
intendent  of  Indian  affairs.53 

In  attempting  to  explain  Clark's  success  in  this  expedition 
against  Illinois,  account  must  be  taken  of  the  secrecy  and 
speed  of  his  movements,  his  spirit  of  dauntless  perseverance 
in  the  face  of  disappointment,  the  absence  of  British  troops 
in  the  country  and  the  attitude  of  the  inhabitants.  The 
element  of  secrecy  is  especially  emphasized  by  Clark  him 
self,54  and  by  Captain  Montgomery.55  A  few  companies  of 
British  regulars  could  probably  have  held  the  country 
against  any  force  which  the  Americans  could  have  sent. 
This,  at  least,  was  the  opinion  of  General  Haldimand,  Carle- 
ton's  successor  as  governor  of  Quebec.56  But  the  attitude 
of  the  inhabitants,  it  seems  to  me,  was  the  decisive  factor 
in  the  collapse  of  British  rule  in  Illinois.  Rocheblave 
attributed  the  failure  of  the  people  to  defend  themselves  to 
Spanish  intrigues,  and  to  the  treachery  of  the  English- 
speaking  merchants.57  What  Clark  could  have  done,  had 
military  resistance  been  encountered,  cannot  be  known,  for 
there  was  none ;  and  consequently  there  was  no  occasion  for 

49  Trans.  III.  St.  Hist.  Soc.,  1907,  270  ct  scq. 

60  Supra,  ch.  IT. 

01  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  175. 

52  Ibid.,  194. 

™  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  420. 

"Ibid.,  415- 

^Cal.  Va,  St.  Papers,  III,  441. 

M  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III.,  369. 

67  Ibid.,4iS. 


OVERTHROW   OF    BRITISH    POWER    IN    ILLINOIS.  59 

the  display  of  great  military  ability.  In  other  words,  the 
explanation  of  his  success  in  1778  is  to  be  sought  for  in  con 
ditions  in  the  country  before  his  arrival.  The  British 
regime  fell  mainly  from  internal  causes. 

Within  a  few  weeks  Clark  was  in  possession  of  the 
territory  along  the  Mississippi  from  Kaskaskia  to  Cahokia, 
and  on  the  Wabash  from  Vincennes  to  Ouiatanon.  But 
he  had  not  men  enough  to  hold  it  securely.  The  time  of 
his  three  months'  recruits  had  expired  and  most  of  them 
were  anxious  to  return.  It  was  only  with  great  difficulty, 
and  by  usurping  authority,  that  he  induced  about  one  hun 
dred  to  reenlist  for  eight  months.58  To  preserve  appear 
ances  and  create  an  impression  of  greater  strength,  he  gave 
out  that  he  could  at  any  moment  secure  reinforcements 
from  the  Falls  of  the  Ohio.  The  several  companies  were 
soon  filled  by  the  enlistment  of  Creole  volunteers,  who  were 
anxious  to  serve  under  him.59  The  men  who  insisted  on 
returning  were  sent  east  under  Captain  Montgomery,  who 
conveyed  Rocheblave  as  a  prisoner,  and  letters  from  Clark 
to  the  governor  of  Virginia  informing  him  of  the  situation 
in  Illinois  and  the  necessity  of  more  troops.60  Garrisons 
were  placed  in  Fort  Clark  at  Kaskaskia,  in  Fort  Bowman 
at  Cahokia,  and  in  Fort  Sackville  at  Vincennes.61 

The  establishment  of  friendly  relations  with  the  neigh 
boring  tribes  was  a  task  which  immediately  confronted 
Clark.  We  have  seen  that  it  was  primarily  Indian  attacks  on 
Kentucky  that  had  occasioned  his  expedition.62  The  counter 
action  of  British  influence  among  the  northwestern  tribes 
was,  then,  an  essential  part  of  his  programme.'  His  unex 
pected  appearance,  and  the  position  taken  by  the  people  of 
Illinois,  greatly  perplexed  and  alarmed  the  savages,  most 
of  whom  had  been  hostile  to  the  Americans.  The  French 
traders,  who  possessed  great  influence  over  the  Indians, 

58  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  419. 
*/&#.,  420. 

60  Ibid.;    Clark's  Memoir,  ibid.,  489;    Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  III,  441. 
"Clark's  Memoir,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  489;   Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  138. 
62  Governor  Henry  to  Virginia's  Delegates  in  Congress,  14  Nov., 
1778,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  245. 


60  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

advised  them  to  make  their  peace  with  Clark.  By  the  middle 
of  August  they  were  flocking-  to  Cahokia,  some,  Clark  says, 
from  a  distance  of  five  hundred  miles,  to  smoke  the  pipe 
of  peace  with  the  "Big-  Knives,"  as  they  called  the  Virginia 
frontiersmen.63  Clark  did  not  believe  in  the  methods  com 
monly  employed  by  English  colonists  in  dealing  with  Indians. 
Abundant  use  of  presents  and  over-conciliatory  speeches 
savored,  in  his  opinion,  of  weakness.  He  seems,  indeed, 
always  to  have  held  these  views.64  He  determined,  accord 
ingly,  to  employ  "harsh  language" ;  in  other  words,  bluff 
and  braggadocio.  During  a  five-weeks'  residence  at 
Cahokia  he  concluded  treaties  with  ten  or  twelve  tribes.65 
At  the  same  time  Captain  Helm  at  Vincennes  was  making 
treaties  with  several  of  the  Wabash  tribes. 

Hamilton  realized  the  importance  of  maintaining  British 
influence  over  the  Wabash  Indians,  and  thought  they  should 
be  utilized  as  a  barrier  against  rebel  inroads  towards 
Detroit.66  As  soon,  therefore,  as  he  learned  of  Clark's 
success  in  Illinois,  he  sent  an  agent  named  De  Celoron,  to 
hold  these  tribes  firm  in  their  alliance  with  Great  Britain.67 
De  Celoron  arrived  at  Ouiatanon  about  the  time  Helm 
reached  Vincennes.  The  latter,  with  a  detachment  of  Clark's 
men  from  Kaskaskia.  started  up  the  Wabash  to  capture  the 
British  agent,  who  fled  at  his  approach,  leaving  Helm  to 
negotiate  a  treaty  with  the  Indians  about  Ouiatanon,  which, 
however,  did  not  long  keep  them  on  the  American  side.68 
Hamilton  later  criticised  De  Celoron  sharply,  and  accused 
him  of  treason.69  Though  Clark  undoubtedly  exaggerated 
the  extent  of  American  influence  over  the  northwestern 

cr'  Letter  to  Mason,  ibid.,  420,  422. 

C4  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  III,  488. 

65  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  420-421,  426. 

"Mich.  P.  Colls..  IX,  459. 

"7  Ibid. 

08  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  427-428;   Butterfield,  op.  cit., 
193-194,  197,  243. 

09  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  I.  359,  and  Colls,  of  the  State  Hist.  Soc. 
of  Wisconsin,  XI,  181. 


OVERTHROW   OF    BRITISH    POWER    IN    ILLINOIS.  6 1 

tribes,  his  achievements  in  this  direction  were  considerable 
enough  to  worry  the  British  officials  at  the  lake  posts. 

He  devoted  some  attention  to  cultivating  friendly  rela 
tions  with  Francisco  de  Leyba,  the  Spanish  commandant 
of  Upper  Louisiana.  That  Leyba  was  as  glad  to  see  Clark 
in  possession  along  the  Mississippi  as  the  latter  implies,70 
seems  doubtful,  however,  in  view  of  later  events. 

70  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  426. 


CHAPTER  V. 

HAMILTON    AND    CLARK. 

Meanwhile  Hamilton  was  not  inactive.  He  was  in  many 
respects  an  able  and  energetic  soldier,  and  it  was  almost 
certain  that  he  would  attempt  to  drive  the  Americans 
out  of  Illinois.  He  learned  of  Clark's  invasion  in  August, 
1778,  and  immediately  informed  Carleton.1  Early  in  the 
same  month  the  disconsolate  Rocheblave  wrote  a  dolorous 
letter  to  Quebec,  stating  the  fact  of  his  capture  by 
"the  self-styled  colonel."2  In  September,  General  Haldi 
mand,  who  had  in  June  succeeded  Carleton  as  governor  of 
Quebec,3  wrote  to  Germain,  informing  the  British  govern 
ment  that  Illinois  had  been  "overrun"  by  parties  of 
rebels.4  Haldimand  thought  that  the  Indians,  if  properly 
directed  by  Hamilton,  might  be  able  to  clear  Illinois  of  the 
Americans,5  but  he  did  not  authorize  Hamilton  to  under 
take  a  regular  expedition  for  this  purpose.6  The  latter 
was,  however,  authorized  by  the  British  government  to 
employ  the  Wabash  Indians  to  dislodge  the  Americans,  but 
this  instruction  could  not  have  reached  him,  since  it  was 
not  written  till  after  he  had  started  from  Detroit  against 
Clark.7  But  Hamilton  was  eager  to  lead  such  an  expedition. 
In  the  spring  of  1778  he  had  been  meditating  an  attack  on 
Fort  Pitt,  which  had,  however,  been  disapproved  by  Haldi 
mand.8  He  now  began  to  plan  the  recovery  of  Illinois. 
But  it  was  not  a  mere  Indian  raid  which  he  had  in  mind. 

1  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  IX,  459. 

2  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III.,  418-419. 

3  Haldimand  to  Sir  Henry  Clinton,  received  I  Aug.,  1778,  Bancroft 
MSS. 

4  Haldimand  to  Germain,  u  Sept.,  1778,  ibid. 

5  Butterficld,  op.  cit.,  163. 

6  Ibid.,  163-164. 

7  For  proof   that  he  was   ordered   to   try  to   recover   Illinois   see 
Germain  to  Stuart,  2.  Dec.,  1778,  Bancroft  MSS. 

"Mich.  P.  Colls.,  IX,  398. 


HAMILTON    AND    CLARK.  63 

He  would  lead  the  expedition  in  person.9  He  hoped 
first  to  recover  Vincennes,  and  then  to  retake  all  the  other 
villages. 

He  wrote  Major  De  Peyster,  commandant  at  Michili- 
mackinac,  informing  him  of  his  plans,  and  asking  for  the 
cooperation  of  the  Indians  in  that  vicinity.10  De  Peyster 
had  already  sent  a  "belt"  to  the  Illinois  tribes  to  stir  them 
up  against  the  rebels,11  and  he  tried  to  convince  the  tribes 
over  whom  he  had  influence  that  commercial  considerations 
bound  them  to  Great  Britain.12  He  lent  Hamilton  his 
hearty  cooperation,  but  the  Indians  about  Michilimackinac 
were  at  that  season  so  greatly  dispersed  that  he  was  unable 
to  dispatch  a  formidable  party,13  and  his  efforts  to  reenforce 
the  lieutenant-governor  were  not  successful.14 

Hamilton's  work  of  preparation  was  effected  with  speed 
and  efficiency,15  and  on  October  7,  he  started  from  Detroit 
for  Vincennes  at  the  head  of  about  230  men,  regulars, 
irregulars,  militia  and  Indians.16  He  was  acting  on  his  own 
responsibility,  without  orders  from  Haldimand.17  The  route 
followed  by  Hamilton  was  down  the  Detroit  river  to  Lake 
Erie,  on  Lake  Erie  to  the  mouth  of  the  Maumee,  up  the 
Maumee  to  its  source,  over  a  portage  to  a  source  of  the 
Wabash,  the  "Petit  Rivierre,"  and  down  the  Wabash  to 
Vincennes.  The  details  of  the  journey  need  not  be 
described.18  It  was  about  600  miles  in  length,  and  consumed 
seventy-one  days.  During  its  progress  Hamilton  was  joined 
by  considerable  numbers  of  Indians.19  The  journey  down 

9  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  164. 
™Mich.  P.  Colls.,  IX.  476. 


12  Colls.  St.  Hist.  Soc.  Wis.,  XI,  117. 
"Ibid.,  119. 

14  Ibid.,  121-122,  124-125. 

15  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  170  et  seq. 

16  For  the  numbers  see  ibid.,  180,  648-652. 

17  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  XIX,  474;   Haldimand  to  Clinton,  26  May,  1779, 
Bancroft  MSS. 

18  The  longest  primary  source  for  this  expedition  is  a  letter  written 
by  Hamilton  in  1781.     See  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  IX,  489-516. 

19  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  I,  220,  and  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  206. 


64  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

the  Wabash  was  very  difficult  and  slow,  for  the  river  was 
low  and  full  of  floating  ice. 

On  December  15  a  party  of  scouts  captured  a  small 
detachment  sent  out  from  Vincennes  by  Helm  to  recon- 
noiter.20  From  these  men  Hamilton  learned  that  Helm 
depended  for  defense  almost  entirely  on  the  militia  of  Vin 
cennes,  who,  the  former  wrongly  imagined,  were  in  the  pay 
of  Congress.21  Helm  was  isolated.  Clark,  it  is  true,  had 
supposed  that  Hamilton  would  attempt  the  recovery  of 
Illinois,22  and  he  knew  as  early  as  September  that  the  latter 
was  trying  to  rouse  the  northern  tribes.23  But  when  his 
spies  reported  that  the  British  commander  was  marching 
south  by  the  Maumee,24  he  completely  mistook  his  object. 

In  May,  1778,  Congress,  ignorant  of  Clark's  expedition, 
voted  to  raise  three  thousand  men  for  western  service. 
General  Hand  was  succeeded  at  Fort  Pitt  by  General 
Mclntosh,  who  arrived  there  in  August.  Mclntosh  was 
instructed  to  lead  an  expedition  against  Detroit.25  After 
spending  some  time  in  attempting  to  conciliate  the  Indians 
whose  hunting-grounds  he  would  have  to  traverse,  he 
advanced  thirty  miles  down  the  Ohio,  where,  at  much  loss 
of  time,  he  erected  Fort  Mclntosh.  The  furthest  point 
reached  in  this  ''campaign"  was  the  headwaters  of  the 
Muskingum,  where  another  fort  was  built.  Leaving  150 
men  there,  Mclntosh  returned  in  December  to  Fort  Pitt, 
disbanded  his  militia  and  went  into  winter  quarters.26 
When  certain  information  reached  Clark  that  Hamilton  was 
on  the  march,  he  supposed  that  he  was  moving  against 
Mclntosh,  "little  thinking,"  he  says,  "that  Mr.  Hamilton 
had  the  same  design  on  me  that  I  supposed  he  had  at  Gen. 

•°  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  216. 

21  Hamilton  to  Stuart,  25  Dec.,  1778,  Bancroft  MSS. 
-"  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  428. 
23  Henry,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  194. 
"4  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  429. 

25  For  the  resolution  of  Congress  leading  to  this  expedition  see 
Journals  Cont.  Cong.,  Ford's  ed.,  XI,  588. 
20  Justin  Winsor,  Western  Movement,  125. 


HAMILTON    AND    CLARK.  65 

Mclntosh."27  Clark  cannot  justly  be  blamed  for  not  fore 
seeing  Mclntosh's  utter  failure.  The  latter's  inability  to 
menace  Detroit  gave  Hamilton  a  free  hand,  and  he  had 
actually  captured  Vincennes  before  Clark  received  accurate 
information  of  his  whereabouts. 

After  arriving  in  the  neighborhood  of  Vincennes,  Hamil 
ton  sent  out  parties  to  watch  the  lines  of  communication 
from  that  village  to  Kaskaskia  and  to  the  Falls  of  the  Ohio, 
and  sent  word  in  advance  to  the  inhabitants  that  no  mercy 
would  be  shown  them  unless  they  abandoned  the  American 
cause.  Helm's  militia  proved  useless,  and  resolved  to  make 
as  good  terms  as  possible  with  Hamilton.  Helm,  indeed, 
said  he  had  not  four  men  upon  whom  he  could  depend; 
"not  one  of  the  militia  will  take  arms,  though  before 
sight  of  the  enemy  no  braver  men."28  He  was  hopelessly 
outnumbered,  and  could  make  no  resistance  to  a  party  as 
large  as  that  which  was  approaching.  By  this  time  it  had 
been  increased  by  the  addition  of  Indians  to  about  five 
hundred  men.29  On  December  17,  Helm  surrendered  Fort 
Sackville.  In  the  town  Hamilton  encountered  no  resistance. 
The  inhabitants  laid  down  their  arms  to  the  number  of 
22O.30  On  December  19,  the  people  were  summoned  to  the 
church,  where  Hamilton,  after  reproaching  them  for  their 
past  treachery,  read  an  oath  of  allegiance,  which  was  signed 
by  more  than  150  in  a  few  days.31  Those  who  had  accepted 
American  commissions  gave  them  up,  and  all  who  took  the 
oath  received  back  their  arms.  Hamilton  hoped  that  lenity 
shown  to  the  people  of  Vincennes  would  have  a  good  effect 
on  those  of  Kaskaskia  and  the  other  villages.  For  his 
success  thus  far  he  alone  deserved  the  credit.  He  had  acted, 

27  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  429. 

28  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  I,  90-91;    English,  op.  cit.,  I,  233. 

29  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  225.     Clark  (Letter  to  Mason)  exaggerates 
the  number  in  placing  Hamilton's  force  at  800.     He  comes  nearer 
the  actual  figure  in  a  letter  to  the  governor  of  Virginia  (Cal.  Va.  St. 
Papers,  I,  315-316),  placing  it  at  600. 

30  Hamilton  to  Stuart,  25  Dec.,  1778,  Bancroft  MSS. 

31  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  228-229. 


66  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

as  has  been  said,  on  his  own  responsibility,  without  orders 
from  his  superior  at  Quebec.32 

He  at  once  put  the  fort,  which  he  found  "  a  miserable 
stockade,"  in  better  condition,  and  erected  blockhouses  and 
barracks.33  Parties  were  sent  out  in  every  direction  to  bar 
intercourse  between  the  Falls  of  the  Ohio  and  the  Illinois 
settlements,34  and  means  were  taken  to  intercept  boats  on 
the  Ohio.  He  deliberated  on  the  project  of  an  immediate 
advance  on  Kaskaskia.  But  it  was  the  dead  of  winter,  the 
route  to  be  traversed  (over  200  miles)  was  through  a 
country  subject  to  inundation,  and  it  was  necessary  to 
maintain  a  garrison  in  Fort  Sackville.  These  considerations 
induced  the  British  commander  to  winter  at  Vincennes  and 
postpone  the  attack  on  Kaskaskia  till  spring. 

He  knew  of  the  aid  extended  to  the  Americans  by 
the  Spaniards,  and  resolved,  if  possible,  to  put  a  stop 
to  it.  As  early  as  January,  1779,  he  suspected  that  war 
had  already  broken  out  between  Spain  and  England 
and  regretted  that  he  had  no  information  which  would 
justify  him  in  taking  the  offensive  against  the  Spaniards  in 
the  West,  "as  there  would  be  so  little  difficulty  in  pushing 
them  entirely  out  of  the  Mississippi."35  In  the  same  month 
he  wrote  to  Galvez,  briefly  describing  his  capture  of  Vin 
cennes.  "Your  Excellency,"  he  said,  "cannot  be  unac 
quainted  with  what  was  commonly  practised  in  the  time  of 
your  predecessor  in  the  government  of  New  Orleans,  I 
mean  the  sending  supplies  of  gunpowder  and  other  stores  to 
the  rebels  then  in  arms  against  their  sovereign.  Though 
this  may  have  been  transacted  in  a  manner  unknown  to  the 
Governor  by  the  merchants,  I  must  suppose  that  under  your 
Excellency's  orders,  such  commerce  will  be  positively  pro 
hibited I  think  it  incumbent  on  me  to  represent  to 

your  Excellency  that  the  rebels  at  Kaskaskia  being  in  daily 
apprehension  of  the  arrival  of  a  body  of  men  from  the 

38  ButteiTidd,  u/>.  cit.,  226. 

33  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  I,  390. 

"Hamilton  to  Stuart,  25  Dec.,  1778,  Bancroft  MSS. 

"Hamilton  to  Haldimand,  24-30  Jan.,  1779,  Bancroft  MSS. 


HAMILTON    AND    CLARK.  67 

upper  posts  accompanied  by  the  savages  from  that  quarter 
have  declared  that  they  will  take  refuge  on  the  Spanish 
territory  as  soon  as  they  are  apprised  of  their  coming.  As 
it  is  my  intention  early  in  the  spring  to  go  towards  the 
Illinois,  I  shall  represent  to  the  officers  commanding  several 
small  forts  and  posts  on  the  Mississippi  for  His  Catholic 
Majesty  the  impropriety  of  affording  an  asylum  to  rebels 
in  arms  against  their  lawful  sovereign.  If  after  such  a 
representation  the  rebels  should  find  shelter  in  any  fort  or 
post  on  the  Mississippi,  it  will  become  my  duty  to  dislodge 
them,  in  which  case  their  protectors  must  blame  their 
own  conduct,  if  they  should  suffer  any  inconvenience  in 
consequence."36 

But  Hamilton  was  meditating  something  more  momen 
tous  than  the  expulsion  of  the  rebels  from  Illinois.  He 
anticipated  for  the  coming  season  the  greatest  gathering  of 
Indians  that  had  ever  been  collected  on  the  American 
frontier.37  Stuart  was  to  incite  the  southern  tribes ;  Ham 
ilton,  who  expected  reinforcements  from  the  commander- 
in-chief,  would,  with  the  northern  Indians,  as  circumstances 
should  decide,  either  first  sweep  the  Americans  from 
Illinois,  or  immediately  attack  Kentucky.38  He  hoped  to 
capture  the  post  at  the  Falls  of  the  Ohio,  and  also  to  build 
a  fort  at  the  mouth  of  that  river.39  Concerted  Indian  action 
was  to  annihilate  the  American  settlements  west  of  the 
Alleghanies.  The  danger  to  the  American  cause  in  the  West 
was  never  greater  than  at  the  opening  of  1779.*°  The 
center  of  hostile  operations,  moreover,  had  come  nearer. 
It  was  now  at  Vincennes. 

By  February  22,  1779,  the  fort  at  Vincennes,  Hamilton 
says,  was  "in  a  tolerable  state  of  defense."  Scouting  parties 
were  kept  on  the  alert.  Most  of  his  Indians,  however,  were 

36  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  I,  377  et  seq. 

37  Hamilton  to  the  commandant  at  Natchez,  13  Jan.,  1779,  Bancroft 
MSS. 

38  Ibid.,  and  Hamilton  to  Stuart,  25  Dec.,  1778,  Bancroft  MSS. 

39  Colls.  St.  Hist.  Soc.  Wis.,  XI,  180,  and  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  IX,  477. 

40  Ibid.,  497,  and  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  259-260. 

6 


68  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

allowed  to  return  to  their  homes,  as  were  some  volunteers 
from  Detroit.  The  people  of  Vincennes  never  became 
attached  to  him,  and  were  ready  at  a  favorable  moment  to 
desert,  if  such  desertion  would  not  endanger  their  own 
safety.  Haldimand  later  expressed  astonishment  that  a 
competent  officer  would  remain  at  Vincennes  "when  he 
knew  the  impracticability  of  my  supplying  him  with  pro 
visions  or  assistance,  and  after  he  must  have  received  notice 
of  the  rebels  approaching-  toward  Detroit."41  Had  Hamil 
ton's  antagonist,  however,  been  a  man  of  ordinary  caliber, 
his  own  occupation  of  Vincennes  would  have  been  tolerably 
secure. 

As  late  as  Christmas,  1778,  Clark  was  completely  in  the 
dark  concerning  Hamilton's  whereabouts,  and  supposed 
that  Mclntosh  had  taken  Detroit.42  Shortly  after  this, 
however,  an  inhabitant  of  Cahokia  was  detected  in  a 
treasonable  correspondence  with  the  British  commander,  in 
which  the  failure  of  Mclntosh  and  Hamilton's  aggressive 
intentions  were  revealed,  "but  not  so  fully  expressed  .... 
as  to  reduce  it  to  a  certainty."43  Clark  was  still  misled  by 
the  supposition  that  the  enemy's  first  attack  would  be 
directed  against  Kaskaskia  rather  than  Vincennes.  In  this 
event  he  determined  to  recall  the  garrison  from  Cahokia 
and  concentrate  his  forces  at  Kaskaskia.  In  January  he 
started  for  the  northern  town  to  confer  with  the  people  and 
determine  lines  of  policy.  While  he  was  on  the  way,  a 
party  sent  out  from  Vincennes  nearly  succeeded  in  captur 
ing  him.  Failing  to  do  this,  they  spread  the  false  report 
that  Hamilton  with  800  men  was  marching  on  Kaskaskia. 
Clark,  believing  the  story,  was  forced  to  return  post  haste 
to  that  village,  where  his  calmness  prevented  a  panic.  The 
Kaskaskians  were  thoroughly  frightened,  but  the  arrival  of 
Bowman's  troops  and  a  company  of  volunteers  from 
Cahokia  reassured  them.  "I  believe,"  says  Clark,  "had 
Mr.  Hamilton  appeared  we  should  have  defeated  him  with 

41  Colls.  111.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  I,  446. 

42  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  429. 

43  Ibid. 


HAMILTON   AND   CLARK.  69 

a  good  deal  of  ease,  not  so  numerous,  but  the  men  being 
much  better.44  He  soon  learned  from  scouts  that  the 
"army"  which  gave  the  alarm  consisted  of  only  about  forty 
whites  and  Indians  "making  their  retreat  as  fast  as  pos 
sible  to  St.  Vincent  [Vincennes],  sent  for  no  other  purpose, 
as  we  found  after,  than  to  take  me."45  The  enemy  he  now 
knew  to  be  at  Vincennes. 

Late  in  January,  1779,  Francisco  Vigo,46  a  merchant  of 
St.  Louis,  whose  business  operations  brought  him  into  close 
contact  with  the  Illinois  and  Wabash  settlements,  arrived 
in  Kaskaskia  from  Vincennes  with  full  information  con 
cerning  that  place,  its  capture  by  Hamilton,  etc.  From  him 
Clark  learned  that  no  attack  would  be  made  on  Kaskaskia 
till  spring;  that  Hamilton  had  sent  most  of  his  Indians  out, 
and  had  only  eighty  men  in  garrison ;  that  belts  and  presents 
had  been  sent  to  all  the  tribes  south  of  the  Ohio,  who  were 
asked  to  meet  at  a  general  council  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Tennessee  and  lay  plans  for  the  reduction  of  Illinois  and 
Kentucky,  and  that  Hamilton  "made  no  doubt  of  clearing 
the  western  waters  by  the  fall."47  "It  was  at  this  moment," 
says  Clark,  "I  would  have  bound  myself  seven  years  a  slave 
to  have  had  500  troops."48 

The  situation  was  desperate.  The  only  escape  from  dis 
aster  or  immediate  retreat  from  Illinois  was  to  attack  Ham 
ilton  before  Hamilton  attacked  him.  This  would  involve 
a  march  of  over  200  miles  in  the  dead  of  winter,  over  snow- 
clad  prairies  and  drowned  lands,  concluded  by  the  storming 

44  For  this  episode  see  Letter  to  Mason,  ibid.,  430-435. 
«/*>«*.,  435- 

46  Vigo  was  an  important  figure  in  the  annals  of  the  Northwest.    A 
Sardinian  by  birth,  he  had  served  in  the  Spanish  army  and  was 
stationed  in  Louisiana.     Leaving  the  army  he  became  a  merchant. 
A  friendship  sprang  up  between  him  and  Clark,  and  he  transferred 
his   allegiance  to   the   United    States.     He  was   a   financial   power 
throughout  the  country  and  rendered  Clark  much  pecuniary  service. 
See  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  267  et  seq. 

47  For  the  information  brought  by  Vigo  see  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers, 
I»  3I5-3I6;    English,  op.  cit.,  I,  395-402,  436,  568. 

48  Ibid.,  436. 


70  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

of  a  fort — a  task  which  Hamilton  had  decided  was  too  diffi 
cult  for  himself  to  attempt.  "I  was  sensible,"  wrote  Clark, 
"the  resolution  was  as  desperate  as  my  situation,  but  I  saw 
no  other  probability  of  securing-  the  country."49  It  was 
nearly  a  year  since  he  had  heard  from  the  Virginia  authori 
ties.  He  was  thrown  entirely  on  his  own  resources  and 
responsibility.50  He  called  a  council  of  his  officers  and 
found  that  their  sentiments  coincided  with  his  own.51  An 
immediate  march  against  Vincennes  was  agreed  upon.  All 
was  to  be  risked  in  a  single  encounter.02  The  issue  was 
thus  expressed  by  Clark:  "We  must  either  quit  the  country 
or  attack  Mr.  Hamilton."53 

A  large  boat  was  rigged,  equipped  with  two  four-pound 
ers  and  four  swivels,  and  manned  by  forty-six  men  under 
command  of  Lieutenant  John  Rogers.  Loaded  with  stores 
and  ammunition,  the  "Willing,"  as  she  was  called,  left 
Kaskaskia  on  February  4.  Rogers  was  instructed  to  take 
his  boat  down  the  Mississippi  and  up  the  Ohio  and  Wabash 
to  within  a  few  leagues  of  the  town,  and  there  to  await 
further  orders.  If  discovered,  he  was  to  do  the  enemy  all 
the  harm  possible  without  losing  his  vessel,  and  if  Clark 
was  defeated,  he  was  to  join  Colonel  David  Rogers  on  the 
Mississippi.54 

Very  gratifying  to  Clark  was  the  enthusiastic  manner  in 
which  the  French  inhabitants  responded  at  this  crisis,  and 
the  evidence  which  they  gave  of  attachment  to  himself.55 
Up  to  this  time  he  had  been  doubtful  of  them,  but  they  now 
proved  their  fidelity  to  the  new  regime.56  Without  their 
cooperation  it  is  more  than  doubtful  if  he  could  have  car- 

4a  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  396. 

ri"  Cat.  Va.  St.  Papers,  I,  315-316. 

51  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  436 ;  Bowman's  Journal, 
ibid.,  568. 

MG;/.   Va.  St.  Papers,  T,  315-316. 

"Ibid. 

'''Ibid.;  Letter  to  Afason,  English,  op.  cit.,  T,  436-437;  Clark's 
Memoir,  ibid.,  520,  Bowman's  Journal,  ibid.,  568. 

M  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib..  II,  526. 

MIbicl.,  Iviii. 


HAMILTON    AND    CLARK.  71 

ried  out  his  plans.  They  contributed  liberally,  both  in  men 
and  in  money.57  On  February  4,  a  volunteer  company  from 
Cahokia  under  Captain  Richard  McCarty  arrived  at  Kas- 
kaskia,  and  on  the  next  day  another  one  was  raised  under 
Captain  Francis  Charleville.58 

With  these  two  companies,  and  two  companies  of  his 
troops,  many  of  whom,  it  will  be  remembered,  were  Creoles, 
under  Captains  Bowman  and  Worthington,  Clark  left 
Kaskaskia  for  Vincennes  on  February  5.  He  had  with  him 
about  170  men.59  "We  were  conducted  out  of  the  town," 
says  Clark,  "by  the  inhabitants  and  Mr.  Gibault,  the  priest, 
who  after  a  very  suitable  discourse  to  the  purpose  gave  us 
all  absolution,  and  we  set  out  on  a  forlorn  hope  indeed, 
for  our  whole  party,  with  the  boat's  crew,  consisted  of 
only  a  little  upwards  of  two  hundred."60  There  were  a 
few  pack-horses,  but  no  tents  or  provision  for  shelter. 
Over  muddy  trails  and  drowned  lands,  Clark's  greatest 
care  was  to  keep  up  the  spirits  of  his  men.  After  much 
hardship  caused  by  the  weather,  the  condition  of  the  country 
and  the  failure  of  provisions,  he  arrived  in  the  immediate 
neighborhood  of  Vincennes  on  February  23.61 

His  approach  seems  to  have  been  entirely  unexpected  by 
Hamilton.62  The  British  commander  could  probably  have 
defended  himself  in  the  fort  for  some  time ;  and,  in  the 
event  of  a  regular  siege,  reinforcements  might  arrive  from 
Detroit  and  oblige  Clark  to  retire.  The  latter,  therefore, 
resolved  to  resort  to  diplomacy.  His  men  had  captured  a 
prisoner,  who  turned  out  to  be  friendly  to  the  Americans 

57  See  English,  op.  cit.,  II,  1054,  for  sums  collected  by  Clark  from 
the  French  inhabitants.    See  also  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  li,  note 
3,  xlvi. 

58  Bowman's  Journal,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  568. 

59  Ibid. 

60  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  437. 

61  This    famous    march,    which    John    Randolph    compared    with 
Hannibal's  passage  of  the  Trasimene  Marsfr,  can  be  followed  in  the 
laconic  journal  of  Captain  Bowman  (English,  op.  cit.,  I,  568  et  seq.). 
For  the  route  taken,  see  Hulbert,  op.  cit..,  34  et  seq. 

62  Bowman's  Journal,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  571-572. 


72  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

and  gave  valuable  information.  The  people  of  Vin- 
cennes,  Clark  knew,  were  not  attached  to  Hamilton  or 
to  the  government  which  he  represented ;  there  was,  more 
over,  a  chance  that  some  of  the  Indians  might  abandon  him. 
Clark  accordingly  sent  on  in  advance  by  a  prisoner  a  proc 
lamation  addressed  "To  the  inhabitants  of  Post  St.  Vin 
cent,"  requesting  all  friendly  to  the  American  cause  to 
remain  in  their  houses,  and  telling  those  who  were  opposed 
to  it  to  repair  to  the  fort  and  fight  like  men.  Everyone 
found  under  arms  would  be  treated  as  an  enemy.63  Before 
dark  he  appeared  in  sight  of  the  town,  which  speedily  sur 
rendered.64  A  number  of  Indians  joined  him,  and  the 
inhabitants  furnished  his  starving  and  half-naked  men  with 
food,  clothing  and  powder.65  A  detachment  of  troops  was 
sent  to  attack  the  fort,  though  Clark  did  not  expect  to  be 
able  to  effect  its  reduction  till  the  arrival  of  the  artillery 
on  the  "Willing."66  There  was  almost  incessant  firing 
for  eighteen  hours.67  The  hostile  commanders  held  several 
conferences  on  December  24,  and  in  the  evening  articles 
of  surrender  were  signed.68  The  fort  was  delivered  over 
to  Clark,  and  the  garrison  became  prisoners  of  war.  The 
reasons  given  at  this  time  by  Hamilton  for  the  surrender 
were  remoteness  from  succor,  the  low  state  of  pro 
visions,  the  unanimity  of  officers  and  men  in  its  expediency, 
and  confidence  in  a  generous  enemy.69  Clark's  total  casual 
ties  were — one  man  wounded.  Though  the  attitude  of  the 

K'  Bowman's  Journal,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  571-572. 

"Ibid.,  397- 

™Mich.  P.  Colls.,  IX,  503. 

08  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  397. 

07  Ibid. 

08  Bowman's  Journal,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  573-575;    Mich.  P.  Colls., 
IX,    504;     Letter   to   Mason,   English,   op.    cit.,   I,   441-444;     Clark's 
Journal,  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  I,  91-94. 

<iu  In  view  of  the  last  reason,  the  story  told  by  Hamilton  of  Clark's 
savage  behavior  (Mich.  P.  Colls.,  IX,  502)  seems  strange.  Its 
truth  becomes  doubtful  when  we  compare  with  it  a  letter  written 
by  Hamilton  a  few  days  after  the  surrender,  in  which  he  testifies  to 
the  honorable  behavior  of  Clark's  officers  and  men.  See  Hamilton  to 
Lernoult,  28  Feb.,  1779,  Bancroft  MSS. 


HAMILTON    AND   CLARK.  73 

people  of  Vincennes  must  be  taken  into  account  as  a  factor 
of  great  importance  in  Clark's  victory,  he  had  undoubtedly 
throughout  this  campaign  displayed  military  ability  of  a 
high  order.  He  needs,  perhaps,  no  greater  praise  than  that 
accorded  by  Hamilton :  "The  difficulties  and  danger  of  Col. 
Clark's  march  from  the  Illinois  were  such  as  required  great 
courage  to  encounter  and  great  perseverance  to  overcome." 

On  the  morning  of  February  25,  Fort  Sackville  was  again 
occupied  by  Americans,  and  its  name  was  changed  to 
Fort  Patrick  Henry.  Clark  dispatched  some  troops  to 
ascend  the  Wabash  and  capture  a  party  which  had  been 
sent  back  by  Hamilton  to  bring  down  stores  from  the  port 
age  at  the  head  of  the  river.  Forty  men  and  seven  boats 
loaded  with  provisions,  together  with  dispatches  from 
Detroit,  were  captured.70 

On  February  27,  the  "Willing"  arrived.  During  her 
voyage  from  Kaskaskia  she  had  picked  up  a  messenger  with 
letters  from  the  Virginia  government  to  Clark.71  He  was 
notified  of  his  promotion  to  the  rank  of  full  colonel,  and 
reinforcements  were  promised. 

In  a  few  days  Hamilton,  his  officers  and  a  few  men,  were 
sent  under  guard  to  Williamsburg,  where  they  arrived  in 
June.  Hamilton  was  kept  in  confinement  till  October,  1780. 
General  Haldimand  protested  against  this,72  but  Governor 
Jefferson  justified  it  on  the  grounds  of  "national  retalia 
tion,"  and  "personal  punishment"  for  his  instigation  of 
Indian  atrocities.  The  terms  of  the  capitulation,  Jefferson 
asserted,  did  not  guarantee  Hamilton  against  confinement.73 
After  being  exchanged,  Hamilton  finally  reached  England 
in  1781.  In  the  account  of  these  campaigns  which  he  wrote, 
he  attributes  his  failure  "chiefly  if  not  entirely  to  the  treach 
ery  of  persons  whom  I  had  reason  to  expect  lenity  and 
moderation  would  have  gained." 

70  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  444. 

71  Bowman's   Journal,  ibid.,   575,   and   Clark  to   the   governor   of 
Virginia,  29  Apr.,  1779,  ibid.,  398. 

72  Haldimand  to  Washington,  29  Aug.,  1779,  Bancroft  MSS. 

73  Writings  of  Jefferson,  Ford's  ed.,  II,  248  et  seq. 


74  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

Upon  the  disposition  of  the  Indians  the  effect  of  Ham 
ilton's  capture  was  great.  It  was  to  him  they  looked  for 
guidance  and  instructions,  and  the  disaster  which  befell 
him  cooled  their  ardor  for  the  British  cause.74  Haldimand 
called  Hamilton's  defeat  a  second  "tour  de  Burgoyne."75 
In  the  spring  and  early  summer  information  reached  Quebec 
from  the  lake  posts  that  the  spirit  of  the  Indians  was  shaken. 
The  friendship  of  the  Illinois  French  for  Clark  contributed 
to  the  same  result.70  The  attitude  of  the  French  in  the 
lake  posts  and  in  Quebec,  upon  whom  the  French  treaty 
of  1778  had  its  natural  effect,  alarmed  the  British  authori 
ties.  Haldimand  knew  the  Americans  had  not  abandoned 
their  designs  on  Canada.77  Small  parties  were  constantly 
entering  the  province  and  escaping  unhurt.78  The  home 
government  was  aware  of  the  importance  and  gravity  of  the 
situation  in  Canada.79  Clark,  indeed,  had  accomplished  a 
more  important  work  than  he  knew.  Had  Hamilton  been 
able  to  maintain  himself  at  Vincennes,  and  bring  about  the 
wholesale  onslaught  upon  the  American  settlements  which 
he  had  been  contemplating,  the  American  cause  in  the  West 
would  have  suffered  a  disaster. 

Clark  remained  at  Vincennes  till  March  20,  when  he 
returned  to  Kaskaskia.  While  at  Vincennes,  he  concluded 
a  number  of  treaties  with  the  Wabash  Indians,  who  flocked 
to  the  village  to  take  the  child  of  fortune  by  the  hand.80 

The  dispatches  brought  to  him  by  the  "Willing,"  as 
has  been  explained,  were  encouraging,  and  he  \vas  led  to 
hope  for  the  reduction  of  Detroit.  sl  They  informed  him 
that  reinforcements  would  be  sent  from  Virinia.  He  knew 


'*  For  the  effect  on  the  Indians  of  Hamilton's  defeat,  see  Mich.  P. 
Colls.,  IX,  382,  429;  XIX,  383,  393.  See  also  Kept,  on  Can.  Archives, 
1885,  326. 

75  Rcpt.  on  Can.  Archives,  1886,  471. 

76  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  IX.  382. 

77  Haldimand  to  Clinton,  TO  Nov.,  1778,  Bancroft  MSS. 
7*  Colls.  Ill,  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  I,  447-44& 

79  Germain  to  Clinton,  4  Nov.,  1778,  Bancroft  MSS. 
™  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  445-448. 
81  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  399. 


HAMILTON    AND    CLARK.  75 

that  the  Illinois  militia  would  turn  out  for  an  expedition 
against  Detroit,  and  he  believed  that  he  could  secure  two 
or  three  hundred  men  from  Kentucky.82  The  French 
inhabitants,  moreover,  manifested  commendable  zeal  in  the 
proposed  enterprise.83  Clark  felt  with  true  military  instinct 
that  the  time  to  attack  Detroit  was  before  the  enemy 
recovered  from  the  shock  of  Hamilton's  defeat.  Three 
hundred  men,  he  thought,  would  suffice  to  capture  the  place, 
weakened  as  it  was  both  by  the  loss  of  Hamilton's  force, 
and  by  the  existence  of  a  pro-American  sentiment  among 
the  French  inhabitants.84  The  commanding  officer  at 
Detroit,  in  expectation  of  an  American  attack,  prepared 
himself  as  well  as  he  could.85 

When  Clark  returned  from  Vincennes  to  Kaskaskia  he 
found  his  force  strengthened  by  the  arrival  of  a  company 
from  New  Orleans  under  Captain  Robert  George.86  But 
disappointments  were  in  store.  Captain  Montgomery 
arrived  from  Virginia  at  the  close  of  May,  with,  however, 
only  half  the  men  Clark  had  expected.87  In  July,  instead 
of  the  two  or  three  hundred  promised  him  from  Ken 
tucky  only  about  thirty  arrived.88  It  was  with  genuine 
sorrow  that  he  was  forced  temporarily  to  abandon  the 
plan  near  to  his  heart.  His  settled  conviction  was  that 
the  frontiers  could  enjoy  no  lasting  tranquility  with  Detroit 
in  British  hands.89  The  reason  why  it  was  never  captured 
by  the  Americans  was  always  the  same,  want  of  men.  The 
narrative  of  Clark's  further  efforts  to  capture  it  is  not 
germane  to  the  present  study.  They  will,  therefore,  be 

81  Ibid.,  444- 

83  Bowman  to  Clark,  28  May,  1779,  Colls.  Ill  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  611. 

"English,  op.  cit.,  I,  399,  449.  For  proof  of  the  weakness  of 
Detroit  see  Hamilton  to  Haldimand,  27  Sept,  1778,  Mich.  P.  Colls., 
IX,  481. 

85  Ibid.,  407. 

88  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  399. 

87  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  III,  442;   Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit., 
I,  449- 

88  Ibid.,  450. 

88  Ibid.,  400,  448. 


76  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

referred  to  only  so  far  as  necessary  to  understand  the  course 
of  events  in  Illinois. 

In  the  summer  Clark  divided  his  small  forces  between 
Kaskaskia,  Cahokia,  Vincennes  and  the  Falls  of  the  Ohio,90 
taking  up  his  headquarters  at  the  last-mentioned  place  "as 
the  most  convenient  spot  to  have  an  eye  over  the  whole."91 
The  post  which  he  had  established  the  previous  year  at 
Corn  Island  to  secure  communication  between  Kentucky 
and  Illinois92  had  been  garrisoned  by  the  families  who  had 
followed  him.  In  his  absence  they  had  crossed  to  the  south 
side  of  the  Ohio,  where  they  were  laying  the  foundations 
of  Louisville.  This  post,  strengthened  and  fortified  by 
Clark,  contributed  to  the  further  settlement  of  Kentucky.93 
Montgomery  was  placed  in  general  charge  of  the  troops  in 
Illinois,  with  headquarters  at  Kaskaskia.94  McCarty  was 
put  in  command  of  the  detachment  at  Cahokia,95  while  Helm 
was  left  in  charge  at  Vincennes.96 

00  Cal  Va.  St.  Papers,  III,  433. 

91  Clark's  Memoir,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  553. 

U2  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  III,  441. 

03  The  town  of  Louisville  was  established  by  act  of  the  General 
Assembly  of  Virginia  in  May,  1780;  Hening,  op.  cit.,  X,  293. 

'"Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  III,  442,  and  Clark's  Memoir,  English, 
op.  cit.,  I,  553. 

"5  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  548. 

90  Clark's  Memoir,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  550. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA,    1778-1783. 

The  campaign  which  resulted  in  the  capture  of  the 
British  posts  in  Illinois  was  an  enterprise  planned  and 
executed  by  Clark  under  authority  of  the  State  of  Vir 
ginia.  Though  many  of  the  people  of  Illinois  imagined  that 
he  was  acting  under  authority  of  Congress,  that  view  was, 
as  has  been  shown,  entirely  erroneous.  Clark,  his  captains, 
and  most  of  his  men  were  Virginians.  His  recruits  were 
Virginia  militia,  and  not  on  the  Continental  establishment.1 

From  July,  1778,  to  May  of  the  following  year  the  only 
government  in  Illinois  was  that  exercised  by  him.  The 
posts  were  held  by  his  officers  and  Virginia's  authority  was 
sustained  by  his  militia.  In  the  secret  instructions  given  to 
him  by  Governor  Henry  in  January,  1778,  he  was  directed 
to  treat  the  inhabitants  of  Illinois  as  fellow-citizens,  and  see 
that  their  persons  and  property  were  secure,  if  they  would 
"give  undoubted  evidence  of  their  attachment  to  this  state 
....  by  taking  the  test  prescribed  by  law."  Clark  was 
obliged  to  devote  a  large  part  of  his  time  to  civil  administra 
tion,  pending  the  formal  organization  of  a  government  by 
Virginia.  It  was  his  policy  to  attach  the  people  to  the  new 
regime  by  making  government  mild.2  Business  was  done 
without  the  imposition  of  fees.3  He  established  "courts 
of  civil  judication"  at  Cahokia,  Vincennes,  and  probably 
at  Kaskaskia,  with  right  of  appeal  to  himself  in  certain 
cases.4  The  members  of  the  courts  were  elected  by  the 
people.  The  Cahokia  court  began  its  sessions  at  least  as  early 

1  For  the  campaign  as  an  example  of  state  sovereignty  see  Van 
Tyne,    "Sovereignty  in  the  American  Revolution,"    Am.  Hist.  Rev., 
XII,  541- 

2  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  428. 
8  Clark's  Memoir,  ibid.,  498. 

4  Ibid.,  484.  Alvbrd  (Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xlviii)  thinks 
Clark  may  be  mistaken  about  the  establishment  of  a  court  at 
Kaskaskia. 


78  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

as  October,  I778.5  It  was  composed  almost  entirely  of 
Creoles.  Clark  was  successful  in  winning  the  favor  of  the 
inhabitants,  which  he  never  wholly  lost.  The  enthusiasm 
with  which  they  rallied  to  his  support  in  the  Vincennes  cam 
paign  proves  at  least  that,  at  that  time,  they  preferred  him  to 
the  reestablishment  of  British  control.6  Clark  appears  to 
have  taken  a  serious  view  of  his  duties,  and  to  have  tried  to 
provide  for  the  safety  and  welfare  of  the  people.  He  was 
obliged  to  employ  stringent  measures  to  suppress  disorders 
in  Kaskaskia  which  were  attributed  to  the  slaves.  Several 
murders  had  been  committed.  On  December  24,  1778,  he 
issued  an  order  forbidding  slaves  to  walk  the  streets  after 
sunset  without  their  masters'  permission,  and  prohibited  the 
sale  of  liquor  to  them.7 

In  the  first  flush  of  enthusiasm  following  his  appear 
ance  and  the  news  of  the  French-American  alliance,  listen 
ing  to  the  new  talk  of  liberty,  and  many  of  them  believing, 
they  knew  not  how,  that  they  would  speedily  be  restored  to 
France,  the  people  of  Illinois  gave  freely  to  Clark,  receiving 
in  return  Continental  paper  money  or  drafts  on  the  treasurer 
of  Virginia  or  on  Oliver  Pollock.8  The  paper  money  was 
worth  only  a  small  fraction  of  its  face  value,  but  the  unsus 
pecting  French  for  a  while  accepted  it  at  par.9  Pollock 
exerted  himself  to  maintain  the  credit  of  Virginia,10  but  it 
was  sinking  rapidly.  Had  it  not  been  for  the  assistance  of 
the  French,  and  the  English-speaking  merchants,  Clark 
could  not  have  maintained  himself.11  The  financial  basis 
of  his  government  was  unsound,  and  as  soon  as  the  enthu 
siasm  which  had  greeted  his  appearance  subsided  trouble 
was  bound  to  arise. 

"Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  2. 

6  For  evidence  of  attachment  to  Clark  at  this  time  see  ibid.,  526. 

7  For  this  episode  see  ibid.,  xlviii-xlix,  13  ct  scq. 

8  A  number  of  these  drafts  in  payment  for  supplies  for  the  troops 
furnished    by    the    Creoles,    are    in    Illinois   Papers    (MSS.)    in    the 
Virginia  State  Library.    They  were  signed  by  Clark,  and  were  drawn 
on  Pollock,  or  the  treasurer  of  Virginia,  usually  at  thirty  days. 

9  Colls.  111.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  IT.  1,  and  notes. 
"Evidence  of  this  is  in  the  Illinois  I'uficrs  (MSS.). 
11  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  li,  and  notes. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER    VIRGINIA.  79 

It  is  probable  that  when  Montgomery  escorted  Rocheblave 
to  Williamsburg,  the  letters  which  he  carried  from  Clark  to 
Governor  Henry  suggested  the  establishment  of  civil  gov 
ernment  for  Illinois.  To  Clark,  who  desired  to  concentrate 
his  attention  on  military  matters,  civil  affairs  were  distaste 
ful.12  The  arrival  of  Montgomery's  party  in  eastern  Vir 
ginia  in  the  autumn  of  1778  naturally  aroused  excitement 
and  interest.  A  regular  government  had  to  be  created  for 
the  French  villages,  for  Illinois  was  something  other  than 
conquered  territory  which  could  be  held  under  prolonged 
military  rule. 

On  November  14,  Governor  Henry  wrote  a  letter  inform 
ing  Virginia's  delegates  in  Congress  of  the  successful  issue 
of  Clark's  expedition,  and  suggesting  the  possibility  of  his 
cooperation  with  measures  which  Congress  might  have  in 
view  respecting  the  West.13  On  November  19,  Clark's 
communications  were  referred  to  a  committee  of  the 
assembly,  which  prepared  a  bill  for  the  establishment  of 
county  government  for  Illinois.14  This  was  reported  to  the 
house  of  delegates  on  the  thirtieth,  and  passed  December 
9.  A  few  days  later  it  was  passed  by  the  senate.15 

The  preamble  of  the  act  declared  that  several  British 
posts  within  the  territory  of  Virginia  had  been  captured  by 
the  militia  of  the  commonwealth;  that  the  inhabitants  had 
taken  an  oath  of  fidelity  and  acknowledged  themselves 
citizens  of  Virginia ;  that  they  ought  to  be  protected ;  and 
that,  since  it  might  be  impracticable  to  govern  them  imme 
diately  by  the  laws  of  the  commonwealth,  a  temporary 
government  should  be  established.  All  citizens  of  Virginia 
settled,  or  about  to  settle,  west  of  the  Ohio,  including  the 
Illinois  French  who  had  become  citizens,  were  formed  into 
a  "distinct  county,"  to  be  called  "Illinois  County."  No 

12  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  449. 

13  English,   op.  cit.,  I,  245-247.     November   16,  the  date  given  in 
English,  is  wrong.    The  original  of  this  letter  is  in  the  Papers  of  the 
Continental  Congress,  Library  of  Congress,  volume  lettered    "Vir 
ginia  State  Papers,"  vol.  I. 

14  Rowland,  Life  of  George  Mason,  I,  307. 

15  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  9,  note. 


So  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

definite  boundaries  were  established.  The  governor,  with 
the  consent  of  the  council,  was  empowered  to  appoint  a 
county-lieutenant,  to  hold  office  during  pleasure,  who 
might  appoint  and  commission  deputy-commandants,  militia 
officers  and  commissaries,  during  pleasure.  The  inhabitants 
were  to  enjoy  their  religion,  civil  rights  and  property.  All 
civil  officers  to  whom  the  people  had  been  accustomed  were 
to  be  chosen  by  a  majority  of  the  citizens,  convoked  by  the 
county-lieutenant  in  the  respective  districts  which  might 
be  established.  They  were  to  be  commissioned  by  the 
county-lieutenant,  paid  in  the  customary  manner,  and  were 
to  conduct  themselves  according  to  the  laws  to  which  the 
people  had  been  used.  For  the  payment  of  officials  to  whom 
the  people  had  not  been  accustomed,  the  governor,  with 
the  advice  of  the  council,  was  empowered  to  draw  warrants 
on  the  treasury  of  Virginia  up  to  £500.  The  county-lieu 
tenant  might  pardon  any  crime  except  murder  or  treason. 
In  these  he  might  respite  execution,  till  the  sense  of  the 
Virginia  government  was  obtained.  The  governor  was 
authorized  to  raise  500  men,  to  march  immediately  to 
Illinois.  The  act  was  put  in  force  for  twelve  months,  and 
thence  "to  the  end  of  the  next  session  of  Assembly,  and 
no  longer."  It  was  thus  temporary  in  its  nature  and 
intended  operation.16  It  was  afterwards  extended  to  1781, 1T 
when  it  legally  expired ;  after  that,  till  the  enactment  by 
Congress  of  the  Northwest  Ordinance  in  1787,  there  was  no 
legal  government  in  the  country  northwest  of  the  Ohio.18 
The  act  reveals  a  wise  and  conservative  spirit,  and  a  desire 
on  the  part  of  Virginia's  legislators  to  make  the  transition 
to  American  government  in  Illinois  as  easy  as  possible. 

Governor  Henry  quickly  took  measures  to  set  in  motion 
the  machinery  for  the  establishment  of  civil  government. 
He  appointed  John  Todd,  a  Pennsylvania!!  by  birth  but  a 
citizen  of  Virginia,  as  county-lieutenant.  Todd  had  been 

18  For  the  text  of  the  act  see  Hening,  op.  cit.,  IX,  552  ct  scq. 

17  Ibid.,  X,  303-304- 

18  For  the  civil  organization  of  Illinois  sec  Boyd,    "The  County  of 
Illinois,"  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  IV,  623  ct  sdj.;   English,  op.  cit.,  I,  ch.  IX. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER    VIRGINIA.  8 1 

one  of  the  first  settlers  of  Kentucky,  and  had  represented 
it  as  a  county  in  the  Virginia  Assembly.  The  governor's 
choice  was  wise,  for  Todd,  though  he  did  not  know 
French,19  was  acquainted  with  western  life  and  conditions, 
and  probably  possessed  more  education  and  knowledge  of 
the  law  than  any  other  American  frontiersman.20  Henry's 
letter  of  instructions  to  him,  dated  December  12,  1778,  is 
complete  and  judicious,  and  shows  a  realization  by  its 
author  of  the  truth  proclaimed  by  Burke,  that  "the  temper 
of  the  people  amongst  whom  he  presides  ought  to  be  the 
first  study  of  a  statesman."21  Todd  was  urged  to  improve 
upon  the  favorable  condition  existing  in  Illinois,  and  to 
cultivate  the  friendship  of  the  inhabitants  and  the  Indians. 
As  he  was  "unacquainted  in  some  degree  with  their  genius, 
usages  and  manners,  as  well  as  the  geography  of  the 
country,"  he  was  to  consult  and  advise  with  the  most 
intelligent  of  the  inhabitants.  He  was  to  cooperate  when 
ever  possible  with  Clark  and  to  aid  the  military.  "The 
inhabitants  of  the  Illinois,"  wrote  Henry,  "must  not  expect 
settled  peace  and  safety  while  their  and  our  enemies  have 
footing  at  Detroit,  and  can  intercept  or  stop  the  trade  of 
the  Mississippi."  Hope  was  expressed  that  the  French  of 
Detroit  might  be  brought  to  cooperate  with  an  expedition 
against  that  place,  but  if  this  was  found  impracticable,  the 
new  authorities  in  Illinois  were  to  content  themselves  with 
measures  of  defense  only.  One  advantage  hoped  for  from 
the  possession  of  Illinois  was  the  cessation  of  Indian  raids 
south  of  the  Ohio.  A  close  attention  to  the  disposition  and 
movements  of  the  hostile  tribes  was  therefore  regarded  as 
necessary.  "I  know  of  no  better  general  direction  to  give 
than  this,"  ran  the  instructions,  "that  you  consider  yourself  at 
the  head  of  the  civil  department  and  as  such  having  command 
of  the  militia,  who  are  not  to  be  under  the  command  of 

19  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III.,  287. 

20  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  liv. 

21  For  these  instructions  see  English,  op.  tit.,  I,  249,  et  seq.,  or 
Boyd,  op.  cit.,  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  IV,  625  et  seq.,  or  Mason,  Early  Chic, 
and  III,  289  et  seq. 


82  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

the  military  until  ordered  out  by  the  civil  authority  and 
to  act  in  conjunction  with  them."  The  county-lieutenant  was 
instructed  to  impress  upon  the  people  the  value  of  their 
newly-acquired  liberty.  Hope  was  held  out  that  in  a  short 
time  they  might  expect  "a  free  and  equal  representation  .... 
together  with  all  the  improvements  in  jurisprudence  and 
police  which  the  other  parts  of  the  state  enjoy."  ....  "Let 
it  be  your  constant  attention,"  urged  Henry,  "to  see  that 
the  inhabitants  have  justice  administered  to  them  for  any 
injury  received  from  the  troops,  the  omission  of  this  may 
be  fatal.--  ....  You  will  embrace  every  opportunity  to 
manifest  the  high  regard  and  friendly  sentiments  of  this 
commonwealth  towards  all  the  subjects  of  His  Catholic 
Majesty  ....  you  will  make  a  tender  of  the  friendship 
and  services  of  your  people  to  the  Spanish  commandant 
near  Kaskaskia  and  cultivate  the  strictest  connection  with 

him    and    his    people A    general    direction    to    act 

according  to  the  best  of  your  judgment  in  cases  where  these 
instructions  are  silent,  and  the  laws  have  not  otherwise 
directed,  is  given  to  you  from  the  necessity  of  the  case, 
for  your  great  distance  from  government  will  not  permit 
you  to  wait  for  orders  in  many  cases  of  great  importance. 
....  The  matters  given  you  in  charge  are  singular  in  their 
nature  and  weighty  in  their  consequences  to  the  people 
immediately  concerned  and  to  the  whole  state.  They  require 
the  fullest  exertion  of  your  abilities  and  unwearied 
vigilance." 

On  the  same  day,  the  governor  wrote  an  equally  states 
manlike  letter  to  Clark,  directing  him  to  retain  command 
of  the  troops  already  in  Illinois,  and  to  assume  command 
of  the  five  new  companies  to  be  raised  under  the  recent 
act  of  the  legislature.  To  prevent  a  continuation  of 
Indian  depredations  south  of  the  Ohio,  Clark  was  instructed 
to  establish  such  new  posts  as  he  saw  fit.  "I  consider  your 
further  success,"  wrote  Henry,  "as  depending  upon  the 
goodwill  and  friendship  of  the  Frenchmen  and  Indians  who 

"  Tn  view  of  subsequent  events  this  injunction  seems  almost 
prophetic. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA.  83 

inhabit  your  part  of  the  commonwealth.  With  their  con 
currence  great  things  may  be  accomplished.  But  their 
animosity  will  spoil  the  fair  prospects  which  your  past 
successes  have  opened.  You  will  therefore  spare  no  pains 
to  conciliate  the  affections  of  the  French  and  Indians.  Let 
them  see  and  feel  the  advantages  of  being  fellow  citizens  and 
freemen.  Guard  most  carefully  against  every  infringement 
of  their  property,  particularly  with  respect  to  land,  as  our 
enemies  have  alarmed  them  as  to  that.  Strict  and  even 
severe  discipline  with  your  soldiers  may  be  essential  to 
preserve  from  injury  those  whom  they  were  sent  to  protect 
and  conciliate."  Clark  was  instructed  to  cooperate  with  the 
civil  department  when  necessary.  "Much  will  depend  upon 
the  mutual  assistances  you  may  occasionally  afford  each 
other  in  your  respective  departments,  and  I  trust  that  a 
sincere  cordiality  will  subsist  between  you."  The  possi 
bility  of  attacking  Detroit  was  dwelt  upon.  Clark  was  "to 
push  at  any  favorable  occurrences  which  fortune  may  pre 
sent For  our  peace  and  safety  are  not  secure  while 

the  enemy  are  so  near  as  Detroit."  He  was  also  to  cultivate 
the  friendship  of  the  Spaniards.  Extensive  discretionary 
powers  were  given  to  him.23 

The  governor,  also  on  the  same  day,  wrote  a  letter  of 
instructions  to  Montgomery,  who  had  been  promoted  to  the 
rank  of  lieutenant-colonel.  He  was  to  superintend  and 
hasten  the  recruiting  of  the  five  new  companies.  "Our 
party  at  Illinois,"  wrote  Henry,  "may  be  lost,  together 
with  the  present  favorable  disposition  of  the  French  and 
Indians  there,  unless  every  moment  is  improved  for  their 
preservation."24  As  already  explained,  only  a  part  of  this 
additional  force  ever  reached  Clark.25  We  shall  see  that  it 
was  the  very  dangers  which  Henry  feared  that  wrecked 
Virginia's  government  in  Illinois. 

Todd  arrived  at  Kaskaskia  to  take  up  the  duties  of 
county-lieutenant  and  head  of  the  civil  department  in  the 

23  For  the  instructions  to  Clark  see  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  253,  et  seq. 

24  For  the  instructions  to  Montgomery  see  Henry,   op.   cit.,  Ill, 
216  et  seq. 

25  Cf.  supra,  ch.  V. 

7 


84  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

first  half  of  May,  I779.28  His  appearance  was  welcomed 
by  the  people  and  by  Clark;  the  two  men  were  already 
acquainted,  and  Clark  was  glad  to  be  rid  of  civil  affairs.21 
Todd's  first  duty  was  to  organize  the  militia  under  authority 
of  Virginia.  Clark  had  confirmed  the  Creole  militia  officers 
who  had  been  serving  during  the  period  of  British  govern 
ment.  They  were  now  for  the  most  part  retained.  Richard 
Winston  of  Kaskaskia,  a  leading  member  of  the  eastern 
merchant  class,  was  indeed  appointed  commandant  of  militia 
in  that  village.  But  Legras  was  retained  in  command  of 
the  Vincennes  militia,28  and  all  others  commissioned  by 
Todd  bore  French  names.29 

For  civil  administration,  the  county  was  divided  into 
three  districts :  Kaskaskia,  including  Prairie  du  Rocher, 
St.  Philippe,  and  the  little  village  around  Fort  Chartres ; 
Cahokia,  including  Prairie  du  Pont  and  Peoria ;  and  Vin 
cennes,  including  the  lower  Wabash  valley.30 

In  Todd's  instructions  stress  had  been  laid  upon  the 
administration  of  justice,  and  the  act  creating  the  county 
of  Illinois  had  decreed  that  all  civil  officials  to  whom  the 
people  had  been  accustomed  should  be  chosen  by  a  majority 
of  the  citizens  in  their  respective  districts.31  Under  French 
government  there  had  been  no  clear  distinction  between 
executive  and  judicial  functions.32  During  most  of  the 
period  of  British  administration,  the  military  commandant, 
appointed,  of  course,  from  without,  had  acted  as  judge, 
with  the  assistance  of  justices  in  the  villages.33  Under 
neither  regime  had  the  inhabitants  acquired  any  experience 
in  self-government.  But  Clark  had  established  courts 
elected  by  the  people,  which  were  in  existence  when  Todd 

="  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III,  287. 

~7  Letter  to  Mason,  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  449. 

n  Am.  St.  Papers,  "Public  Lands;'  I,  10. 

29  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III,  294;    Colls.  111.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ivi. 

mlbid..  Ivii. 

31  Cf.  supra. 

32Alvord,  Illinois  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  16. 

33  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ivii. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA.  85 

arrived.  This  model  the  county-lieutenant  determined  to 
follow. 

Civil  government  under  authority  of  Virginia  was 
formally  inaugurated  on  May  12,  1779.  On  that  day  the 
people  of  Kaskaskia  were  called  together  in  an  assembly  in 
front  of  the  church,  always  the  meeting  place  and  most 
important  edifice  in  the  French  colonial  village.  Clark  pre 
sided.  His  address  in  French  was  written  and  read  by  an 
interpreter.  He  praised  the  people  for  their  efforts  in  the 
Vincennes  expedition,  presented  Todd  as  their  governor, 
and  urged  them  to  elect  the  best  persons  as  judges  of  their 
court.34  A  French  speech  by  Todd,  also  read  by  an  inter 
preter,  followed.35  He  expressed  thanks  for  his  reception, 
and  declared  that  the  State  of  Virginia  was  actuated  only 
by  pure  motives.  Distance,  he  said,  made  it  imprac 
ticable  for  the  new  county  to  send  representatives  to  the 
Virginia  Assembly,  but  representation,  if  desired,  would 
be  granted  in  the  future.36 

The  assembly  then  proceeded  to  the  election  of  the  judges. 
Six  men,  all  of  them  French,  were  chosen,  headed  by  the 
most  distinguished  inhabitant,  Gabriel  Cerre.  All  of  those 
elected  had  cordially  accepted  Clark's  regime.  A  few 
days  later,  representatives  in  the  court  were  elected  from 
Prairie  du  Rocher  and  St.  Philippe,  bringing  the  number  of 
justices  for  the  Kaskaskia  district  up  to  nine.37  On  May  21, 
Todd  commissioned  these  men,  "justices  of  the  peace  for 
the  District  of  Kaskaskia  and  judges  of  the  court  of  the 
said  district  in  cases  both  civil  and  criminal."  Any  four 
or  more  of  them  were  authorized  to  constitute  a  court, 
before  which  should  be  cognizable  all  actions  and  cases  of 
which  the  courts  of  the  other  counties  of  Virginia  had 
cognizance.  Their  judgments  were  required  to  have  the 
concurrence  of  at  least  a  majority,  and  to  be  entered  with 

34  Ibid.,  Ivii-lix. 

35  His  later  proclamations  were  regularly  issued  in  French.     See 
Todd's  Record-Book,  passim;    Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III.,  289-316. 

36  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  lix-lx. 

37  Ibid.,  Ixi. 


86  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

the  proceedings  previous  and  subsequent,  and  recorded  in 
books  provided  for  the  purpose/'8  The  court  chose  a  clerk, 
and  Winston  was  appointed  sheriff.39  A  prosecuting  officer, 
or  state's  attorney,  was  appointed  by  Todd. 

The  court  for  the  district  of  Cahokia  was  soon  established 
and  was  in  session  early  in  June.40  Most  of  the  justices 
who  had  served  under  Clark's  authority  were  reflected.41 
The  Cahokia  court  appears  to  have  numbered  seven,  four 
of  whom  were  necessary  for  a  quorum.42 

In  June,  a  similar  court  was  established  for  the  Vin- 
cennes  district.43  It  consisted  of  nine  justices,  six  of  whom 
were  elected  from  the  village  of  Vincennes  and  the  rest 
from  the  neighboring  posts.44  It  resembled  the  other 
courts  in  essential  features. 

In  these  courts,  monthly  sessions  were  the  rule,  though 
occasional  special  sessions  were  held.45  The  records  were 
naturally  kept  in  French.46  Individual  justices  had  juris 
diction  in  civil  cases  up  to  twenty-five  shillings,  as  elsewhere 
in  Virginia.  The  law  was  French,  the  "coutume  de  Paris," 
somewhat  modified  by  the  laws  of  Virginia.  Attempts  were 
made  to  imitate  English  forms ;  but  on  the  whole,  as  was 
to  be  expected  in  courts  composed  of  French  Creoles,  French 
practice  was  followed.  Juries,  though  employed  in  criminal 
cases47,  were  not  popular.  In  civil  cases  litigants  usually 
preferred  to  have  the  court  decide.  To  the  French  it  seemed 

38  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ixi. 

sslbid. 

"Ibid.,  13. 

41  Ibid.,  Ixii. 

42  Ibid.,  Ivii. 

43  Am.  St.  Papers,  "Public  Lands,"  I,  10. 
"Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ivii,  Ixii. 

48  Ibid.,  Ixii. 

48  Cf.  "Cahokia  Court  Records,"  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II, 
22-447,  passim.  Records  in  the  courts  established  by  Clark  seem  to 
have  been  kept  in  English,  ibid.,  4  ct  seq. 

47 Ibid.,  12-21.  For  a  jury  trial  in  the  Cahokia  court  see  ibid.,  70. 
The  statement  that  juries  were  not  introduced  till  after  the  Ordi 
nance  of  1787  (Boyd,  op.  cit.,  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  IV,  632)  is  wrong. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER    VIRGINIA.  87 

juster  than  submission  of  facts  to  a  jury.48  Prosecutions 
were  brought  by  the  state's  attorney.49  The  opinion  that 
these  courts  did  very  little  work50  is  disposed  of  by  the  care 
ful  records  of  the  Cahokia  court.51  The  scarcity  of  com 
petent  persons  in  Illinois  accounts,  no  doubt,  for  the  fact 
that  the  names  of  men  holding  militia  commissions  are 
encountered  as  judges. 

The  problem  confronting  Todd  was  exceedingly  difficult. 
He  was  called  upon  to  preside  over  French  Creoles  and 
American  merchants,  traders  and  pioneers,  a  truly  hetero 
geneous  population.  The  knowledge  of  the  French- Ameri 
can  alliance  and  the  enthusiasm  felt  for  Clark  and  the 
United  States  had  almost  brought  the  French  and  the 
Americans  together.  But  it  was  a  temporary  union.  They 
differed  not  more  in  race,  language  and  religion,  than  in 
temperament,  taste  and  tradition.  But  other  and  more  fatal 
difficulties  were  not  slow  in  making  their  appearance. 

The  paper  money  in  which  the  Creoles  had  been  paid  for 
supplies  furnished  to  Clark's  men  was  a  cause  of  endless 
trouble.  As  stated  above,  it  was  greatly  depreciated,  but 
was  for  a  time  accepted  at  par.  The  possibility  of  making 
profits  out  of  it  proved  attractive  to  "Yankee"  speculators, 
who  arrived  in  Illinois  in  the  spring  of  1779,  while  Clark 
was  on  the  Vincennes  expedition.  They  outbid  one  another, 
offering  fabulous  prices,  and  the  people  woke  up  to  the  fact 
that  they  had  been  swindled  and  refused  to  accept  the 
money.  Clark  would  have  been  in  a  pitiable  position, 
indeed,  had  not  some  of  the  merchants  supplied  him  with 
necessaries.52  The  natural  result  was  an  enormous  rise  of 
prices,  which  was  enhanced  by  the  fact  that  the  American 
occupation  of  Vincennes,  blocking  the  most  important  com 
mercial  route  between  Illinois  and  Canada,  caused  a 

48  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ixiii. 

49  Ibid.,  Ixi,  18  et  seq. 

50  Boyd,  op.  cit.,  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  IV,  632.    When  this  was  written, 
however,   the   Kaskaskia   and   Cahokia   records    had   not   yet   been 
brought  to  light. 

51  See  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  22  ct  seq. 
K  English,  op.  cit.,  I,  400-401. 


88  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

scarcity  of  commodities.53  The  people  of  Illinois  felt  and 
continued  to  feel  that  they  had  been  deceived  and  cheated 
by  the  Virginians. 

Before  his  arrival  in  Illinois,  Todd  learned  that  Congress 
had  ordered  the  issues  of  Continental  money  dated  May  20, 
1777.  and  April  u,  1778,  to  be  paid  into  the  Continental 
loan  offices  by  June  i,  1779.  Otherwise  they  would  be 
worthless.54  The  hardship  and  injustice  which  this  measure 
would  work  in  Illinois  can  readily  be  imagined.  Todd 
thought  that  a  time  extension  should  be  given  to  the  people, 
who  had  not  only  accepted  the  money,  but  had  taken  it  at 
face  value.  He  accordingly  ordered  all  the  paper  of  the 
called-in  emissions  to  be  removed  from  circulation  and 
sealed  up.55 

For  this  he  was  blamed  by  some,  on  the  ground  that 
it  was  injurious,  and  even  fatal  to  Virginia's  credit.56 
The  people  of  Kaskaskia  received  certificates  from  Todd  in 
exchange  for  the  paper  money.  At  Vincennes,  Legras  was 
instructed  to  see  that  all  the  money  of  the  called-in  emis 
sions  was  sealed  up,  and  to  give  the  holders  certificates. 
These  Todd  hoped  Congress  would  some  day  redeem.57 
About  $15,000  of  greatly  depreciated  paper  was  thus 
removed  from  circulation  in  and  about  Kaskaskia,  but  a 
great  many  notes  of  these  issues  remained  in  possession  of 
the  inhabitants  and  became  worthless.58  By  the  summer 
of  1779  it  became  almost  impossible  to  purchase  supplies 
for  the  troops.59  Hence  animosity  was  engendered  between 
the  military  and  civil  authorities.  The  former  seem 
to  have  thought  Todd  was  responsible  for  the  growing 
difficulty  of  procuring  provisions  and  accused  him  of 

n:'G//.  Va.  St.  Papers,  III,  501. 

'A  Colls.  111.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  IT,  Ixxi.    For  this  resolution  of  Congress 
(2  Jan.,  1779)  see  Pennsylvania  Archives,  VII,  156. 
•'"''Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III,  317. 
™  Colls.  Ill  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ixxiii. 
r'7  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III,  320-321. 
w  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II.  Ixxi. 
™Ibid.,  614-615. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA.  89 

championing  the  French.60  This  was  not  true,  for  Todd, 
in  trying  to  bolster  up  Virginia's  credit,  ordered  the  people 
to  receive  Continental  money  at  a  par  with  Spanish 
piasters.61  In  Vincennes  several  persons  were  imprisoned 
for  refusing.62  Todd's  policy  was,  of  course,  equivalent  to 
a  system  of  forced  loans.  The  legislature  of  Virginia 
finally  committed  itself  to  this  policy  by  passing  an  act  in 
March,  1781,  ordering  that  all  bills  of  credit  emitted  by 
Congress  and  the  state  of  Virginia,  as  well  as  all  bills  of 
credit  issued  by  the  governor,  should  "to  all  intents  and 
purposes"  be  considered  as  legal  tender.63  The  unfortunate 
Creoles  were  also  subjected  to  the  evils  of  counterfeit 
money.64 

Some  of  the  acquisitive  Easterners  who  reached  Illinois 
in  the  summer  of  1779  engaged  in  land  speculation.65  On 
June  14,  Todd  issued  a  proclamation  relating  to  this 
subject.  To  protect  just  claims,  every  inhabitant  was 
required  to  lay  before  persons  chosen  in  each  district  for 
the  purpose  a  memorandum  of  his  land,  with  vouchers, 
depositions,  or  certificates  to  support  his  claim.  The  mem 
orandum  was  to  prove  the  title.  New  settlements  on  the 
"flat  lands"  of  the  Mississippi,  Ohio,  Illinois  and  Wabash 
rivers,  or  "within  one  league  of  said  lands,"  unless  in  the 
French  form  of  settlement,  were  forbidden  until  further 
orders.66  It  was  the  policy  of  Virginia  to  confirm  and  protect 
the  titles  and  property  rights  of  her  new  citizens  and  to  pre 
vent  private  purchase  of  land  from  the  Indians.67  In  May, 
1779,  the  Virginia  Assembly  passed  an  act  declaring  that  the 
commonwealth  had  the  exclusive  right  of  purchasing  lands 

60  For  evidence  of  the  breach  between  Todd  and  the  military  see 
ibid.,  615-616. 

61  See  a  memorial  of  the  people  of  Vincennes  to  the  governor  of 
Virginia,  30  June,  1781,  English,  op.  cit.,  II,  738. 

62  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III.,  328-329. 
^Hening,  op.  cit.,  X,  398. 

64  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III.,  328-329. 

65  Ibid.,  318-319- 

66  Proclamation  relating  to  land,  by  Todd,  14  June,  1779,  ibid.,  301. 

67  Hening,  op.  cit.,  X,  161-162. 


90  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

from  the  Indians  within  its  chartered  limits.  Private  pur 
chases  both  past  and  future,  were  declared  void.68  The 
assembly  also  forbade  new  settlements  northwest  of  the 
Ohio.69  Sometimes,  if  nobody  could  successfully  claim  it, 
land  was  adjudged  to  the  state.70  Todd  believed  that 
purchases  by  individuals  from  the  Indians  should  be  pre 
vented  under  fine,  and  also  that  new  settlements  should  be 
made  only  under  certain  regulations.71  After  his  departure 
from  Illinois,  however,  no  attention  was  paid  either  to  his 
proclamation  or  to  the  Virginia  law.72  The  Vincennes 
court,  with  the  concurrence  of  Legras,  assumed  authority 
to  grant  land,  and  kept  on  doing  so  for  several  years.  They 
later  sought  to  justify  their  course  by  saying  that  former 
commandants  at  Vincennes  had  exercised  this  power,  and 
that  they  had  done  it  with  Legras'  permission.73 

But  the  support  of  the  troops  was  probably  Todd's  most 
difficult  problem.  They  required  food  and  clothing.  The 
people  would  no  longer  sell  supplies  for  paper  money,  and 
many  drafts  on  Virginia  and  on  Oliver  Pollock  were  pro 
tested.74  Unauthorized  drafts  seem  to  have  been  made  on 
other  sources.75  On  June  15,  1779,  while  the  expedition 
against  Detroit76  was  under  discussion,  Todd,  anticipating 
an  absence  from  Kaskaskia,  instructed  Winston  to  consult 
the  members  of  the  court  regarding  supplies  which  Clark 
might  want.  If  the  people,  having  it  in  their  power,  refused 
to  dispose  of  their  goods,  Winston  was  authorized  to  impress 
provisions  'Valuing  the  property  by  two  men  upon  oath." 
On  no  account  was  he  to  give  the  troops  a  pretext  for 
"forcing"  property.77  On  August  n,  Todd,  by  proclama- 

08  Hening,  op.  cit.,  X,  97-98. 

ca  Ibid.,  557,  and  Rowland,  op.  cit.,  I,  364-365. 

70  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III.,  308. 

71  Ibid.,  318. 

72  Colls.  III.  St.  Plist.  Lib.,  II,  Ixx. 

n  Am.  St.  Papers,  "Public  Lands,"  I,  10,  16,  71. 

74  Colls.  III.,  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  IT,  Ixxv. 

75  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  111,  322. 
70  See  supra,  ch.  V. 

77  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  111,  302. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA.  91 

tion,  invited  the  people  of  Kaskaskia  to  contract  with  com 
missaries  appointed  to  procure  provisions  for  the  troops. 
"I  hope,"  he  said,  "they'll  use  properly  the  indulgence  of 
a  mild  government.  If  I  shall  be  obliged  to  give  the  military 
permission  to  press,  it  will  be  a  disadvantage,  and  what 
ought  more  to  influence  freemen,  it  will  be  a  dishonor  to 
the  people."78  On  August  20,  Colonel  Montgomery  pro 
posed  that  one  of  the  citizens  of  Kaskaskia  be  appointed 
to  assess  the  inhabitants  for  the  support  of  the  troops.79 
Evidently  the  former  enthusiasm  and  self-denial  of  the 
people  were  now  things  of  the  past. 

On  August  22,  the  county-lieutenant  issued  another 
proclamation  enjoining  the  inhabitants  of  the  county  from 
exporting  provisions  for  a  period  of  sixty  days,  "unless  I 
shall  have  assurances  before  that  time  that  a  sufficient  stock 
is  laid  up  for  the  troops,  or  sufficient  security  is  given  to 
the  contractors  for  its  delivery  whenever  required."  Vio 
lations  of  this  order  were  to  be  punished  by  imprisonment 
for  one  month.80  Measures  were  taken  to  put  this  proc 
lamation  in  execution  in  the  other  villages  as  well  as  in 
Kaskaskia.81  The  Kaskaskia  court  levied  assessments  on 
the  inhabitants  and  a  considerable  amount  of  supplies  was 
thus  secured  for  the  time,  with  the  natural  result  of  widen 
ing  the  breach  between  the  people  and  the  government. 

This  breach  was  made  irreparable  by  Todd's  policy  of 
supporting  the  troops  on  Virginia's  credit,  when  her 
treasury  was  empty  and  her  credit  gone.  Pollock  at  New 
Orleans  found  it  increasingly  difficult  to  borrow  on  the 
state's  credit  for  the  purpose  of  negotiating  bills  drawn 
against  himself.82  Perhaps  it  would  have  been  impossible 
for  any  man  in  Todd's  position  to  have  succeeded.  In  his 
instructions  he  had  been  told  to  aid  the  military  and  defend 
the  rights  and  liberties  of  the  people.  These  two  injunc- 

"Ibid.,  305. 

79  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ixxvi-lxxvii. 

80  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  111.,  306. 


"Ibid.,  323. 


92  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

tions,  with  the  development  of  circumstances,  were  incom 
patible.  The  support  of  the  troops,  with  conditions  as  they 
were,  meant  injustice  to  the  people.  Todd  tried  to  do  his 
duty,  but  his  position  was  an  impossible  one.  He  soon 
became  convinced  of  the  hopelessness  of  it.  As  early  as 
August  1 8,  1779,  in  a  letter  to  the  governor  of  Virginia,  he 
asked  permission  to  attend  the  legislature  the  following 
spring,  and  ''get  a  discharge  from  an  office  which  an 
unwholesome  air,  a  distance  from  my  connections,  a  lan 
guage  not  familiar  to  me,  and  an  impossibility  of  procuring 
many  of  the  conveniences  of  life  suitable,  all  tend  to  render 
uncomfortable."83  In  November  of  that  year,  he  left  Kas- 
kaskia  for  Kentucky,  and  arrived  at  the  Falls  of  the  Ohio 
in  December.84  He  did  not,  however,  resign  his  position 
as  county-lieutenant,  and  returned  for  a  short  time  in 
I78o.85  Correspondence  was  continued  between  him  and 
the  people  and  officials  in  Illinois,  and  as  long  as  he  lived86 
he  took  a  lively  interest  in  the  affairs  of  the  county.87 
Before  leaving,  he  appears  to  have  abandoned  his  earlier 
opposition  to  " forcing"  supplies, ss  for  he  gave  a  general 
consent  to  impressment  by  the  troops  of  the  property  of  the 
people.89  After  his  departure  Winston  served  as  his 
deputy.90 

Very  early  in  the  life  of  the  court  established  by  Todd 
at  Kaskaskia  we  find  the  Creole  judges  championing  the 
interests  of  the  inhabitants  against  the  troops.  Probably 
the  very  qualities  which  had  fitted  Clark's  men  for  the  work 
they  had  accomplished  unfitted  them  for  dwelling  peace 
ably  among  the  people.  The  typical  American  frontiers 
man — and  that  was  the  class  from  which  Clark's  men  had 

w  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III.,  287. 

84  See  dates  of  letters  in  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  I,  358;  see  also  Colls. 
III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  617. 

™  Ibid.,  Ixxix-lxxx. 

scHe  was  killed  in  the  Battle  of  the  Blue  Licks  in  1782. 

*'  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III,  335. 

*Ibid.,  302. 

*' Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  IT,  Ixxviii. 

""Mason,  Early  Chic.  ,n:d  III.,  302,  and  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib., 
II.  Ixxix. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA.  93 

been  recruited — possessed  many  virtues.  He  was  hardy, 
self-reliant  and  brave.  But  he  was  not  distinctively  peace- 
loving,  or  law-abiding.  His  passionate  belief  in  himself 
and  in  his  race  filled  him  with  contempt  for  other  peoples. 
He  was  usually  self-assertive  and  boastful.  His  fierce 
individualism  and  aggressive  democracy  caused  him  to  pay 
little  respect  to  constituted  authority.  He  considered  him 
self  the  equal  of  any  American,  and  immeasurably  superior 
to  men  of  other  races.  To  him,  no  doubt,  the  gentler  and 
more  refined  qualities  of  the  French  Creoles  suggested 
effeminacy  and  cowardice.  These  people  spoke,  moreover, 
a  language  he  could  not  understand,  and  in  religion  there 
was  no  common  ground  upon  which  the  followers  of  Calvin 
could  meet  the  adherents  of  Loyola.  Clark,  popular  with 
both,  had,  no  doubt,  done  much  to  ward  off  a  clash  between 
them.  But  even  he  could  not  permanently  have  prevented 
it,  and  when  he  took  up  his  headquarters  at  the  Falls  of  the 
Ohio,  his  immediate  influence  was  at  an  end. 

As  early  as  May  24,  1779,  the  court  of  the  Kaskaskia 
district  addressed  a  memorial  to  Todd  setting  forth  the 
grievances  of  the  people.  The  soldiers  had  been  seizing 
and  killing  their  animals.  Even  beasts  of  burden  had  not 
been  spared.  "We  have  always  been  ready,"  said  the 
memorialists,  "to  furnish  animals  for  the  garrison  in  so 
far  as  it  was  in  our  power,  and  are  still  ready  as  far  as 
we  have  resources.  If  it  is  permitted  that  our  beasts  of 
burden  be  killed,  how  can  we  cultivate  our  fields,  and 
furnish  the  needs  of  the  garrison  and  those  of  our  fam 
ilies  ?"  The  evil  of  trade  in  intoxicants  with  the  Indians 
was  also  complained  of.  Todd  was  requested  to  prohibit 
this,  and  also  to  forbid  traffic  with  slaves  without  their 
masters'  permission.91  The  first  of  these  evils,  the  killing 
of  cattle,  was  the  greatest,  and  of  it  we  have  constant  com 
plaint  from  this  time  on.92 

91  Colls.  111.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ixvii-lxviii. 

92  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III.,  337-338;   Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  IT, 
Ixxx,  548;    English,  op.  cit.,  II,  738;   Cat.  Va.  St.  Papers,  II,  192-193, 
Address  to  Congress  from  the  French  Inhabitants  of  Post  Vincennes, 
Kaskaskia,  etc.,  1788. 


94  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

Conditions  were  bad  enough  while  Todd  remained  in 
Illinois.  They  became  worse  when  he  left.  The  methods 
which  had  made  Wallenstein's  army  the  scourge  of  Ger 
many  were  regularly  employed  by  the  troops.  The 
worst  features  of  militarism  appeared.  Tyranny  and 
brigandage  was  the  rule  of  the  day.93  It  was  not  only 
from  seizures  of  their  property  that  the  people  suffered. 
Troops  were  quartered  in  their  homes,  for  whose  board  only 
worthless  notes  were  given.94  In  December,  1779,  in 
response  to  a  petition  from  the  inhabitants,  the  Kaskaskia 
court  demanded  of  Montgomery  that  the  troops  should  be 
prevented  from  seizing  property  without  their  order,  and 
threatened  to  appeal  to  the  governor  and  assembly  of  Vir 
ginia.  To  this  Montgomery  paid  no  heed.  He  even 
threatened  to  treat  persons  who  refused  supplies  as 
traitors  "to  the  cause  of  America."95 

The  troops  were  recalled  from  Cahokia  in  the  autumn 
of  i/79,9G  much  to  the  joy  of  the  inhabitants.  Richard 
McCarty,  commander  of  the  detachment  stationed  there,  had 
made  himself  odious  to  the  people  by  playing  the  role  of 
military  tyrant.97  He  wrote  to  Todd  in  October  1780, 
".  .  .  .  we  are  become  the  hated  beasts  of  a  whole  peo 
ple  ....  the  people  are  now  entirely  alienated  against  us."08 
In  January,  1780,  Montgomery  asked  the  people  of  Cahokia 
for  supplies."  The  court  agreed  that  a  census  should  'he 
taken  and  the  people  forced  to  contribute  according  to  their 
capacity.100  It  is  pathetic  to  find  the  Cahokians  asking 
Clark  for  aid,  but  expressing  fears  lest  he  should  send  more 
men  than  they  could  support.101 

"Colls.  111.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ixxx. 

04  Ibid.,  546. 

'*  Ibid.,  Ixxxi-lxxxii. 

96  Ibid.,  546. 

97  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  111,  335. 
"Ibid.,  337-338. 

w  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  34. 
100  Ibid.,  34,  36. 
w  Ibid.,  531. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA.  95 

It  is  evident  that  the  civil  authorities  were  unable  to 
remedy  the  evils  of  military  oppression.  Winston,  Todd's 
deputy,  had  never  been  popular  with  the  French,102  and  was 
suspected  by  them,  as  well  as  by  the  troops.  He  quarreled 
with  Montgomery,  and  accused  him  of  attempting  to  bring 
the  county  under  military  rule  and  to  throw  off  the  civil 
authority  altogether.103  He  was  for  a  time  actually  impris 
oned  by  military  order.104  But  he  seems  to  have  done 
nothing  to  forward  the  interests  of  the  people.105  Many 
of  them  suspected  him  of  double  dealing,  and  he  was  later 
accused  of  instigating  the  troops  against  the  people,  while 
at  the  same  time  urging  the  latter  to  resist.106  He  got  into 
a  dispute  with  the  Kaskaskia  court  on  the  subject  of 
arbitrary  appointments.107  A  worse  man  to  represent  the 
civil  government  could  scarcely  have  been  selected. 

Corruption,  moreover,  seems  to  have  found  its  way  into 
the  Kaskaskia  court.  In  the  midst  of  general  distress  and 
poverty,  the  justices  took  the  opportunity  to  demand 
higher  pay.108  The  state's  attorney  accused  them  of  laxity 
in  allowing  new  settlers,  of  whom  nothing  was  known,  to 
take  up  land  without  subscribing  to  an  oath  of  allegiance  to 
the  United  States.109 

The  lawless  example  of  the  troops  was  followed  by  some 
of  the  new  settlers  from  the  East,  who  helped  themselves 
to  their  neighbors'  property.  The  Kaskaskia  court  tried 
and  punished  several  of  them.110  Tramps  and  other  unde 
sirables,  moreover,  appeared  in  Illinois ;  Clark  urged  the 
Kaskaskia  court  to  proceed  against  them  to  the  fullest 
extent.111 

102  Ibid.,  cvii. 

103  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III,  339. 

104  English,  op.  tit.,  II,  736. 

105  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ixxxvi. 
108  Ibid.,  cxx-cxxi. 

107  Ibid.,  cvi-cvii.    For  a  view  of  the  evil  results  of  the  activities  of 
Winston  and  McCarty,  see  John  Rogers  to  Jefferson,  29  Apr.,  1781, 
Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  II,  77. 

108  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ixxxiv. 

109  Ibid.,  Ixxxiv-lxxxv. 

110  Ibid.,  cvi. 

111  Ibid.,  cix. 


96  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

An  emigration  across  the  Mississippi  had  begun  by 
the  close  of  1779.  The  best  class  was  leaving  the  country. 
Cerre  went  before  the  end  of  the  year.  Gratiot,  one 
of  Cahokia's  leading  citizens,  unable  to  tolerate  con 
ditions  in  Illinois,  moved  to  St.  Louis,112  where  he  became 
prominent.113  Both  of  these  men  had  rendered  the  Amer 
ican  cause  valuable  assistance,  and  both  continued  to 
entertain  friendship  for  Clark  personally.  The  people  of 
Illinois  in  general  did  not  attribute  the  evils  that  had  come 
upon  them  to  him.  Indeed,  they  came  to  look  back  on  his 
administration  as  a  period  of  comparative  happiness.114 
This  view  seems  to  have  been  shared  by  the  Americans  as 
well.115  But  many  of  the  inhabitants  were  so  disgusted  with 
the  way  Virginia  government  was  working  out,  that  they 
would  have  welcomed  even  a  restoration  of  British  rule.110 

An  episode  which  occurred  in  1780  further  illustrates  the 
growing  hostility  between  the  people  of  Illinois  and  the 
Virginia  authorities.  In  July  of  that  year  a  Frenchman, 
Augustin  Mottin  de  la  Balme  by  name,  appeared  in  Vin- 
cennes  and  shortly  after  in  Kaskaskia.  The  purpose  of  his 
presence  in  Illinois  is  not  perfectly  clear.  He  had  held  a 
commission  in  the  Continental  army,  but  had  resigned  and 
gone  into  business  in  Philadelphia.117  He  claimed  to  be  in 
the  American  service,118  and  was  promoting  an  expedition 
against  Detroit,  which,  he  hoped,  if  successful,  would  result 
in  a  general  rising  of  the  Canadians  against  the  English. 
But  the  time  when  a  joint  enterprise  of  Americans  and 
French,  like  the  expedition  of  February  1779  against  Vin- 
cennes,  could  have  been  possible,  had  passed.  De  la  Balme 
consequently  devoted  himself  to  arousing  the  French,  and 
ignored  the  Virginia  authorities.  He  had  nothing  to  say 

112  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  556.     See  also  Houck,  op.  cit.,  II, 
47-48. 

113  Houck,  op.  cit.,  II,  383- 

114  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  II,  192-193. 

115  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  621. 
110  Ibid.,  562. 

1:7  Ibid.,  xc,  and  authorities  in  note  2. 
""English,  op.  cit.,  II,  695. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA.  97 

to  Montgomery.119  He  tried  to  show  the  people  that  Con 
gress  was  ignorant  of  the  way  they  had  been  oppressed  by 
the  Virginia  troops,  and  urged  them  to  ask  the  French 
minister  at  Philadelphia  to  force  Virginia  to  redeem  the 
paper  money  and  withdraw  the  troops.120  He  also  urged 
them  to  undertake  an  expedition  against  Detroit,  "which 
will  win  the  confidence  of  the  honorable  Congress."121 

De  la  Balme's  hostility  toward  the  Virginia  government 
in  Illinois  may  be  explained  reasonably  enough  by  that 
government's  complete  failure.  It  has  been  suggested,  in 
the  attempt  to  substantiate  the  theory  that  France  was  try 
ing  to  reconstruct  her  colonial  empire,122  that  he  was  an 
emissary  sent  by  the  French  government  to .  arouse  the 
Creoles  for  that  end;123  and  it  is  true  that  in  a  manifesto 
which  he  intended  to  publish  after  he  got  to  Canada,  no 
mention  was  made  of  Congress  or  of  the  United  States.124 
The  British  at  Detroit,  moreover,  believed  that  his  activities 
were  independent  of  the  United  States.125  Another  theory 
to  explain  his  presence  in  Illinois  is  that  it  was  in  further 
ance  of  a  plan  of  Washington  and  Luzerne,  the  French 
minister  to  the  United  States,  to  incite  the  Canadians  to 
throw  off  British  rule.126  His  hostility  towards  Americans, 
indeed,  seems  to  have  been  confined  to  the  Virginians.  He 
never  spoke  disrespectfully  of  Congress.  Neither  theory 
has  been  proved. 

The  character  of  his  reception  by  the  French  Creoles, 
however,  is  not  doubtful.  They  looked  upon  him  as  a  Moses 

119  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  620. 

120  "An  Address  of  De  la  Balme  to  the  Inhabitants,"  ibid.,  xci. 

121  Ibid.,  xcii. 

122  See  infra,  ch.  VII. 

123  Turner,    "The  Policy  of  France  toward  the  Mississippi  Valley 
in  the  Period  of  Washington  and  Jefferson,"  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  X,  255, 
note  2. 

124  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ixxxix,  note  3. 

125  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  XIX,  581. 

126  This  explanation  is  offered  by  Mr.  Alvord,  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist. 
Lib.,  II,  Ixxxix. 


98  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

who  would  lead  them  out  of  a  hateful  bondage ;  they 
received  him  as  the  Hebrews  would  have  received  the 
Messiah.1-7  It  may  well  be  that  De  la  Balme  thought  an 
expression  of  hostility  towards  Virginia  would  strengthen 
him  with  the  inhabitants.  At  any  rate,  he  allowed  them 
to  hope  that  the  French  king  would  again  rule  over  Illi 
nois,1-8  and  he  seems  to  have  created  the  impression  among 
the  Virginia  officers  that  his  mission  was  hostile  to  the 
American  cause.129  It  was  even  said  that  he  had  announced 
that  French  troops  would  be  in  Illinois  in  the  spring.130 

Having  collected  between  fifty  and  one  hundred  volun 
teers,  De  la  Balme  started  for  Detroit  under  French 
colors,11'1  possibly  because  the  Creoles  \vould  march  under 
no  others.  He  attacked  and  captured  the  little  British  post 
at  the  head  of  the  Wabash  (Miamitown),  plundered,  and 
destroyed  cattle.  Indians,  however,  attacked  his  party  and 
killed  about  thirty.132  His  papers,  including  memorials 
from  the  Illinois  villages  to  Luzerne,  were  captured.133 
This  unsuccessful  and  abortive  expedition  still  further 
increased  the  hostility  of  the  Creoles  towards  the  govern 
ment.  Their  hopes  of  a  restoration  to  France  were,  for  the 
time  at  least,  destroyed. 

Another  episode  which  has  attracted  some  attention 
followed  De  la  Balme's  activities  in  Illinois.  Before  start 
ing  for  Detroit  he  had  instigated  a  party  of  Cahokians  to 
undertake  an  expedition  against  the  small  British  post  of 
St.  Joseph,  in  what  is  now  the  state  of  Michigan.  They 
succeeded  in  capturing  a  number  of  traders  and  carrying 
off  some  property,  but  after  leaving  were  overtaken  by  a 
party  of  Indians  who  captured  or  killed  nearly  all  of 

127  Cal  Va.  St.  Papers,  I,  380. 

128  "Memorial   of    the   Inhabitants   of   Cahokia   to    De   la   Balme/' 
Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  551. 

129  McCarty's  Journal,  ibid.,  618. 

130  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III.,  337-338. 

131  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xcii  and  note. 
iazMich.  P.  Colls.,  XIX,  581. 

33  Those  from  Cahokia  and  Vincennes  are  in  the  Canadian 
Archives. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA.  99 

them.13*  The  Cahokians,  eager  for  revenge,  then  raised  a 
party  of  about  twenty  men.  Francisco  Cruzat,  who  had 
succeeded  Leyba  as  commandant  of  St.  Louis,  was  at  the 
same  time  organizing  an  expedition  to  attack  British  posts 
east  of  the  Mississippi.135  The  two  enterprises  appear  to 
have  been  united,  and  a  mixed  party  of  Spaniards,  French 
Creoles  and  Indians,  under  a  Spaniard,  Eugenio  Pouree, 
marched  to  St.  Joseph  in  January,  i/Si.136  They  sacked 
the  fort  and  made  good  their  escape.  Nor  could  a  sufficient 
force  of  Indians  be  raised  to  pursue  them.137 

This  insignificant  raid  was  magnified  by  the  Spanish 
officials  into  an  important  victory.  A  highly  embellished 
account  of  it  was  printed  in  the  Madrid  Gazette  of  March 
12,  1782,  in  which  it  was  stated  that  Pouree  had  taken 
possession  of  the  post  of  St.  Joseph,  with  its  "dependen 
cies,"  and  of  the  Illinois  river.138  During  the  peace 
negotiations  in  1782,  the  Spanish  ambassador  to  France 
referred  to  this  episode  as  a  conquest  which  justified  Spain 
in  claiming  the  Northwest.139 

In  the  spring  of  1780,  the  situation  in  Illinois  was  as 
gloomy  as  can  well  be  imagined.  Besides  the  grave 
internal  disorders  already  described,  there  was  external 
danger  from  anticipated  British  and  Indian  attacks.140 
British  officials  at  the  lake  posts,  indeed,  were  meditating  the 
capture  of  all  Spanish  and  American  settlements  on  the  Mis 
sissippi.141  Clark  knew  something  of  their  designs,  which, 
he  feared,  might  result  in  the  loss  of  Illinois  and  Ken 
tucky.  He  could  not  maintain  garrisons  sufficient  to  defend 
all  the  Illinois  villages  from  such  an  attack  as  the  British 
and  Indians  were  likely  to  deliver.  The  only  way,  in  his 
opinion,  to  hold  the  country  was  to  evacuate  his  present 

134  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  XIX,  591-592;    Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  I,  465. 

135  Houck,  op.  cit.,  II,  42. 

136  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  I,  465 ;    Houck,  op.  cit.,  II,  42-43.  • 

137  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  XIX,  600. 

138  Houck,  op.  cit.,  II,  44,  note  106. 
189  See  infra,  ch.  VII. 

140  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  531;    see  also  ibid.,  547. 

141  Houck,  op.  cit.,  II,  35. 


100  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

posts  and  concentrate  his  forces  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Ohio ;  he  thought  that  a  fort  there  could  be  reenforced  by 
Kentucky  militia,  and  supported  by  families  who  might  be 
encouraged  to  emigrate  thither  by  grants  of  land.142 

The  plan  of  establishing  a  fort  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio 
was  not  new ;  Governor  Henry  had  referred  to  it  in  his 
instructions  to  Clark  in  January,  1778,  and  in  a  letter  of 
the  same  month  to  Governor  Galvez  of  New  Orleans. 
Shortly  after  his  arrival  at  Louisville,  as  the  settlement  in 
Kentucky  at  the  Falls  of  the  Ohio  was  beginning  to  be 
called,  Clark  indicated  his  intention  of  establishing  such  a 
post  and  encouraging  settlers  to  go  there.143  A  fort  and 
settlement  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio  would,  it  was  hoped, 
strengthen  Virginia's  claim  to  the  Mississippi  as  her 
western  boundary,  control  an  extensive  trade,  secure  com 
munication  with  New  Orleans,  and  serve  as  a  barrier 
against  possible  Spanish  encroachments  north  of  the 
Ohio.144 

Todd,  who  retained  his  office  though  he  had  left  Illinois, 
favored  Clark's  plan.  He  did  not  believe  in  maintaining 
the  principal  post  at  Louisville.145  But  a  garrison  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Ohio  could  not  be  maintained  without  a 
settlement  to  support  it.  He,  therefore,  granted  four 
hundred  acres  apiece  to  a  number  of  families  at  a  price 
to  be  fixed  by  the  assembly.  Preparations  were  made  to 
withdraw  the  troops  from  the  Illinois  villages.  Those  at 
Cahokia  had  already  been  recalled,  and  those  at  Vincennes 
were  withdrawn  early  in  1780,  their  place  in  garrison  being 
taken  by  militia.146  On  June  14,  1780,  Governor  Jefferson 
wrote  to  the  speaker  of  the  house  of  delegates  concerning 
the  establishment  of  a  post  near  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio, 
referring  to  the  assembly  the  measures  of  Clark  and  Todd. 

:42  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  I,  338. 

143  Ibid.,  331. 

144  Ibid.,  338,  358;   Henry  to  the  governor  of  Xcvv  Orleans,  14  Jan., 
1778,  Bancroft  MSS.;    Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  So. 

146  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III.,  345. 
^  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  I,  358. 


ILLINOIS   UNDER   VIRGINIA.  IOI 

Jefferson  implied  that  the  expense  attending  the  support 
of  the  troops  in  Illinois,  and  the  trouble  about  paper  money, 
were  the  principal  causes  for  withdrawing  them  south  of 
the  Ohio.147 

The  total  evacuation  of  Illinois  was  prevented  by  the 
receipt  of  information  that  a  strong  British  and  Indian 
attack  was  imminent.148  The  British  commandant  at 
Michilimackinac  was  organizing  a  large  Indian  force  to 
capture  the  Spanish  and  American  posts  on  the  Mississippi. 
It  was  hoped  that  the  capture  of  St.  Louis  would  secure 
for  the  English  the  fur  trade  of  the  Missouri  river  region, 
which  centered  at  that  village.149  The  success  of  this  expedi 
tion  would  have  meant  the  total  destruction  of  American 
power  in  Illinois.150  Clark,  with  a  force  of  about  one 
hundred  and  twenty  officers  and  men,  was  busy  establishing 
Fort  Jefferson,  a  few  miles  south  of  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio, 
when  news  came  that  Cahokia  was  menaced.151  The 
attack  was  made  on  St.  Louis  and  Cahokia  on  May  26, 
I78o.152  But  it  was  not  unexpected.153  Preparations 
for  defense  had  been  made  at  St.  Louis,154  and  both 
Montgomery  and  Clark  were  able  to  bring  aid  to  Cahokia 
before  it  was  attacked.155  At  St.  Louis  the  Indians 
were  repulsed  though  several  of  its  defenders  were  killed 
or  captured.158  Clark  planned  a  joint  attack  with  the 
Spaniards  on  the  villages  of  the  Indians  who  had  composed 
the  expedition,  but  Montgomery,  who  was  put  in  charge 

147  Fergus  Historical  Series,  No.  33. 

148  Colls.  Ill  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ixxxvii. 

149  Houck,  op.  cit.,  II,  35-36. 

w  Ibid.,  37- 

151  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  531. 
162  Houck,  op.  cit.,  II,  38. 

153  Colls.  St.  Hist.  Soc.  Wis.,  XI,  154- 

154  Houck,  op.  cit.,  II,  37-38. 

165  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  III,  442-443. 

186  Houck,  op.  cit.,  II,  38-40.  Houck  has  used  the  report  of 
Navarro,  the  Spanish  intendant.  A  few  documents  from  the 
Canadian  Archives  relating  to  this  attack  on  St.  Louis  are  printed 
in  the  Missouri  Historical  Society  Collections,  II,  No.  6. 


102  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

of  the  enterprise,  effected  nothing.157  The  southern  part  of 
the  British  programme  was  defeated  by  the  energy  of 
Governor  Galvez,  who  succeeded  in  capturing  West  Florida. 
Fort  Jefferson  did  not  enjoy  a  long  or  tranquil  existence. 
In  July,  1780,  it  was  attacked  by  a  party  of  Indians,  who 
were,  however,  repulsed.  But  Indian  depredations  con 
tinued  to  be  of  frequent  occurrence.  The  number  of  troops, 
too  weak  to  defend  the  fort  adequately,  was  diminished 
through  frequent  desertions.  The  people  who  had  come  to 
settle  in  expectation  of  assistance  from  the  Virginia  govern 
ment  found  their  hopes  delusive,  and  many  crossed  tlvj  Mis 
sissippi  into  Spanish  territory.  Sickness  and  famine  played 
havoc  with  those  who  remained.  In  the  general  decline  of 
American  credit,  even  necessary  supplies  could  not  be 
procured.158  Clark  was  absent  from  the  post  during  a  large 
part  of  1780,  and  the  following  year  his  attention  and  efforts 
were  concentrated  on  a  proposed  expedition  against  Detroit. 
At  the  new  fort  affairs  went  from  bad  to  worse.159  Mont 
gomery  stopped  there  in  May,  1781,  on  his  way  back  from 
New  Orleans  to  Illinois.  "Want  of  provisions"  he  gave 
as  the  main  reason  for  the  evacuation  of  the  post,  which 
finally  took  place  in  June,  I782.160 

When  Montgomery  left  Illinois  for  a  visit  to  New  Orleans 
in  October,  1780,  the  few  troops  remaining  in  the  country 
were  placed  under  the  command  of  Captain  Rogers.161  The 
further  narrative  of  events  in  Illinois  is  a  mournful  com 
mentary  on  the  utter  failure  of  the  Virginia  regime.  Rogers 
fell  under  the  influence  of  two  cunning  and  unscrupulous 
adventurers  who  appeared  in  Illinois  in  1780.  Thomas 
Bentley,  a  former  resident  of  Kaskaskia,  had  been  arrested 
during  Rocheblave's  administration,  upon  the  latter's  true 

157  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  541. 

158  Mason,  Early  Chic,  and  III,  330-334;    Cat.   Va.   St.   Papers,  I, 
382,  424-425- 

159  Ibid.,  383. 

190  Ibid.,  11,313;    111,443-444- 

181  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xcv. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA.  103 

accusation  that  he  was  in  correspondence  with  the  rebels. 
He  had  been  sent  to  Quebec,  where  he  was  confined  till 
1780,  when  he  escaped.162  Returning  to  Kaskaskia,  he 
resolved  to  recoup  himself  for  his  sufferings  and  loss  of 
property,  and  punish  the  inhabitants  who,  he  believed,  had 
been  in  league  with  Rocheblave  against  him.163  He  wrote 
to  Clark,  expressing  himself  as  friendly  to  the  American 
cause,  and  about  the  same  time  also  to  Haldimand,  saying 
that  the  Illinois  villages  could  easily  be  captured,  since  the 
people  were  discontented  and  would  not  resist  British  regu 
lars,  though  they  would  always  fight  Indians,  if  they  were 
sent,  since  they  were  in  such  fear  of  their  cruelty.164  Bentley's 
correspondence  proves  the  duplicity  of  his  character.  He 
must  have  played  his  double  game  with  skill,  for  the 
Americans  in  Illinois  had  no  suspicion  of  his  correspondence 
with  the  British,  and  Clark  commended  him  as  having  "a 
universal  good  character."165 

The  other  evil  genius  of  Illinois  was  John  Dodge,  a  native 
of  Connecticut.  Early  in  the  Revolution  Dodge  had  been 
engaged  in  trading  in  the  Northwest.  He  had  been 
captured  by  the  British,  and  taken  first  to  Detroit  and  then 
to  Quebec,  but  escaped  in  I778.166  Dodge  impressed  Wash 
ington  as  a  man  of  intelligence,  well  acquainted  with  the 
West  and  the  Indians,  who  could  be  employed  usefully 
in  any  western  enterprise  that  Congress  might  have  in 
view.167 

The  monetary  situation  in  Illinois  at  once  appealed  to 
the  mercenary  instincts  of  this  pair  of  Yankee  minds,  and 
a  sort  of  partnership  was  formed  by  them  to  buy  up  the 
paper  certificates  held  by  the  people.168  It  is  probable  that 

™Mich.  P.  Colls,,  XIX,  324  et  seq. 
163  Colls.  Ill,  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xcvi. 
™Ibid.,  note  3,  and  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  XIX,  561-562. 

165  Cal  Va.  St.  Papers,  II,  153. 

166  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xcv,  and  note  4;    Official  Letters  to 
the  Honorable  American  Congress  by  Washington,  II,  345-346. 

167  Ibid.,  346. 

168  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  621. 


104  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

they  resorted  to  dishonesty  in  their  operations.169  Their 
activities,  at  any  rate,  increased  the  hatred  felt  by  the 
Illinois  Creoles  towards  the  Virginia  authorities,  and  were 
probably  a  partial  cause  of  the  zeal  with  which  the  people 
welcomed  De  la  Balme.  Some  of  the  Americans  also  were 
antagonized.  McCarty,  who  had  been  a  vigorous  supporter 
of  the  military  regime  and  an  opponent  of  Todd,  changed 
his  attitude.  He  had  been  arrested  by  order  of  Mont 
gomery,  before  the  latter  left  Illinois  in  1780,  and  this  fact 
may  partially  explain  his  new  point  of  view.  But  in  a 
letter  written  to  Todd,  McCarty  implies  that  his  change  of 
feeling  was  caused  by  the  scandalous  traffic  of  Bentley  and 
Dodge.170  From  this  time  on  he  sided  with  the  inhabitants 
and  advised  them  to  refuse  supplies  for  the  troops,171  as 
did  Winston,  who  accused  Dodge  of  promoting  faction 
and  discord,  of  bribery,  and  of  trying  to  overthrow  the 
laws  of  the  state.172 

Rogers,  on  his  side,  entertained  a  lively  hatred  for  the 
representatives  of  the  civil  government,  and  expressed  the 
opinion  that  the  people  had  been  too  leniently  treated.  He 
professed  to  regard  Winston  and  McCarty  as  instruments 
of  turbulence  and  sedition,  inciting  the  people  to  "an 
absolute  state  of  rebellion."173  Todd,  who  continued  to 
receive  complaints  from  Illinois,  believed  that  the  "avarice 
and  prodigality"  of  the  Virginia  officers  were  chiefly 
responsible  for  the  sad  condition  of  the  country.  "They 

all,"  he  wrote,  "vent  complaints  against  each  other 

I  believe  our  French  friends  have  the  justest  grounds  of 
dissatisfaction."174 

The  withdrawal  of  most  of  the  troops  from  the  Illinois 
villages  threw  the  work  of  defense  more  upon  the  inhabi 
tants.  In  July,  1780,  the  Kaskaskians  defended  themselves 

1Rn  Cal  Va.  St.  Papers,  I,  381 ;  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xcvii,  481. 

170  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  I,  379-380. 

171  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  xcviii. 

172  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  I,  381. 

173  Ibid.,  II,  77. 
™Ibid.,  II,  45. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA.  105 

successfully  against  an  Indian  attack.175  In  August  the 
Cahokia  court,  in  expectation  of  a  similar  attack,  convoked 
the  militia  officers  and  principal  inhabitants  to  deliberate  on 
the  best  means  to  avoid  a  surprise.176  They  decided  to  move 
against  the  enemy,  rather  than  stand  an  attack,  and  directed 
that  provisions  for  a  fortnight  should  be  kept  on  hand.  A 
reconnoitering  party  was  sent  up  to  the  Illinois  river  to 
locate  the  enemy.177  By  the  autumn  of  1780,  indeed,  the 
idea  was  prevalent  among  the  people  that  Virginia  had 
practically  abandoned  Illinois. 

While  the  inhabitants,  in  constant  apprehension  of  Indian 
attacks,  were  being  robbed  of  their  all  by  the  officers  and 
speculators,  the  troops  themselves  were  suffering.  The 
commissaries  were  inefficient  and  probably  dishonest.  In 
1779,  the  Virginia  Assembly,  appreciating  the  importance 
of  holding  Illinois,  had  passed  resolutions  that  the  civil  and 
military  establishments  there  ought  to  be  supported  and 
augmented,  that  the  governor  should  be  authorized  to  pro 
cure  credit  for  that  purpose  in  New  Orleans,  and  that  the 
assembly  would  provide  funds  to  fulfill  any  engagement 
which  he,  with  the  consent  of  the  council,  might  enter 
into.178  But  Virginia's  treasury  was  empty,  and  the  only 
way  to  increase  expenditures  was  to  increase  indebtedness. 
The  fact  is  that  the  state  could  not  support  its  troops  in 
Illinois.  The  possession  of  the  country,  moreover,  was  felt 
to  be  extremely  precarious.179  The  soldiers  had  to  live  off 
the  land  and  the  people  as  best  they  could.  "The  less  you 
depend  for  supplies  from  this  quarter,"  wrote  Jefferson  to 
Clark  in  1780,  "the  less  will  you  be  disappointed."180  How 
badly  the  troops  fared  can  be  imagined.  From  Louisville, 
Vincennes  and  Fort  Jefferson  came  the  same  story  of 
neglect  and  privation.181 

116  Ibid.,  I,  368;   Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ixxxviii. 

176  Ibid.,  59. 

177  Ibid.,  61,63. 

178  Rowland,  op.  cit.,  I,  345. 

179  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  Ford's  ed.,  II,  345. 

180  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  Ixvii. 

181  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  II,  306-307,  313,  338. 


106  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

Then,  too,  Virginia's  interest  in  her  western  county  was 
declining.  As  early  as  1777,  the  proposition  that  Congress 
should  exercise  sovereign  powers  over  the  West  had  been 
made  by  Maryland's  delegates  in  Congress.182  The  western 
claims  of  Virginia  and  some  of  the  other  states  seemed  at 
that  time  likely  to  prove  fatal  to  the  formation  of  a  con 
federation,  since  the  smaller  states,  whose  cause  Maryland 
was  representing,  considered  themselves  entitled  to  a  right, 
in  common  with  all  the  others,  to  the  West.183  In  order  to 
facilitate  the  unanimous  ratification  of  the  Articles  of  Con 
federation,  the  Virginia  Assembly,  on  January  2,  1781, 
resolved  that  the  commonwealth  would  yield  to  Congress 
all  its  claims  to  territory  northwest  of  the  Ohio,  upon  cer 
tain  conditions.184  The  prospect  of  this  cession  to  Congress 
was  in  view  by  the  Virginia  authorities  at  least  as  early  as 
the  autumn  of  I78o.185  Though  it  was  not  finally  com 
pleted  until  1784,  Virginia's  interest  in  the  Northwest 
naturally  declined,  and  the  county  organization  of  Illinois, 
as  has  been  said,  was  allowed  to  expire  in  1781. 

In  the  autumn  of  1780,  a  conflict  arose  between  the 
Bentley-Dodge-Rogers  clique  and  the  Kaskaskia  court. 
Bentley  brought  a  suit  in  November,  but  the  court  refused 
to  recognize  his  standing  till  he  took  an  oath  of  fidelity  to 
the  United  States  and  to  Virginia.  This  he  refused  to  do, 
but  instead  produced  a  certificate  signed  by  Rogers  which 
declared  that  he  had  taken  the  oath.  The  court  refused  to 
accept  the  certificate.  The  civil  and  military  authorities  thus 
collided,  and  Rogers  addressed  a  bullying  note  to  the  court, 
threatening  to  set  it  aside.  But  that  body,  which  was  sup 
ported  by  Winston,  was  not  intimidated.  Bentley  left  for 
the  East  in  the  spring  of  1781  to  carry  his  case  before  the 
governor  and  council,  and  also  to  get  what  he  could  for  the 
certificates  which  he  and  Dodge  had  bought  up.  He  was 

182  Adams,    "Maryland's   Influence   in  Founding  a  National   Com 
monwealth,"    Md.  Hist.  Soc.  Fund  Pub.,  No.  u,  27-28. 

183  Hening,  op.  c\t.,  X,  549. 
l*4Ibid.,  564. 

1W  Writ,  of  Jcf.,  Ford's  ed.,  II,  347- 


ILLINOIS   UNDER   VIRGINIA.  107 

accompanied  by  the  latter  and  Rogers.  In  order  to  counter 
act  "aspersions"  against  himself  while  in  command  in 
Illinois,  Rogers  wrote  to  Governor  Jefferson,  blaming  Win 
ston  and  McCarty  for  the  existing  disorders  and  commend 
ing  the  disinterested  zeal  and  public  spirit  of  Bentley.188 
It  is  pleasant  to  learn  that  the  latter  failed  to  win  the  support 
of  the  Virginia  government.  The  council  refused  to  regard 
his  claims,  and  implied  that  he  was  an  imposter.187  This 
called  forth  a  letter  from  Bentley  in  which  he  appealed  to 
Clark's  expressed  opinion  of  his  character,  and  to  testimony 
of  Dodge  and  Montgomery  regarding  his  services  in  behalf 
of  the  troops,  and  complained  of  his  treatment  by  the 
court.188  But  the  greater  part  of  his  claims  were  still  unpaid 
when  he  died,  probably  in  I783-189  Rogers  was  back  in  Kas- 
kaskia  in  November,  1781,  but  we  hear  no  more  talk  of  his 
setting  aside  the  court.190 

The  determination  of  Bentley  to  appeal  from  the  court 
to  the  governor  caused  the  people  of  Kaskaskia  and  Cahokia 
to  send  representatives  to  the  Virginia  government,  to 
counteract  the  mischief  that  might  be  done  and  to  present 
their  claims  and  grievances.  Early  in  April,  1781,  the 
Cahokians  chose  Pierre  Prevost  to  represent  their  interests, 
and  the  Kaskaskians  chose  Prevost  and  McCarty.191  A 
memorial  addressed  to  the  governor  was  prepared  and 
signed  by  a  number  of  the  Kaskaskians,  and  other  papers 
were  drawn  up  by  the  court.192  A  similar  memorial  was 
signed  by  inhabitants  of  Vincennes  in  June.193  But 
McCarty  was  killed  by  Indians  and  his  papers  were  taken 
to  Detroit.  They  revealed  to  the  British  authorities  the  fact 
that  the  people  of  Illinois  were  suffering  great  misery 
and  were  heartily  tired  of  the  tyranny  of  the  Virginia 

186  Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  II,  76-77. 

187  Ibid.,  238. 

188  Ibid. 

189  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  cix. 


"Ibid. 

191  Ibid.,  cii-ciii,  479,  481. 

™Ibid.,  ciii. 

198 


Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers,  II,  192-193. 


108  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

authorities.194  Bentley,  as  we  have  seen,  had  made  a  similar 
statement  to  Haldimancl  the  previous  summer. 

After  1779,  British  authorities  in  the  Northwest  had 
never  been  wholly  free  from  anticipations  of  an  American 
attack  on  Detroit.195  Of  all  Americans,  Clark  was  the  man 
best  qualified  to  lead  an  expedition  against  that  post.  His 
preeminent  fitness  for  the  task  was  generally  recognized,198 
and  the  unbounded  confidence  reposed  in  him  by  the  western 
frontiersmen  was  a  matter  of  common  knowledge.197  As 
we  have  seen,  he  had  desired  to  attack  Detroit  immediately 
after  the  successful  issue  of  the  Vincennes  campaign  in 
1779.  But  the  favorable  opportunity  was  lost  for  want  of 
men.  Even  after  Mclntosh's  failure  in  1778,  Washington 
had  the  reduction  of  Detroit  constantly  in  mind,198  for  only 
by  this,  in  his  opinion,  could  the  frontiers  secure  peace.199 
Jefferson  took  a  similar  view.-00  Military  men  most  fami 
liar  with  conditions  in  the  West  were  keenly  alive  to  the 
importance  of  effecting  this  object.201  It  was  chiefly  to 
discuss  an  expedition  against  Detroit  that  Clark  went  east 
in  the  autumn  of  1780. 

Jefferson  endorsed  the  plan  and  detailed  instructions  were 
prepared  for  Clark,  who  was  to  lead  the  expedition.202 
Washington  heartily  ccooperated  with  the  proposed  enter 
prise  and  directed  Colonel  Brodhead,  the  Continental  com 
mandant  at  Fort  Pitt,  to  furnish  Clark  with  supplies  and 
as  many  men  as  he  could  spare.203  But  the  British  invasion 
of  Virginia  in  1781  prevented  the  governor  from  furnishing 
the  intended  number  of  men,204  and  Brodhead  declined  to 

™Mich.  P.  Colls.,  XIX,  646. 

135  Butterfield,  op.  cit.,  481 ;    Mich.  P.  Colls.,  XX,  3. 
1!lfl  Rowland,  op.  cit.,  I,  366. 

97  Butterfield,  Washington-Irvine  Corrcsp.,  53 ;  Writ,  of  Jcf., 
Ford's  ed.,  II,  347. 

198  Butterfield,  Washington-Irvine  Corrcsp.,  53. 
196  Ibid.,  83. 

2"°  Writ,  of  Jcf.,  Ford's  ed.,  II,  346. 
i01  P.utterfield,  Washington-Irvine  Corrcsp.,  79. 
z"-Cal.  Va.  St.  Papers.  I,  441. 
808  English,  op.  cit.,  II,  704-707. 
'"*Cal.  I'a.  V.  Papers,  II,  108-100. 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA.  109 

spare  any.205  The  war  had  lasted  so  long  that  some  of  the 
earlier  enthusiasm  had  worn  off  and  a  disinclination  to 
enlist  was  apparent.  This  and  the  decline  of  Virginia's 
credit  made  it  impossible  to  raise  the  number  necessary  to 
insure  success.206 

By  August  Clark  himself,  who  had  started  down  the  Ohio 
from  Fort  Pitt  with  what  men  he  could  collect,  had  almost 
despaired  of  success.207  Intending  to  join  him,  a  party  of 
about  one  hundred  militia,  recruited  from  the  western 
counties  of  Pennsylvania,  followed  down  the  Ohio.  Their 
commander  was  Captain  Archibald  Laughery,  county-lieu 
tenant  of  Westmoreland  County.  They  arrived  at  Wheeling 
on  August  8.  The  chief  Joseph  Brant,  with  a  party  of 
Indians,  was  watching  for  Clark  near  the  mouth  of  the 
Miami,208  but  Clark  passed  them  in  the  night  undetected. 
Laughery's  party,  however,  was  annihilated  by  Brant  and 
his  followers.207  This  disaster  gave  the  coup  de  grace  to 
the  expedition  against  Detroit.  Again  Clark  was  baffled, 
and  again  for  the  same  reason,  lack  of  men. 

This  proposed  expedition,  while  not  immediately  con 
nected  with  the  internal  history  of  Illinois,  explains  to  some 
extent  the  fact  that  the  British  commandants  at  the  lake 
posts  were  forced  to  act  on  the  defensive,  and  dared  not 
weaken  their  garrisons  by  sending  troops  to  conquer 
Illinois.210  For  offensive  operations  they  relied  upon  the 
Indians,  who  were  held  to  their  alliance  only  by  presents, 
which,  it  was  said,  made  them  inactive  and  lazy,211  and  Indian 
attacks,  on  account  of  the  cruelty  that  always  accompanied 
them,  the  people  of  Illinois  were  sure  to  resist  to  the  extent 
of  their  power.212  Information  similar  to  that  revealed  by 

205  Ibid.,  116. 

208  Ibid.,  116,  131,  294-295,  English,  op.  cit.,  II,  710-712. 
207  Cal  Va.  St.  Papers,  II,  294-295. 

908  Mich.  P.  Colls.,  XIX,  655. 

209  For  this  massacre  see  Indiana  Historical  Society  Publications, 
II,  106-107,  109-110;    also  Butterfield,   Washington-Irvine  Corresp., 
77;   Mich.  P.  Colls.,  XIX,  658. 

™Mich.  P.  Colls.,  XIX,  623,  629. 

211  Ibid.,  622-623. 

212  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  561. 


110  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

the  capture  of  McCarty's  papers  had,  for  some  time,  been 
coming  to  the  ears  of  the  British  commandants  in  the  North 
west.  It  naturally  aroused  the  hope  that  British  authority 
might  be  reestablished  over  the  Illinois  villages  by  peaceful 
means. 

Early  in  the  summer  of  1781,  Patrick  Sinclair,  who  had 
been  in  command  at  Michilimackinac  since  October,  1779, 213 
dispatched  a  small  party  under  a  man  named  Clairmont, 
with  a  letter  to  the  inhabitants  of  Cahokia  and  Kaskaskia.214 
The  object  of  this  mission  was  to  promote  friendship 
between  the  inhabitants  and  the  British.215  But  Clairmont 
made  the  mistake  of  stopping  at  St.  Louis.  Since  Spain 
was  now  openly  at  war  with  Great  Britain,  the  Spanish 
commandant,  Cruzat,  caused  Clairmont  and  his  party  to  be 
arrested,  and  sent  a  copy  of  their  letter  to  Major  Williams, 
then  in  command  of  the  few  troops  remaining  at  Kaskaskia. 
It  is  unlikely,  however,  that  Cruzat  was  as  well  disposed 
towards  the  Americans  as  this  action  makes  it  appear.  He 
certainly  allowed  two  of  the  emissaries  to  proceed  to 
Cahokia,  where  they  were  obliged  by  the  court  to  find  bonds 
men  answerable  for  them  while  they  remained.216 

That  this  mission  might  have  succeeded  in  reestablishing 
British  control  in  Illinois  is  possible.  Considerable  dissatis 
faction,  at  any  rate,  was  expressed  in  Cahokia  and  Kaskas 
kia  at  the  action  of  the  Spanish  commandant  in  arresting 
the  emissaries.217  Antoine  Gerardin,  one  of  the  most 
influential  men  in  Cahokia  and  a  former  member  of  the 
court,  who  undoubtedly  knew  the  state  of  public  opinion, 
wrote  to  Sinclair  in  November,  1781,  that  he  thought  the 
people,  partly  for  commercial  reasons,  were  ready  to  receive 

213  Colls.  St.  Hist.  Soc.  Wis.,  XI,  141,  note. 

-1"  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  553,  557.     Also  Hotick,  of.  cit.,  IT,  49. 

33  The  three  sources  for  this  episode  in  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib., 
II,  552-563,  differ  as  to  the  exact  purpose  of  the  mission.  One  says 
it  was  to  put  the  people  on  their  guard  against  the  Spaniards ; 
another,  to  raise  militia  to  be  paid  by  the  British,  and  the  third,  to 
negotiate  a  commercial  treaty. 

216  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  95. 

"T  Ibid.,  555- 


ILLINOIS    UNDER   VIRGINIA.  Ill 

the  English  and  renew  their  allegiance  to  England.  He 
offered  his  services,  and  agreed  to  prepare  them  to  receive 
the  English,  provided  they  brought  no  savages  with  them.218 
Had  a  British  party  of  respectable  strength,  unaccompanied 
by  Indians,  been  promptly  sent,  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that 
it  would  not  have  succeeded,  since  Illinois  by  this  time  had 
been  almost  completely  evacuated  by  the  Virginia  troops.219 

But  the  military  operations  in  Virginia  in  the  autumn 
of  1781  decided  the  war  and  no  such  party  was  sent.  Vir 
ginia's  nominal  possession  of  Illinois  survived  the  Revolu 
tion,  though  legally  the  county  organization  of  that 
territory,  as  explained  above,  expired  in  1781.  The  Kas- 
kaskia  court  was  abolished  in  I782.220  The  Cahokia  court 
continued  to  sit  till  1790,  and  conditions  in  that  town  were 
less  anarchical  than  at  Kaskaskia,  possibly  because  there 
were  fewer  Americans  in  it.  The  Vincennes  court  con 
tinued  in  existence  till  I787.221 

The  financial  condition  of  Virginia  made  prudent  what 
the  termination  of  the  war  made  possible,  and  the  Illinois 
troops  were  disbanded.222  In  July,  1783,  Clark  was  relieved 
of  his  command.223  From  the  close  of  the  Revolution  till 
the  establishment  of  government  under  the  Northwest 
Ordinance  the  people  of  Illinois  were  cut  off  from  associa 
tion  with  the  outside  world,  though  they  continued  to  regard 
themselves  as  subjects  of  Virginia.22*  But  though  relieved 
of  the  burden  of  the  troops,  confusion  continued,  and  there 
was  no  tranquility  or  happiness  for  them.  Hoping  for 
better  things,  they  learned  in  1784  of  their  transference  to 
the  jurisdiction  of  Congress.225 


218 

219  Cal  Va.  St.  Papers,  III,  68,  198. 

220  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  cxvii. 

221  Am.  St.  Papers,  "Public  Lands,"  I,  10. 

222  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  ex. 
223 


English,  op.  cit.,  II,  783. 
-"Address   to    Congress   from    the   French   Inhabitants    of   Post 
Vincennes,  Kaskaskia,  etc.,  1788. 
226  Colls.  III.  St.  Hist.  Lib.,  II,  567. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS   AND    THE    WEST. 

The  actual  establishment  of  American  rule  in  Illinois  was 
the  work  of  the  revolutionary  government  of  Virginia.  A 
legal  title  to  the  territory  was  secured  by  the  treaty  of  peace. 
The  scene  shifts  to  the  French  capital,  and  the  final  step  in 
the  transition  was  made  in  the  negotiations  which  concluded 
the  Revolution. 

The  surrender  of  Cornwallis  in  October,  1781,  settled  the 
question  of  American  independence.  In  British  official 
circles  the  feeling  was  strong  that  peace  must  be  secured.1 
Before  Lord  North's  ministry  fell,  speculation  was  rife  as 
to  the  extent  of  the  surrenders  which  the  government  would 
have  to  make.  Independence,  it  was  hoped,  would  satisfy 
the  United  States.2  France  expected  territorial  and  com 
mercial  gains.  The  policy  of  Spain  will  be  discussed  later. 
On  March  20,  1782,  Lord  North,  virtually  forced  out  of 
office,  handed  in  his  resignation,  and  the  king  was  reluc 
tantly  obliged  to  resort  to  the  Rockingham  Whigs.  Under 
the  Marquis  of  Rockingham,  a  ministry  was  formed  whose 
avowed  policy  was  to  end  the  war.  In  his  cabinet,  the  home 
and  colonial  departments  were  intrusted  to  Lord  Shel- 
burne,  while  Mr.  Charles  James  Fox  took  the  foreign 
portfolio. 

As  early  as  September,  1779,  Congress  had  appointed 
John  Adams  sole  commissioner  to  discuss  terms  of  peace 
with  the  British  government.  He  was  instructed  to  claim 
the  Mississippi  as  the  western  boundary  of  the  United 
States,  and  the  cession  of  Canada  was  stated  as  desirable. 
He  was  to  be  governed  by  the  terms  of  the  French  alliance.3 

1  Grafton   to    Shclburnc,    14   Nov.,    i/Si,   Bancroft   MSS.     Trans 
cripts   from  the  State  Paper   Office  and   Lansdozvnc  House  MSS., 
concerning    Negotiations     for     Peace,     1781-1783,     6    vols.      These 
documents  will  be  referred  to  as  Bancroft  MSS.,  Peace  Negotiations. 

2  Ibid. 

8  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  IV,  339  ct  seq. 


THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS   AND   THE    WEST.  113 

But  his  relations  with  the  French  foreign  minister,  Ver- 
gennes,  then  regarded  as  the  European  sponsor  of  the 
United  States,  were  not  cordial,*  and  in  June,  1781,  Con 
gress,  influenced  by  Luzerne,  annulled  Adams'  commission 
and  issued  another  to  him  and  four  others.  The  additional 
commissioners  named  were  Franklin,  Jay,  Laurens  and 
Jefferson.5 

Just  as  the  Rockingham  ministry  was  coming  into  power, 
Franklin,  the  only  one  of  the  American  commissioners  then 
in  France,  wrote  to  Shelburne,  with  whom  years  before  he 
had  had  pleasant  relations,  expressing  an  earnest  hope  for  a 
general  pacification.6  In  response  the  colonial  secretary 
sent  Mr.  Oswald,  a  Scotch  merchant  in  whom  he  reposed 
great  confidence  and  who  had  extensive  interests  in 
America,  to  interview  Franklin  in  an  informal  manner.7 
Shelburne  attached  great  importance  to  this  preliminary 
negotiation  and  said  that,  if  it  failed,  the  war  would  be 
vigorously  carried  on,  since  the  nation  at  large  was  not 
reconciled  to  American  independence.8  It  was  his  policy 
to  reserve  the  concession  of  this  as  a  valuable  consideration 
to  be  offered  to  the  colonies,  and  to  foment  difficulties  and 
disagreements  between  America,  France  and  Spain  wher 
ever  their  interests  conflicted.9  He  was  determined  at  all 
events  that  the  United  States,  if  independent,  should  be 
so  of  all  the  world,  and  should  not  become  the  protege  and 
permanent  ally  of  France.10  He  hoped,  indeed,  to  detach 
the  United  States  from  the  other  enemies  of  England. 

4Durand,  New  Materials  for  the  History  of  the  American 
Revolution,  232-233. 

6  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  220. 

6  Ibid.,  381. 

7  Oswald    had    previously    been    consulted    by    Lord    North    on 
American  affairs.    For  events  leading  to  the  decision  of  the  Rocking 
ham  cabinet  to  open  informal  negotiations  with  Franklin  see  Fitz- 
maurice,  Life  of  William,  Earl  of  Shelburne,  III,  175. 

8  Paper  marked  "Private,  to  be  burnt,"    Shelburne  to  Oswald,  no 
date,  probably  April,  1782.    Bancroft  MSS.,  Peace  Negotiations. 

9  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  169. 

10  Memorandum  to   Mr.    Oswald   in  conversation,  28  Apr.,    1782. 
Bancroft  MSS.,  Peace  Negotiations.    Cf.  also  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  X,  12. 


114  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

Franklin,  however,  feeling  that  a  separate  treaty  between 
his  country  and  Great  Britain  would  be  dishonorable,  as 
well  as  contrary  to  the  terms  of  the  French-American  alli 
ance  and  Congress'  instructions  of  1781,  at  once  informed 
Oswald  that  the  United  States  would  treat  only  in  concert 
with  France,11  and  that  no  definite  action  could  be  taken 
until  his  fellow-commissioners  arrived.12 

In  order  to  secure  the  West  as  far  as  the  Mississippi, 
Congress  considered  it  necessary  to  show  either  that  the 
states  as  individual  sovereignties  had  succeeded  to  all 
rights  which  they  had  possessed  when  colonies,  or  that, 
when  the  king  of  Great  Britain  ceased  to  be  king  of  the 
thirteen  colonies,  all  vacant  lands  of  which  he  was  seised 
in  that  capacity  passed  to  the  United  States  collectively.13 
In  other  words,  Congress  desired  to  secure  the  West  on 
one  principle  or  the  other,  and  was  apparently  unwilling  to 
commit  itself  to  either.  According  to  the  second  principle, 
the  United  States  could  claim  the  West,  even  if  the  procla 
mation  of  1763  were  held  to  confine  the  individual  colonies 
to  lands  east  of  the  Alleghanies.14  American  statesmen, 
however,  understood  that  abstract  claims  would  be  greatly 
strengthened  by  actual  conquest  and  occupation.  Jefferson 
had  expressed  the  view  that  Clark's  expedition  would  have 
an  important  bearing  on  the  final  establishment  of  the  north 
western  boundary  of  the  United  States.15  George  Mason, 
who  had  also  been  concerned  in  Clark's  enterprise,  was  of 
the  same  opinion.16  They  evidently  considered  it  of  great 
importance  that,  when  the  treaty  of  peace  was  finally  made, 
the  American  commissioners  should  be  able  to  argue  the 
principle  of  "uti  possidetis"  with  respect  to  the  West. 

11  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  381. 

12  Moore,  Digest  of  International  Law,  V,  634. 

13  Sec.  Journ.  of  Cong,.,  Ill,  170,  198. 

14  For  this  national  theory  respecting  the  West,  see  Thomas  Paine, 
"Public  Good,"    Writ,  of  Paine,  Conway's  ed.,  II.     Cf.  also  Pelatiah 
Webster's    essay    on    Western    Lands,    in    Political   Essays    on    the 
Nature  and  Operation  of  Money,  Public  Finances,  and  other  Sub 
jects:    Philadelphia,  1/91. 

15  Bancroft,  History  of  the  United  States:    Boston,  1878,  VI,  192. 
1(1  Rowland,  op.  cit.,  I,  365. 


THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS    AND   THE    WEST.  115 

In  January,  1782,  an  important  letter  dealing  with  the 
question  of  the  West  in  the  coming  peace  negotiations  was 
written  to  Franklin  by  the  American  foreign  secretary, 
Robert  R.  Livingston.17  ".  .  .  .  Our  western  and  northwest 
ern  extent,"  wrote  Livingston,  "will  probably  be  contested 
with  some  warmth,  and  the  reasoning  on  that  subject  be 
deduced  from  general  principles,  and  from  proclamations 

and  treaties  with  the  Indians I  believe  it  will  appear 

that  our  extension  to  the  Mississippi  is  founded  in  justice, 
and  that  our  claims  are  at  least  such  as  the  events  of  the 
war  give  us  a  right  to  insist  upon."  The  proclamation  of 
1763,  he  argued,  was  a  temporary  measure  which  did  not 
nullify  the  claims  of  any  colony  to  western  land.  He  even 
argued  from  the  wording  of  the  document  itself  that  such 
was  the  case ;  otherwise  it  would  not  have  been  necessary 
to  forbid  colonial  governors  to  make  grants  in  the  West, 
since  they  would  have  had  no  power  to  do  so.  The  treaty  of 
Fort  Stanwix,  in  his  opinion,  constituted  no  obstacle  to 
colonial  claims.  Arguments  against  American  extension,  he 
admitted,  might  be  derived  from  the  Quebec  Bill,  but  as 
that  was  one  of  the  laws  that  had  occasioned  the  war, 
"to  build  anything  upon  it  would  be  to  urge  one  wrong 
in  support  of  another."  He  referred  to  a  map  which  had 
been  made  by  the  king's  geographer,  shortly  after  the 
Seven  Years'  War,  on  which  Virginia  and  the  Carolinas 
were  represented  as  extending  to  the  Mississippi.  "The 
rights  of  the  King  of  Great  Britain  ....  to  America," 
he  said,  "were  incident  to  his  right  of  sovereignty  over 
those  of  his  subjects  that  settled  America  and  explored  the 

lands  he  claims If  we  admit  ....  that  the  right 

of  sovereignty  over  the  people  of  America  is  forfeited,  it 
must  follow  that  all  rights  founded  on  that  sovereignty  are 

forfeited  with  it Upon  this  principle  Great  Britain 

is  left  without  a  foot  of  land  in  America  beyond  the  limits 
of  those  governments  which  acknowledge  her  jurisdiction." 
To  strengthen  theoretical  arguments,  Livingston  adduced 
the  fact  that  actual  settlements  had  been  made  in  the  Wrest 

17  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  268,  et  seq. 
9 


Il6  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

by  people  who  acknowledged  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United 
States.  In  his  opinion  it  would  be  impolitic  as  well  as  unjust 
to  abandon  them.  In  expectation,  however,  that  there  would 
be  much  dispute  over  the  boundary,  he  unofficially  suggested 
that,  if  the  Mississippi  could  not  be  obtained,  the  territory 
between  that  river  and  the  western  limits  assigned  to  the 
states  should  be  left  to  the  Indians  under  a  joint  guaranty 
of  France,  Spain,  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States. 
An  analysis  of  this  document  shows  that  the  American 
government  was  disposed  to  urge  charter  claims  as  ground 
for  claiming  the  West  and  the  Mississippi  boundary,  that 
the  argument  of  actual  settlement,  and  "the  events  of  the 
war,"  were  to  be  advanced  to  strengthen  these  claims,  but 
that  Congress  would  probably  not  insist  upon  the  Mis 
sissippi. 

In  the  instructions  given  in  1780  by  Congress  to  John 
Jay,  when  he  was  sent  as  American  agent  to  Spain, 
the  fact  of  actual  settlement  as  ground  for  claiming  the 
West  was  more  emphatically  stated.  ".  .  .  .  The  people 
inhabiting  these  states,"  ran  the  instructions,  "while  con 
nected  with  Great  Britain,  and  also  since  the  Revolution, 
have  settled  themselves  at  divers  places  to  the  westward 
near  the  Mississippi ;  are  friendly  to  the  Revolution,  and 
being  citizens  of  the  United  States,  and  subject  to  the  laws 
of  those  to  which  they  respectively  belong,  Congress  can 
not  assign  them  over  as  subjects  to  any  other  power."18 

During  Oswald's  first  visit  to  Paris  in  April,  1782,  Frank 
lin  had  shown  a  disposition  to  talk  matters  over,  and  with 
the  utmost  sang-froid  had  suggested  the  cession  of  Canada 
to  the  United  States  as  a  measure  likely  to  promote  a  true 
reconciliation.19  If  Canada  were  retained  by  Great  Britain, 
he  thought  it  would  involve  perpetual  friction  between  that 
power  and  the  United  States.  If  ceded,  the  waste  lands 
there  could  be  sold  to  indemnify  the  royalists  for  confisca 
tions,  and  to  pay  for  some  of  the  damage  to  American 
private  property  caused  by  the  British  and  the  Indians.20 

"Sparks,  op.  cit.,  VII,  301-302;   Sec.  Journ.  of  Cong.,  Ill,  155. 
19  Fitzmauricc,  of>.  cit.,  Ill,  180-182. 
10  Moore,  op.  at.,  V,  634-635. 


THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS   AND   THE    WEST.  1  17 

Oswald  went  back  to  England,  and  after  a  brief  sojourn 
returned  with  a  paper  refusing  the  cession  of  Canada.21 
He  expressed  his  personal  opinion,  however,  that  a  satis 
factory  settlement  on  that  point  might  be  reached.22  Indeed, 
somewhat  later,  he  went  so  far  as  to  tell  Franklin  that  he 
personally  agreed  with  him  concerning  Canada.23  Franklin, 
therefore,  continued  to  hope  for  the  acquisition  of  that 
province. 

On  April  23,  an  important  meeting  of  the  Rockingham 
cabinet  was  held,  a  minute  of  which  reads  :  ".  .  .  .  the 
principal  points  in  contemplation  are  the  allowance  of 
independence  to  America  upon  Great  Britain's  being 
restored  to  the  situation  she  was  placed  in  by  the  treaty  of 
I763/'24  This  meant  that  Canada  was  to  be  retained,  and 
also,  presumably,  the  country  between  the  Alleghanies  and 
the  Mississippi,  which  had  been  relinquished  by  France  in 
the  treaty  referred  to.  Independence,  moreover,  was  not 
to  be  assumed  as  existing  till  granted  by  the  proposed  treaty. 

Fox,  in  whose  department  negotiations  with  foreign 
powers  lay,  sent  Thomas  Grenville,  a  son  of  the  former 
premier,  to  Paris  early  in  May.  As  is  well  known,  he 
advanced  the  theory  previously  maintained  by  American 
statesmen25  that  the  United  States  was  already  independ 
ent.26  Therefore,  he  argued,  the  conduct  of  negotiations 
with  the  American  commissioners  belonged  to  his  depart 
ment,  since  the  United  States  was  a  foreign  power.27  Act 
ing  on  this  theory,  he  instructed  Grenville  to  "sound" 
Franklin,  and  to  inform  him  and  Vergennes  that  independ- 

21  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  188-189. 

22  Ibid.,  191. 


"Ibid.,  183-184. 

25  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  42-43  ;   VI,  129. 

28  This  theory  may  be  considered  finally  to  have  prevailed,  for  the 
treaty  of  peace  was  a  recognition,  not  a  grant  of  independence;  see 
Moore,  op.  cit.,  V,  695. 

27  In  this  contention  Fox  was  technically  wrong  ;  till  the  independ 
ence  of  the  United  States  was  recognized,  negotiations  with  the 
American  commissioners  belonged  to  Shelburne's  department,  ibid., 
624. 


IlS  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

ence  was  to  be  the  basis  for  negotiations.  Grenville  was 
to  find  out  whether,  if  a  general  pacification  proved  impos 
sible,  there  was  any  prospect  of  a  separate  peace  between 
England  and  the  United  States.28  Fox  thought  it  would  be 
easy  to  show  the  Americans  that  it  was  unreasonable  that 
they  should  be  incumbered  and  obstructed  by  "powers  who 
have  never  assisted  them  during  the  war."-9  The  foreign 
secretary  could  not  believe,  he  said,  that  Congress  was 
bound  to  support  every  claim  set  up  by  the  court  of  Ver 
sailles  and  its  allies.80  Grenville  reported  that  Franklin 
earnestly  desired  peace,  though  he  was  determined  to 
adhere  to  the  treaty  obligations  into  which  the  United 
States  had  entered ;  and  that  Vergennes  would  neither 
make  overtures  nor  answer  propositions  till  after  com 
munication  with  the  allies  of  France.  It  was  evident, 
howrever,  that  France  would  demand  for  her  exertions 
in  the  war  more  than  the  independence  of  the  United 
States.  The  acknowledgement  of  that  would  not  be 
regarded  by  the  French  government  as  a  favor  con 
ceded  by  Great  Britain  to  France,  for,  Vergennes  signifi 
cantly  observed,  France  had  found  and  not  made  America 
independent.31  He  desired  a  treaty  more  just  and  durable 
than  that  of  1763,  which  he  never  could  read  without  shud 
dering  ("sans  fremir").  "Justice''  and  "dignity,"  he  said, 
were  the  two  chief  points  upon  which  his  government  would 
insist  in  the  proposed  treaty.32  Grenville,  accordingly, 
became  convinced  that  the  demands  of  France,  and  of  Spain 
also,  would  be  so  extensive  that  it  would  be  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  for  Great  Britain  to  accede  to  them.  "It  is  from 

28  Fox  to  Grenville,  30  Apr.,  1782,  Bancroft  MSS.,  Peace  Negotia 
tions. 

29  Fox  to  Grenville,  21  May,  1782;  ibid. 

80  Fox  to  Grenville,  26  May,  1782,  ibid.    Fox,  as  a  European  states 
man,    wanted    to    end    the    American   war    quickly    and    isolate    the 
Bourbon  powers;    see  Wakeman,  Charles  James  Fox,  70-71. 

81  Grenville  to  Fox,  10  May,  1782,  Bancroft  MSS.,  Peace  Negotia 
tions;  Fitzmauricc,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  192. 

"Grenville  to  Fox,  10  May,  1782,  Bancroft  MSS.,  Peace  Negotia 
tions. 


THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS    AND    THE    WEST.  119 

the  expectation  the  courts  of  Madrid  and  Versailles  entertain 
of  being  supported  by  America  in  these  claims,"  he  wrote, 
"that  they  will  derive  the  greatest  confidence  in  making 
them."  The  obvious  remedy  for  Great  Britain  to  apply  was, 
if  possible,  to  detach  the  United  States  from  France.33 

The  British  foreign  secretary,  anxious  for  a  speedy 
escape  from  the  American  war,  authorized  Grenville  to  offer 
independence  "in  the  first  instance,  instead  of  making  it 
a  conditional  article  of  a  general  treaty."34  On  June  10, 
he  sent  full  powers  to  Grenville  to  treat  with  any  of  the 
enemies  of  Great  Britain,35  and  on  the  thirtieth  he  moved 
in  cabinet  "that  the  independence  of  America  should  be 
granted  even  without  a  treaty  for  a  peace."36  He  thus  hoped, 
no  doubt,  to  get  the  negotiations  with  the  Americans  com 
pletely  out  of  the  colonial  secretary's  hands.  The  cabinet, 
however,  decided  against  him  and  he  resigned. 

On  July  i  Rockingham  died,  and  the  next  day  the  king 
offered  the  treasury  to  Shelburne,  who  accepted  and  formed 
a  new  ministry.37  The  home  and  colonial  departments  were 
given  to  Thomas  Townshend;  Lord  Grantham  took  the 
foreign  office.  Shelburne  informed  Grenville  that  neither 
the  resignation  of  Fox  nor  the  death  of  Rockingham  would 
make  any  difference  in  the  government's  policy,38  but  Gren 
ville  determined  to  retire  with  his  chief,  and  "decline  any 
further  prosecution  of  this  business."39  Benjamin  Vaughan 
was  then  sent  to  Paris  to  inform  Franklin  that  the  change 
of  administration  would  make  no  change  in  the  progress  of 
the  negotiations,  and  Alleyn  Fitzherbert,  British  minister 
at  Brussels,  was  appointed  to  succeed  Grenville  in  represent 
ing  the  British  foreign  secretary.  Oswald  remained  the 
ministry's  representative  as  far  as  America  was  concerned.40 

33  Grenville  to  Fox,  14  May,  1782 ;  ibid. 

34  Fox  to  Grenville,  26  May,  1782;    ibid. 

35  Fox  to  Grenville,  10  June,  1782;    ibid. 

36  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  219. 

37  Ibid.,  222-223. 

38  Shelburne   to    Grenville,    5   July,    1782,   Bancroft   MSS.,    Peace 
Negotiations. 

39  Grenville  to  Shelburne,  9  July,  1782;  ibid. 

40  Moore,  op.  cit.,  V,  637. 


120       .  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

Meanwhile  Franklin  had  been  joined  by  John  Jay,  who 
reached  Paris  on  June  23.  Jay  had  been  for  several  months 
in  Madrid  as  diplomatic  agent  of  the  United  States,  trying 
to  induce  the  Spanish  government  to  recognize  American 
independence.41  His  residence  there,  however,  was  informal, 
and  did  not  bind  Spain  to  recognize  the  United  States  as 
an  independent  power.42 

The  policy  of  Spain  is  a  subject  of  importance  in  the 
peace  negotiations  so  far  as  they  relate  to  the  West.  As 
we  have  seen,  that  power  had  been  secretly  aiding  the 
Americans  from  the  beginning  of  the  Revolution.  The 
motives  of  the  Spanish,  like  those  of  the  French  govern 
ment,  were,  of  course,  wholly  unconnected  with  sentiments 
of  genuine  friendship  for  the  United  States.  Both  powers 
were  actuated  by  a  spirit  of  revenge  toward  England.  The 
Count  of  Floridablanca,  the  Spanish  Minister  of  state,  in 
particular,  was  suspicious  of  the  Americans  and  entertained 
no  belief  in  the  integrity  of  Congress  or  its  commis 
sioners.43  He  feared,  indeed,  the  success  and  independence 
of  the  United  States.44  Before  the  alliance  of  1778  Ver- 
gennes  had  pointed  out  that  the  Americans,  if  independent, 
might  turn  conquerors  and  endanger  Spanish  America.45 
Lafayette,  to  whose  efforts  the  final  recognition  by  Spain 
of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  was  partly  due, 
wrote  from  Madrid  in  March,  1783,  that  in  his  opinion 
Spain  feared  the  moral  effect  of  that  independence  upon 
her  own  colonies.46 

In  April,  1779,  Spain  concluded  a  secret  convention  with 
France,  by  which  the  Bourbon  Family  Compact  was 
renewed,  and  she  bound  herself  to  declare  war  on  Eng- 

41  Corresp.  and  Pub.  Papers  of  John  fay,  Johnston's  ed.,  II,  21. 

42  Moore,  op.  cit.,  I,  206-207. 

43  Floridablanca    to    Marquis    D'Ossun,    17    Oct.,    1777,    Stevens, 
op.  cit.,  XIX. 

"Bancroft,  History  of  U.  S.,  VI,  176. 

45  Considerations,  12  March,  1776,  by  Vergennes,  Stevens,  op.  cit., 
XIII,  No.  1316. 
4(1  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  X,  34. 


THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS    AND    THE    WEST.  121 

land.47  She  did  not,  however,  recognize  the  independence 
of  the  United  States.  Among  the  avowed  objects  which 
she  expected  to  attain  through  her  participation  in  the  war 
were  the  recovery  of  Gibraltar,  Minorca  and  East  Florida, 
and  the  acquisition  of  Mobile.  She  desired  to  make  the 
Gulf  of  Mexico  a  Spanish  lake,  and  to  control  the  naviga 
tion  of  the  Mississippi  by  possession  of  both  banks  at  its 
mouth.  Floridablanca,  indeed,  expressly  declared  that 
unless  Spain  could  exclude  all  other  nations  from  the  Gulf, 
she  might  as  well  admit  all.  In  his  opinion,  the  exclusive 
navigation  of  the  Mississippi  was  an  essential  feature  of 
Spanish  policy,  more  important  even  than  the  restoration 
of  Gibraltar.48  Spanish  hopes  of  controlling  the  Mis 
sissippi  were  naturally  raised  by  the  work  of  Galvez  in 
Florida,  for,  before  the  end  of  the  war,  Spain  actually  held 
both  banks  of  the  river  at  its  mouth. 

That  at  the  time  of  this  secret  treaty  the  Spanish  govern 
ment  desired  to  secure  the  possession  of  any  territory  in 
North  America  beside  the  provinces  of  East  and  West  Flor 
ida  cannot  be  categorically  asserted.  While  Spain  was  still 
nominally  at  peace  with  England,  an  agent,  Juan  de  Miralles 
by  name,  was  sent  to  the  United  States  to  have  an  eye  to 
Spanish  interests.  In  the  instructions  which  were  given  to 
him  nothing  was  said  about  the  conquest  of  territory.  In 
July,  1778,  however,  Gerard,  the  first  French  minister  to  the 
United  States,  wrote  to  Vergennes  about  Miralles  and  his 
mission.  Gerard  had  not,  indeed,  seen  his  instructions,  but 
the  Spaniard's  conduct  and  language  seemed  to  him  to  indi 
cate  their  nature.  Among  other  objects  of  his  mission  he 
was  trying  to  show,  Gerard  thought,  that  France  should  con 
quer  Canada,  and  that  Spain  should  acquire  all  territory 

47  Text  of  the  convention  in  Doniol,  Histoire  de  la  Participation 
de  la  France  a  I'etablissement  des  Etats-Unis  d'Amerique,  III,  803 
et  seq.;  or  Wharton,  op.  cit.,  I,  356  et  seq.    For  a  brief  discussion  of 
Spain's  part  in  the  war  see  Rousseau,  "La  Participation  de  1'Espagne 
a  la  guerre  d'Amerique,"    in  R<evue  des  Questions  Historiques  for 
1902,  444  et  seq. 

48  Rives,    "Spain  and  the  United  States  in  1795,"    Am.  Hist.  Rev., 
IV,  64-65. 


122  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

received  by  England  in  1763  in  Florida  and  on  the  Missis 
sippi.41'  Though  he  was  mistaken  concerning  Miralles' 
instructions,  his  suppositions  were  not  unnatural  in  view  of 
the  intimations  made  by  the  Spaniard  on  his  own  responsi 
bility.  At  all  events,  after  the  conquest  of  the  Illinois  vil 
lages  by  Clark,  there  is  no  doubt  that  Miralles  actually 
proposed  the  cession  of  Illinois  to  Spain,  and,  again  without 
authorization,  urged  the  abandonment  of  American  claims  to 
the  Northwest.00  As  a  result  of  the  capture  by  Galvez  of  the 
English  settlements  on  the  lower  Mississippi,  the  Spanish 
government  itself  began  to  view  the  situation  in  a  different 
light.  In  1780  Gerard's  successor,  Luzerne,  informed  Con 
gress  that  the  king  of  France,  desiring  an  alliance  between 
his  two  allies,  Spain  and  the  United  States,  had  directed 
him  to  communicate  to  Congress  conditions  which  the 
king  of  Spain  regarded  as  important.  Among  these 
were,  besides  the  possession  of  East  and  West  Florida, 
a  precise  and  invariable  western  boundary  of  the  United 
States,  the  exclusive  navigation  of  the  Mississippi,  and  the 
possession  of  the  lands  on  the  east  bank  of  that  river  above 
West  Florida.  In  the  opinion  of  the  Spanish  government, 
wrote  Luzerne,  the  United  States  should  extend  no  farther 
west  than  the  proclamation  line  of  1763,  and  were  entitled 
to  no  lands  on  the  Mississippi.  The  territory  on  the  east 
bank  of  that  river  was  a  possession  of  England,  and  a  proper 
object  of  Spanish  conquest.51  From  Luzerne's  communica 
tion  to  Congress  we  cannot  avoid  the  conclusion  that,  what 
ever  her  previous  policy  may  have  been,  Spain  now  desired 
to  acquire  the  whole  east  bank  of  the  Mississippi.  As 
late  as  February,  1783,  after  the  provisional  treaty  between 
England  and  the  United  States  had  given  the  east  bank  of 
that  river  to  the  latter,  Lafayette  wrote  from  Madrid 
to  Livingston  that  the  Spaniards  would  "insist  upon  a  pre- 

48  Gerard  to  Vergcnncs,  25  July,  1778,  Doniol,  oft.  cit.,  TIT,  293. 

50  For  my  information  regarding  Miralles'  instructions  and  cor 
respondence,  I  am  indebted  to  Professor  William  R.  Shepherd  of 
Columbia  University. 

61  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  X,  402-403. 


THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS    AND    THE    WEST.  123 

tended  right  to  an  extent  of  country  all  along  the  left  shore 
of  the  Mississippi.  Not  that  they  mean  to  occupy  it,  but 
because  they  are  afraid  of  neighbors  that  have  a  spirit  of 
liberty."52  But  suspicions  of  Spanish  designs  on  the  West 
were  not  confined  to  officials  connected  with  the  French 
court.  Clark,  in  establishing  Fort  Jefferson,  thought  that 
post  would  be  useful  in  frustrating  any  plans  which  Spain 
might  have  formed  for  seizing  the  country  north  of  the 
Ohio.  Indeed,  he  believed  that  the  Spaniards  would  have 
been  glad  to  see  the  American  posts  in  Illinois  conquered 
by  England,  so  that  they  might  have  the  opportunity  of 
reconquering  them.  Todd  had  not  been  in  Illinois  long 
before  he,  too,  concluded  that  Spain  had  aggressive  designs 
on  the  country.53  The  opinions  of  Clark  and  Todd  were,  of 
course,  formed  from  their  observations  of  the  conduct  of 
the  Spaniards  around  St.  Louis. 

Jay's  mission  to  Spain  was  a  failure.  Floridablanca 
could  not  be  induced  to  recognize  the  independence  of  the 
United  States.  In  his  attempts  to  come  to  an  understanding 
with  the  Spanish  minister,  Jay  was  subjected  to  delay  and 
mortification.  He  even  complained  that  his  mails  were 
tampered  with  and  sometimes  destroyed.54  Upon  his  arrival 
at  Madrid,  Floridablanca,  according  to  Jay,  implied  that  the 
Mississippi  was  to  be  regarded  as  the  western  boundary 
of  the  United  States.55  If  the  Spanish  minister  meant  to 
convey  this  impression,  he  was  misleading  Jay,  for  he  cer 
tainly  was  unwilling  that  the  United  States  should  possess 
the  left  bank  of  the  Mississippi.  The  slights  which  Jay 
received  while  in  Spain  convinced  him  that  the  colonial 
policy  of  that  country  was  directly  opposed  to  the  interests 
of  the  United  States. 

Franklin,  also,  was  suspicious  of  Spanish  policy  in  the 
West.  Before  Jay's  arrival  in  France,  he  wrote  to  the 

52  Ibid.,  26. 

53  Cal  Fa.  St.  Papers,  I,  338,  358. 

54  Corresp.  and  Pub.  Papers  of  John  Jay,  Johnston's  ed.,  II,  20, 
165,  1 86,  242. 

55  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  203. 


124  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

American  foreign  secretary,  expressing  fear  that  Spain  was 
trying  to  acquire  the  trans-Alleghany  country  at  the  expense 
of  the  United  States,  and  that  she  was  using  every  pretext 
to  accomplish  that  end.56  ''I  see  by  the  newspapers,"  he 
wrote,  "that  the  Spaniards  having  taken  a  little  post  called 
St.  Joseph57  pretend  to  have  made  a  conquest  of  the  Illinois 
country.  In  what  light  does  this  proceeding  appear  to 
Congress  ?  While  they  decline  our  proffered  friendship,  are 
they  to  be  suffered  to  encroach  on  our  bounds  and  shut  us 
up  within  the  Appalachian  Mountains?  I  begin  to  fear 
they  have  some  such  project."  Jay,  also,  read  a  version  of 
the  St.  Joseph  affair,  published  in  a  Spanish  newspaper.58 
He  came  to  Paris  full  of  suspicions  of  Spanish  policy,  and 
resolved  that  his  country  should  not  be  at  the  mercy  of  the 
European  powers. 

The  situation  confronting  the  two  commissioners  was 
indeed  serious.  The  treaty  of  1778  bound  the  United  States 
to  make  no  peace  independent  of  France,  and  Congress  had 
supinely  instructed  its  commissioners  not  to  conclude  any 
arrangements  with  the  English  without  the  approval  of  the 
French  government.59  "You  are,"  ran  the  instructions,  "to 
make  the  most  candid  and  confidential  communications 
upon  all  subjects  to  the  ministers  of  our  generous  ally,  the 
King  of  France,  to  undertake  nothing  in  the  negotiations 
for  peace  or  truce  without  their  knowledge  and  concur 
rence."  These  instructions  were,  no  doubt,  highly  proper 
and  honorable  so  long  as  France  was  acting  in  the  interests 
of  the  United  States.  Congress,  indeed,  expected  that  the 
French  government  would  assist  the  United  States  in  secur 
ing  the  Mississippi  boundary.60  But  the  French-Spanish 
treaty  of  1779,  made  without  the  knowledge  of  the  United 
States,  introduced  another  factor  into  the  war.  By  this 

M  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  339. 

CT  For  the  episode  see  supra,  ch.  VI. 

68  Morton,  "Robert  R.  Livingston, — Beginnings  of  American 
Diplomacy,"  John  P.  Branch  Historical  Papers  of  Randolph-Mac  on 
College,  Xo.  IV,  321. 

59  For  the  instructions  see  Sec.  Journ.  of  Cong.,  II,  446. 

c"  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  X,  87-88. 


TPIE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS    AND   THE    WEST.  125 

treaty  France  bound  herself  not  to  make  peace  till  Spain 
had  accomplished  her  objects.  The  United  States  were 
surely  not  bound  in  honor  to  further  the  plans  of  a  govern 
ment  which  persistently  refused  to  recognize  their  inde 
pendence,  especially  when  those  plans,  as  the  American 
commissioners  were  convinced,  were  opposed  to  their  own 
interests.  To  argue  that  Spain  for  her  own  purposes  could 
compel  the  United  States  to  continue  hostilities  indefinitely 
would  be  a  manifest  absurdity.  By  experience  and  inclina 
tion,  no  man  was  better  qualified  than  Jay  for  the  task  of 
defeating  Spanish  designs. 

The  first  question  on  which  his  influence  was  decisive 
was  whether  Great  Britain  should  treat  with  the  United 
States  as  colonies,  and  acknowledge  their  independence  in 
the  treaty,  or  whether  she  should  conduct  negotiations  with 
the  United  States  as  independent  and  sovereign.  Shelburne, 
as  already  stated,  was  anxious  to  end  the  American  war 
quickly.  Parliament  rose  on  July  n,  and  he  desired  to  be 
able  to  announce  peace  with  America  when  next  it  met.61 
Late  in  July  a  commission  was  sent  to  Oswald  to  treat  with 
commissioners  of  "the  colonies,"  authorizing  him  to  con 
cede  independence.62  Jay  promptly  expressed  his  dissatis 
faction.  Independence,  he  thought,  should  be  no  part  of 
the  treaty,  but  should  have  been  expressly  granted  by  Par 
liament,  and  all  troops  withdrawn  prior  to  any  proposal  for 
peace.  Since  this  had  not  been  done,  he  thought  the  crown 
should  do  it  by  proclamation.63  Franklin,  however,  did  not 
see  much  difference  between  independence  granted  before 
the  treaty,  or  by  it.64  He  held  that  Oswald's  acceptance  of 
the  American  commission,  which  described  the  commission- 

01  Moore,  op.  cit.,  V,  686. 

62  Fitzmaurice,    op.    cit.,   Ill,    249-251.     For    the    commission    see 
Sparks,  op.  cit.,  X,  76-79. 

63  Minutes   of  conversation  with  the  American  commissioners,  7 
Aug.,   1782,  Bancroft  MSS.,  Peace  Negotiations,  and  Fitzmaurice, 
op.  cit.,  Ill,  251. 

04  Minutes  of  conversation,  by  Oswald,  11-13  Aug.,  1782,  Bancroft 
MSS.,  Peace  Negotiations ;  Corresp.  and  Pub.  Papers  of  John  Jay, 
Johnston's  ed.,  II,  372. 


126  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

ers  as  ministers  of  the  United  States,  was  equivalent  to  an 
acknowledgment  of  independence.'55  Jay's  position  here 
corresponded  to  that  of  John  Adams,  who  had  said  a  year 
before,  "There  are  no  American  colonies  at  war  with  Great 
Britain.  The  power  at  war  is  the  United  States  of  Amer 
ica."66  Vergennes,  however,  advised  the  American  com 
missioners  to  treat  with  Oswald  under  the  commission 
which  he  had  received,  but  Jay  positively  refused.07  His 
firmness  caused  Oswald  to  write  to  Shelburne  ".  .  .  . 
Your  Lordship  will  see  that  the  American  commissioners 
will  not  move  a  step  until  the  independence  is  acknowl 
edged."68 

A  decided  difference  of  opinion  was  becoming  manifest 
between  the  two  American  commissioners.  Jay  was  a 
young  man,  a  lawyer,  and  disposed  to  be  somewhat  assertive 
and  dogmatic.  The  purity  of  his  patriotism  could  never 
be  questioned.  Franklin,  equally  patriotic  and  equally  dis 
posed  to  peace,  was  an  old  man,  versed  in  diplomacy  and 
the  ways  of  the  world,  benevolent  and  wise.  He  was  on 
excellent  terms  with  both  Shelburne  and  Vergennes,  and 
inclined  to  suspect  neither. 

On  July  6,  Franklin  had  handed  Oswald  a  paper  contain 
ing  conditions  of  peace,  some  of  which  he  regarded  as 
necessary,  others  advisable.  Among  the  former  were  the 
acknowledgment  of  entire  independence,  the  extension  of 
the  United  States  to  the  Mississippi,  and  a  curtailment 
of  Canada  to  the  extent  it  had  possessed  before  the  Quebec 
Act ;  i.e.,  so  as  not  to  include  the  Northwest.  Among 
the  latter  he  mentioned  the  cession  of  Canada.69  Oswald 

65  Hale,  Franklin  in  France,  II,  125. 

60  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  VI,  129. 

«7Ibid.,VUI,  128,  135. 

68  Oswald  to  Shclhurnc,  18  Aug.,  1782,  Bancroft  MSS.,  Peace 
Negotiations.  Dr.  Wharton  thought  that  Jay's  attitude  towards 
Oswald's  first  commission,  while  patriotic,  tended  to  undermine  the 
goodwill  between  England  and  the  United  States  which  Shelburne 
and  Franklin  were  seeking  to  promote,  and  that,  had  Franklin  been 
left  to  conduct  matters  in  his  own  way,  the  United  States  would 
probably  have  acquired  Canada;  Moore,  o/>.  cit.,  V,  638,  649. 

ralbid.,  637. 


THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS    AND   THE    WEST.  127 

at  once  communicated  these  conditions  to  Shelburne.70  In 
August,  numerous  conferences  were  held  between  Oswald, 
Jay  and  Franklin.  The  Americans  sent  to  London  for  a  set 
of  maps  in  order  to  discuss  the  boundary  question  more 
intelligently.71  Oswald  concluded  that  to  secure  a  lasting 
peace,  the  abandonment  by  Great  Britain  of  the  Northwest, 
which  had  been  added  to  Canada  in  1774,  would  be  neces 
sary.  A  refusal  on  this  point,  he  thought,  "would  occasion 
a  particular  grudge,"  as  the  American  commissioners  would 
maintain  that  the  ungranted  and  unappropriated  lands  in 
the  West  belonged  to  the  states.  He  supposed  this  demand 
would  be  granted  "upon  certain  conditions."72  On  Septem 
ber  i,  Townshend  authorized  Oswald  to  concede  Franklin's 
"necessary"  articles,  implying  the  abandonment  by  Great 
Britain  of  the  West,  and  the  curtailment  of  Canada  to  its 
extent  before  I774-73 

Viewing  the  peace  negotiations  as  the  last  step  in  the 
transition  of  which  this  study  treats,  the  great  problem  con 
fronting  the  American  commissioners  was  to  defeat  what 
they  regarded  as  the  hostile  designs  of  Spain,  supported 
as  they  were  by  France.  Shortly  after  his  arrival 
in  Paris,  Jay  had  a  long  interview  with  the  Spanish  ambas 
sador  to  France,  the  Count  of  Aranda.  The  Spaniard,  in 
discussing  the  status  of  the  West,  gave  it  as  his  opinion 
that  this  territory  had  belonged  to  France  till  1763,  when 
it  became  a  distinct  part  of  Great  Britain's  dominions,  out 
side  of  any  existing  colony,  "until  by  the  conquest  of  West 
Florida,  and  certain  posts  on  the  Mississippi  and  Illinois, 
it  became  vested  in  Spain."  He  went  on  to  argue  that  even 
if  Spain's  right  of  conquest  did  not  extend  over  all  the  West, 

70  Oswald   to    Shelburne,    10   July,    1782,    Bancroft   MSS.,    Peace 
Negotiations. 

71  Minutes   regarding  the  treaty,  29  Aug.,    1782,  Bancroft  MSS., 
Peace  Negotiations. 

72  Minutes  of  conversation  11-13  Aug.,  1782,  by  Oswald,  Bancroft 
MSS.,    Peace    Negotiations,    and    Minutes    regarding    the    treaty, 
29  Aug.,  1782,  ibid. 

73  Townshend  to   Oswald,   I    Sept.,    1782,   Bancroft  MSS.,   Peace 
Negotiations. 


128  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

its  real  possessors  would  be  the  Indian  tribes  who  dwelt 
there.74  Aranda  sent  Jay  a  map  on  which  he  had  indicated 
what  he  considered  an  appropriate  western  boundary  for 
the  United  States.  His  line  extended  from  the  western  con 
fines  of  Georgia  to  the  mouth  of  the  Kanawha,  thence 
around  the  western  shores  of  Lake  Erie,  Huron  and  Michi 
gan  to  Lake  Superior.  Jay  and  Franklin  both  considered 
this  inadmissible.75  Oswald  believed  that  Spain  wanted  the 
country  from  West  Florida  "of  a  certain  width  quite  up 
to  Canada,  so  as  to  have  both  banks  of  the  Mississippi  clear, 
and  would  wish  to  have  such  a  cession  from  England  before 
a  cession  to  the  colonies  takes  place."70 

Jay  was  now  fully  convinced  that  Spain  and  the  United 
States  could  never  agree  on  the  boundary  question,  for 
Spain,  he  believed,  would  not  consent  to  the  possession  of 
the  east  bank  of  the  Mississippi  by  the  United  States.  He 
came,  moreover,  to  the  further  conclusion  that  France  was 
in  league  with  Spain  to  deprive  his  country  of  the  Mis 
sissippi.  The  views  of  the  French  government  were 
expressed  in  a  memoir  written  by  M.  de  Rayneval,  Ver- 
gennes'  principal  secretary,  and  handed  by  him  to  Jay. 
Rayneval  denied  that  the  country  between  the  Alleghanies 
and  the  Mississippi  formed  part  of  the  United  States, 
and  said  that  the  proclamation  of  1763  proved  that  it 
was  a  distinct  part  of  Great  Britain's  possessions,  beyond 
the  limits  of  the  colonies.  He  suggested  a  partition  of  the 
West  between  Spain,  England,  the  Indians  and  the  United 
States.  By  this  arrangement  the  United  States  would  not, 
at  least  south  of  the  Ohio,  extend  to  the  Mississippi, 
and  would  be  deprived  of  the  navigation  of  that  river  in 
its  lower  course.  The  east  bank,  as  far  north  as  the  mouth 
of  the  Ohio,  was  to  be  given  to  Spain.  The  southwestern 
Indians,  whose  lands  were  to  intervene  between  the  posses 
sions  of  Spain  and  those  of  the  United  States,  were  to  be 

74  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  150;    Corrcsp.  and  Pub.  Papers  of  John 
Jav,  Johnston's  ed.,  II,  390. 
":B  Ibid. 
70  Fitzmauricc,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  258. 


THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS    AND    THE    WEST.  129 

divided  into  two  zones  or  belts,  the  western  under  the  pro 
tection  of  Spain,  the  eastern  under  that  of  the  United  States. 
North  of  the  Ohio,  possession  was  to  be  determined  as 
Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  decided.77  Jay  was 
justified  in  taking  this  paper  as  an  authoritative  expression 
of  the  policy  of  the  French  government. 

Though  insisting  on  the  independence  of  the  United 
States,  Vergennes  was  for  keeping  them  under  European 
tutelage.  He  opposed  American  claims  to  the  West  and 
denied  their  validity.  At  the  beginning  of  the  French  alli 
ance  in  1778  he  had  said  that  France  insisted  on  independ 
ence  only  for  the  thirteen  United  States  exclusive  of  any 
of  the  British  possessions  which  had  not  revolted.78  In 
a  letter  to  Luzerne  in  September,  1779,  he  spoke  of  the 
pretended  right  of  the  United  States  to  lands  on  the  Mis 
sissippi.79  In  October,  1782,  in  the  midst  of  the  peace 
negotiations,  he  wrote  to  that  minister  that  according  to 
Congress  the  English  charters  extended  the  territory  of  the 
United  States  from  the  Atlantic  Ocean  to  the  "South  Sea," 
and  that  Jay  was  urging  this  theory  as  the  basis  of  negotia 
tions.  "Such  folly,"  he  said,  "does  not  deserve  to  be 
seriously  refuted But  I  know,  sir,  all  the  extrava 
gance  of  the  American  pretensions  and  theories."80  Jay 

77  Corresp.  and  Pub.  Papers  of  John  Jay,  Johnston's  ed.,  II,  395 
et  seq.;   Sparks,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  156-160. 

78  Circourt,    Histoire    de   I'action    commune   de    la   France    et    de 
I'Amerique  pour  I'independance  des  Etats-Unis,  par  George  Bancroft, 
III,  310.     "Nous  ne  demandons  I'independance  que  pour  les  treize 
etats  de  I'Amerique  qui  seront  unis  entre  eux,  sans  y  comprendre 
aucune  des  autres  possessions  anglaises  qui  n'ont  point  participe  a 
leur  insurrection." 

79  Doniol,  op.  cit.,  IV,  357. 

80  Circourt,   op.   cit.,   Ill,  290.     "Suivant  le   Congres,   les  chartes 
emanees  de  la  couronne  britanique  etendent  le  domaine  de  1'Amer- 
ique  depuis  1'ocean  jusqu'  a  la  mer  du  Sud.     Tel  est  le  systeme 
propose  par  M.  Jay  pour  base  de  sa  negociation  avec  1'Espagne.    Un 

pareil  delire  ne  merite  pas  d'etre  refute  serieusement Au 

surplus,  je  ne  vois  pas  a  quel  titre  les  Americains  formeraient  des 
pretensions   sur  les   terrains  qui   bordent  le  lac   Ontario.     Ou   ces 
terrains  appartiennent  au  sauvages,  ou  ils  sont  une  dependance  du 


130  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

evidently  had  reason  for  suspicion  of  the  hostility  of 
France  toward  the  westward  extension  of  the  United  States. 
"This  court,"  he  wrote  in  September,  1782,  "as  well  as 

Spain  will  dispute  our  extension  to  the  Mississippi 

Dr.  Franklin  does  not  see  the  conduct  of  this  court  in  the 
light  I  do."81  Franklin,  indeed,  could  not  bring  himself  to 
share  Jay's  well-grounded  suspicions  of  the  French  govern 
ment.8-  Livingston,  likewise,  though  aware  of  Spanish 
designs  on  the  West,  did  not  believe  that  the  French  min 
ister  was  opposed  to  the  expansion  of  the  United  States.83 
Jay  was  convinced  that  France  would  oppose  this  extension 
and  the  free  navigation  of  the  Mississippi  by  the  United 
States,  and  believed,  moreover,  that  she  would  support 
British  claims  to  the  Northwest.84 

On  September  9,  shortly  after  receiving  Rayneval's 
memoir,  Jay  learned  of  the  departure  of  its  author  for 
England.  He  suspected  that  the  purpose  of  the  French 
man's  mission  was  to  impress  Shelburne  with  the  deter 
mination  of  Spain  to  possess  the  exclusive  navigation 
of  the  Mississippi,  and  to  suggest  a  partition  of  the 
West  which  would  satisfy  both  Spain  and  England, 
leaving  the  territory  north  of  the  Ohio  to  the  latter  power.85 
On  September  10,  the  American  commissioners  learned 
of  an  intercepted  dispatch,  written  by  Marbois,  secretary  of 
the  French  legation  at  Philadelphia,  advising  that  the 

Canada.  Dans  1'un  ou  1'autre  cas,  les  Etats-Unis  n'y  ont  aucun  droit. 
Mais  je  connais,  monsieur,  totite  1'extravagance  des  pretensions  et 
des  vues  americaines." 

81  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  126. 

82  Moore,  op.  cit.,  V,  687.     Sparks  thought  Jay  was  mistaken  in  his 
suspicions  of  the  French  government.  Dip.   Corrcsp.   of  Am.  Rev., 
VIII,  208-212;    but  the  evidence  in  the  third  volume  of   Circourt's 
work  shows  that  he  was  not. 

83  Morton,  op.  cit.,  John  P.  Branch  Hist.  Papers,  I,  No.  IV,  321. 

84  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  160. 

83  For  Rayneval's  mission  to  England,  see  Circourt,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  38 
et  scq.  His  purpose  was  to  "sound"  the  British  government  on  the 
conditions  on  which  peace  would  be  made  with  Spain,  and  particu 
larly  to  urge  the  surrender  of  Gibraltar.  Not  much  was  really  said 
about  the  American  boundaries,  ibid.,  46. 


THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS    AND    THE    WEST.  131 

United  States  be  excluded  from  a  share  in  the  fisheries.86 
This  further  aroused  Jay,  and  he  took  a  very  important 
step.87  Without  Franklin's  knowledge,  he  induced  Ben 
jamin  Vaughan  to  return  to  England,  in  order  to  counter 
act  influences  which  he  believed  were  being  brought  to  bear 
on  Shelburne,  to  suggest  a  separate  negotiation  between 
England  and  the  United  States,  and  to  show  the  premier 
that  it  was  England's  interest  to  break  the  French-Amer 
ican  alliance.88  Jay  told  Vaughan  that  the  right  of  the 
United  States  to  the  West  was  proved  by  charters  and 
"other  acts  of  government."  He  declared  himself  ready 
to  treat  without  prior  acknowledgment  of  American  inde 
pendence,  provided  Oswald  should  receive  a  commission 
in  which  his  country  was  referred  to  as  the  thirteen  United 
States  of  America.  This  meant,  of  course,  an  abandonment 
of  the  instructions  of  Congress.  Jay  stood  alone,  for  even 
now  Franklin  refused  to  believe  that  the  destinies  of  the 
United  States  were  not  safe  in  Vergennes'  hands.89 

The  information  brought  by  Vaughan  showed  Shelburne 
that  what  he  hoped  for  had  come  to  pass :  differences  had 
arisen  between  France  and  the  United  States.  The  altera 
tions  in  Oswald's  commission  necessary  to  meet  Jay's 
requirements  were  quickly  made,  and  a  new  one,  authorizing 
him  to  treat  with  commissioners  of  the  United  States  of 
America,  was  sent  on  September  2490  and  received  early 
in  October.91 

Formal  negotiations  without  the  knowledge  of  the  French 
minister  were  immediately  begun  between  Oswald  and  the 

89  Ibid.,  II,  226-227. 

87  Winsor,  Narrative  and  Critical  History  of  America,  VII,  121-122. 

88  For  the  Vaughan  mission,  see  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  VIII,  165  et  seq.; 
Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  267.     John  Fiske,  Critical  Period,  ch.   I, 
considers  this  the  crucial  point  in   the   negotiations.     Fitzmaurice 
thinks  that  from  this  point  on  Jay  predominated  over  Franklin,  Life 
of  Shelburne,  III,  258. 

89  Moore,  op.  cit.,  V,  687. 

^Townshend  to  Oswald,  24  Sept.,  1782,  Bancroft  MSS.,  Peace 
Negotiations. 

91  Oswald  to  Townshend,  2  Oct.,  1782,  Bancroft  MSS.,  Peace 
Negotiations.  For  this  commission  to  Oswald  see  Sparks,  op.  cit., 
X,  80-83. 

10 


132  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

American  commissioners,02  for  Franklin  agreed  to  disre 
gard  his  instructions  so  far  as  to  conduct  separate  negotia 
tions  with  the  British  government,  though  he  continued  to 
believe  in  the  candor  of  Vergennes.  On  October  8  a  series 
of  articles  was  agreed  upon  by  Oswald  and  the  Americans,93 
less  than  a  week  after  Congress  had  solemnly  resolved  that 
it  would  listen  to  no  propositions  for  peace,  unless  they  were 
discussed  "in  confidence  and  in  concert"  with  the  French 
government.94  Franklin  feared  that  these  articles  would  not 
be  satisfactory  to  the  British  government  and  this  proved 
to  be  the  case.  The  boundaries  and  the  West  were  not  so 
troublesome  as  the  fisheries,  treatment  of  the  loyalists,  and 
debts  in  America  clue  British  creditors.  Oswald,  though 
a  man  of  intelligence  and  considerable  information,  was  no 
match  as  a  diplomat  for  the  American  commissioners.  His 
handling  of  the  Canada  question  had  been  anything  but 
diplomatic.  Instead  of  making  the  most  of  Rodney's  great 
victory  in  May,  as  a  means  of  securing  better  terms  for 
England,  he  had  made  the  astonishing  statement  that  she 
must  have  peace,  that  her  enemies  might  do  as  they  pleased, 
but  it  was  hoped  that  they  would  show  magnanimity.95 
Much  opposition  to  him  was  expressed  in  Shelburne's  cabi 
net,  where  Richmond  and  Keppel,  leaders  of  the  party 
which  was  less  inclined  to  peace,  were  especially  bitter 
against  him.96  Nevertheless,  he  was  retained  by  the  min 
istry.  Henry  Strachey,  however,  was  sent  to  join  him  as 
an  additional  envoy. 

The  repulse  of  the  Spanish  and  French  forces  at  Gibral 
tar  in  September  naturally  caused  the  English  to  expect 
more  favorable  terms.  Strachey,  therefore,  was  to  induce 

92  Wharton,  op.  cit.,  V,  748. 

03  Ibid.,  805  ct  scq. 

84  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  X,  87-88. 

95  Wakcman,   op.    cit.,   75.     Viscount    Stormont,    in    criticizing   the 
negotiations,  declared  that  Oswald  was  outmatched  by  any  one  of  the 
American  commissioners,  and  described  him  as    "a  very  extraordi 
nary  geographer  and  politician,"  Parliamentary  History  of  England, 
XXIII,  397- 

96  Moore,  op.  cit.,  V,  640 ;   Rousseau,  op.  cit.,  486. 


THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS   AND   THE    WEST.  133 

the  Americans  to  modify  their  demands,  and  to  urge  Eng 
land's  claims  to  the  trans-Alleghany  country.97  Shelburne 
may  have  felt  that  he  had  been  too  precipitate  in  conceding 
Franklin's  "necessary"  articles,  he  may  have  believed  it 
politic  to  seem  to  abandon  the  West  only  as  a  great  con 
cession  to  the  United  States  or  he  may  have  come  to  feel 
that  the  relinquishment  of  the  whole  West  was  too  great 
an  apparent  surrender.  There  is  preserved  among  his 
papers  a  letter  written  to  him  by  an  American  Tory,  which 
was  received  in  September,  pointing  out  the  importance  of 
the  West,  and  saying  that  the  cession  of  the  Northwest  to 
the  United  States  would  deprive  England  of  the  peltry 
trade,  and  render  the  part  of  Canada  which  was  retained 
of  small  value.98  At  any  rate,  after  the  articles  of  October 
8  had  been  rejected  and  Strachey  dispatched  to  Paris,  Shel 
burne  took  strong  ground  against  the  American  claims  to 
the  West.  "Independently  of  all  the  nonsense  of  charters," 
he  wrote  to  Oswald,  "I  mean  when  they  talk  of  extending 
as  far  as  the  sun  sets,  the  soil  is  and  has  always  been 
acknowledged  to  be  the  King's."  He  suggested  that  the 
back  lands  might  be  used  as  a  fund  to  compensate  the  loyal 
ists  for  their  losses.  The  commissioners  later  wrote  to 
Livingston  that  the  question  of  the  West  was  discussed  at 
length,  and  that  the  British  commissioners  advanced  argu 
ments  for  the  retention  of  the  whole  province  of  Quebec 
as  established  by  the  act  of  I774.100 

About  the  time  Strachey  reached  Paris,  another  of  the 
American  peace  commissioners,  John  Adams,  arrived  to 
participate  in  making  the  treaty.  Adams  came  fresh  from 
a  diplomatic  triumph  at  the  Hague,  where  he  had  succeeded 
in  negotiating  a  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Hol 
land.  Jay  told  him  what  he  firmly  believed,  that  France 
was  not  playing  fair,  and  that  it  was  her  policy  to  give  her 
Bourbon  ally  the  West,  the  Mississippi,  and  the  whole  Gulf 

97  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  281. 

88  Lieutenant-Colonel  Connolly  to  Shelburne,  endorsed  September, 
1782,  Bancroft  MSS.,  Peace  Negotiations. 

89  Shelburne  to  Oswald,  21  Oct.,  1782;   ibid. 
100  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  X,  117. 


134  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

of  Mexico.  He  at  once  sided  with  Jay  and  refused  to  con 
sider  that  the  instructions  of  Congress  bound  himself  and 
his  colleagues  in  all  respects  to  the  will  of  the  French  min 
isters.101  In  his  opinion  the  instructions  should  be  inter 
preted  by  "such  restrictions  and  limitations  as  reason, 
necessity,  and  the  nature  of  things  demand."102  There  is 
not  much  doubt  that  a  strict  adherence  to  the  letter  of  the 
instructions  would  have  meant  the  loss  of  the  West  for  the 
United  States.  Any  designs  which  Spain  might  have 
formed  for  the  acquisition  of  territory  in  America  would  be 
strengthened  rather  than  weakened  by  the  repulse  which  had 
recently  been  inflicted  upon  her  forces  before  Gibraltar.  It 
was  now,  indeed,  out  of  her  power  to  secure  the  recovery 
of  that  fortress,  and  she  might  reasonably  be  expected  to 
look  elsewhere  for  compensation.  If  the  American  com 
missioners  were  to  secure  the  West  and  the  Mississippi,  "the 
nature  of  things"  demanded  a  separate  treaty  with  Great 
Britain.  They  must  not  be  hampered  by  constant  communi 
cation  with  a  government  which  was  supporting  the  policy 
of  Spain  and  was  hostile  to  the  object  they  had  in 
view.  "Had  I  not  violated  the  instructions  of  Congress," 
Jay  wrote,  "their  dignity  would  have  been  in  the  dust."103 

That  Vergennes  was  opposed  to  the  extension  of  the 
United  States  to  the  Mississippi  has  been  shown.  The 
ultimate  policy  of  the  French  government  respecting  Amer 
ica  is  difficult  to  determine.  Vergennes'  position  was  not 
easy.  France  was  at  the  head  of  a  heterogeneous  alliance, 
and  was  feeling  severely  the  burdens  imposed  by  the  war. 
She  needed  peace.  There  was  a  feeling  in  Parisian  circles 
that  she  had  been  duped  by  her  allies104  and  that  they  would 
win  the  rewards  which  her  exertions  had  made  possible. 
She  had  agreed  to  further  the  territorial  policy  of  Spain, 

101  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  VI,  437- 

102  For  Adams'  "Journal  of  the  Peace  Negotiations,"  see  Wharton, 
op.  cit.,  V,  845  et  scq. 

103  Wharton,  op.  cit.,  V,  810. 

104  Fitzherbert  to  Grantham,   3  Oct.,   1782,   Bancroft  MSS.,   Peace 
Negotiations. 


THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS   AND   THE    WEST.  135 

and  Spain  was  opposed  to  the  possession  of  the  West  by 
the  United  States  and  was  clamoring  for  exclusive  control 
of  the  Mississippi.  Vergennes'  attitude  can  be  explained 
without  assuming  that  he  had  any  designs  on  the  West  for 
his  own  country.  But  he  was  not  the  statesman  in  whose 
hands  Congress  should  have  placed  the  destinies  of  the 
United  States.105 

Another  and  radical  view  of  French  policy  has  been 
advanced  in  a  striking  article  by  Mr.  F.  J.  Turner.106  He 
calls  attention  to  a  document  written  in  1777,  the  authen 
ticity  of  which,  however,  is  doubtful.  It  is  entitled 
"Memoire  Historique  et  Politique  sur  la  Louisiane,"  and 
was  written  "par  M.  de  Vergennes."  If  really  written  by 
the  French  minister,  it  would  prove  that  he  had  in  mind 
the  reestablishment  of  the  colonial  empire  of  France.  In 
the  "Memoire"  it  is  stated  that  the  United  States  cannot 
rightfully  claim  the  trans-Alleghany  country  on  the  basis  of 
colonial  charters,  and  it  is  proposed  that  Great  Britain  be 
obliged  to  restore  to  France  at  the  close  of  the  Revolution 
all  the  conquests  she  had  made  in  the  Seven  Years'  War, 
This  revived  colonial  empire  would  involve  the  retrocession 
by  Spain  to  France  of  Louisiana  west  of  the  Mississippi, 
a  result  which  Vergennes  actually  tried  to  bring  about.107 
It  will  be  noticed,  too,  that  the  contention  of  the  "Memoire" 
respecting  the  invalidity  of  American  claims  to  the  West 
is  in  harmony  with  Rayneval's  memoir,  and  Vergennes' 
views  referred  to  above.  Mr.  Turner  considers  the  subse 
quent  conduct  of  Vergennes,  after  the  date  of  the 
"Memoire,"  as  "entirely  consistent"  with  the  view  that  he 
was  its  author,  and  thinks  that  his  anxiety  to  forward  the 
interests  of  Spain  between  the  Mississippi  and  the  Alle- 
ghanies  becomes  more  intelligible  if  we  suppose  that  he 
expected  France  to  supplant  that  power  in  the  interior  of 

105  For  a  temperate  view  of  Vergennes'  part  in  the  peace  negotia 
tions,  see  McLaughlin,  The  Confederation  and  the  Constitution,  chs. 
I  and  II. 

'"The  Policy  of  France  towards  the  Mississippi  Valley  in  the 
Period  of  Washington  and  Jefferson,"  Am.  Hist.  Rev.,  X,  249  et  seq. 


136  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

North  America.  From  this  point  of  view,  De  la  Balme's 
abortive  attempt  on  Detroit108  becomes  part  of  a  compre 
hensive  scheme  of  French  policy.  Mr.  Turner  thinks  that 
Napoleon's  efforts  to  reconstruct  a  French  colonial  empire 
in  America  were  along  the  lines  planned  by  Vergennes. 
His  supposition  regarding  the  latter's  ultimate  policy 
is,  however,  conjectural.  By  the  treaty  of  1778,  it 
should  be  remembered,  the  king  of  France  renounced  for 
ever  the  possession  of  any  territory  in  North  America  then 
or  previously  belonging  to  Great  Britain.  Whatever  the 
ultimate  policy  of  Vergennes  may  have  been,  his  immediate 
intention  certainly  was  to  prevent  the  acquisition  of  the 
West  by  the  United  States. 

Although  in  October,  1782,  Shelburne  showed  a  disposi 
tion  to  retain  the  West,  he  was  not  inclined  to  let  the 
boundary  question  wreck  the  negotiations  and  lose  the 
advantages  which  would  come  from  a  separate  peace  with 
the  United  States.  After  much  deliberation  and  discussion 
a  provisional  treaty  was  signed  at  Paris  on  November  3O,109 
by  which  the  West,  from  the  Alleghanies  to  the  Mississippi, 
and  from  the  Great  Lakes  to  the  315!  degree,  north  latitude, 
was  secured  by  the  United  States.  The  American  commis 
sioners  who  participated  in  making  the  treaty  were  Jay, 
Franklin  and  Adams.  Laurens  arrived  just  in  time  to  sign 
it.  Jefferson  did  not  go  to  France  at  all.  This  territory 
was  not  ceded  to  the  United  States,  but  was  recognized  as 
included  within  their  boundaries.  To  save  the  conscience 
of  the  American  commissioners,  and  to  give  them  a  technical 
defense  against  France,  these  provisional  articles  were  "to 
be  inserted  in  and  to  constitute  the  Treaty  of  Paris,"  but 
the  treaty  was  not  to  be  concluded  till  England  and  France 
made  peace.110  On  December  5,  the  king's  speech 
announced  to  Parliament  that  a  provisional  treaty  had  been 
made  with  the  American  commissioners.111 

108  Supra,  ch.  VT. 

"1!)  Wharton,  op.  cit.,  VI,  96  et  scq. 
"°  Fitzmaurice,  op.  cit.,  Ill,  302. 
111  Par.  Hist,  of  En-.,  XXIII,  206. 


THE    PEACE    NEGOTIATIONS    AND   THE    WEST.  137 

On  November  29,  Franklin  wrote  Vergennes  that  pre 
liminary  articles  had  been  agreed  upon  with  the  British  com 
missioners.112  The  French  minister  was  naturally  surprised. 
He  felt  that  the  American  commissioners  in  violating  their 
instructions  had  acted  towards  France  in  a  manner  both 
boorish  and  dishonorable.113  He  does  not  appear,  however, 
to  have  been  displeased  that  the  terms  were  so  favorable 
to  the  United  States.114  Franklin  admitted  that  he  and  his 
colleagues  had  neglected  a  point  of  "bienseance,"  but 
asserted  that  they  had  concluded  nothing  that  was  preju 
dicial  to  France.115  The  truth  is  that  the  American  com 
missioners  and  the  English  government  had  stolen  a  march 
on  the  Bourbon  courts. 

Historians  have  been  puzzled  to  account  for  the  very 
favorable  terms  secured  by  the  Americans.  So  far  as 
the  acquisition  of  the  West  was  concerned,  the  Ameri 
can  claims,  based  upon  colonial  charters  or  the  right 
of  succession  of  the  United  States  collectively  to  the 
sovereignty  over  the  West  previously  vested  in  the  British 
crown,  probably  counted  for  as  little  as  theoretical  claims 
usually  do.  Laughed  at  by  European  statesmen,  they  can 
not  explain  why  Shelburne's  government  abandoned  the 
domain  which  England  had  wrested  from  France  a  few 
years  before. 

Another  explanation  has  appealed  strongly  to  a  large 
number  of  writers.  Clark's  conquest  and  the  establishment 
of  Virginia  government  in  the  Northwest  have  frequently 
been  pointed  to  as  the  decisive  factor  in  the  winning  of 
that  territory.  Clark  has  been  metamorphosed  into  a  con 
scious  empire-builder,  and  the  state  of  Virginia  represented 
as  possessing  in  1782  the  entire  territory  from  Lake 
Superior  to  the  southern  boundary  of  Kentucky.116  Indeed, 
in  the  opinion  of  some  of  his  contemporaries,  Clark's  work 

112  Complete  Works  of  Benjamin  Franklin,  Bigelow's  ed.,  VIII,  213. 

113  Moore,  op.  cit.,  V,  654. 

114  Sparks,  op.  cit.,  X,  120. 

115  Com.  Works  of  Franklin,  Bigelow's  ed.,  VIII,  228,  234. 
118Fiske,    Crit.   Period,    18;     Lodge,    The   Story    of    the   Revolu 
tion:   New  York,  1903,  337. 


13  TRANSITION    IN    ILLINOIS. 

was  an  argument  of  great  importance  in  favor  of  Amer 
ican  claims  to  the  Northwest.117  But  if  this  were  really  the 
case,  we  should  surely  encounter  frequent  mention  of  that 
work  and  the  establishment  of  Virginia  government  in  Illi 
nois  in  the  documents  relating  to  the  peace  negotiations. 
This  we  do  not  find.  It  may  be  that  the  American  com 
missioners  intentionally  refrained  from  referring  to  what 
had  been  done  in  the  Northwest,  for,  as  we  have  seen  in 
the  preceding  chapter,  the  fair  hopes  aroused  by  Clark's  con 
quest  in  1778  had  been  dissipated,  and  Virginia's  govern 
ment  in  Illinois  had  utterly  collapsed.  The  Americans  in 
1782  could  scarcely  with  good  grace  argue  the  principle  of 
"uti  possidetis"  as  ground  for  claiming  that  territory. 11N 

When  we  turn  to  the  diplomatic  situation  confronting 
Shelburne,  we  find  a  more  satisfactory  explanation  of  his 
compliance  with  the  American  demands  concerning  the 
West.  In  Europe,  France,  Spain  and  Holland  were  at  war 
with  England.  It  was,  of  course,  very  much  to  his  interest 
to  make  a  speedy  peace  with  the  United  States,  which 
would  place  his  government  in  a  better  position  respecting 
its  European  enemies,  and  at  the  same  time  break  the 
French-American  alliance.  We  have  seen  how  eager  he 
was  to  open  discussion  with  Franklin,  how  readily  he 
accepted  the  latter's  '"necessary"  articles,  and  how  com 
pliantly  he  met  Jay's  advances  for  a  separate  negotiation. 
He  was  willing  to  concede  much  for  the  sake  of  peace,  and 
the  American  commissioners  stood  firm  on  the  Mississippi 

117  Rowland,  op.  cit.,  I,  365. 

118  Mr.    Van    Tyne    naively    argues    thus,    American    Revolution, 
284:     "These    posts     [Vincennes,    Cahokia,    and    Kaskaskia]    were 
sufficient  to  insure  the  American  hold  upon  the  Northwest,  until,  in 
the  peace  negotiations  of  1782,  the  military  prowess   of  Clark  was 
followed  up  by  the  diplomatic  triumph  of  Jay.    Although  no  mention 
of  Clark's  work  is  found  among  tlic  papers  of  the  diplomats,  yet  ihc 
fact  of  possession  must  have  had  weight."    The  italics  are  mine.    Mr. 
Van  Tyne's  statement   is,  of  course,   a  mere  conjecture.     It  would 
be  indeed  strange  if  the  decisive  factor  in  causing  Great  Britain  to 
abandon  the  Northwest  were  not  referred  to  in  any  of  the  documents. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  by  1782,  the    "American  hold  upon  the  North 
west"   amounted  to  nothing. 


THE   PEACE   NEGOTIATIONS   AND   THE   WEST.  139 

boundary.  To  them,  even  more  than  to  him,  a  separate 
treaty  was  of  vital  importance.  In  a  general  treaty  it  is 
difficult  to  see  how  they  could  have  secured  the  West,  to 
say  nothing  of  other  advantages ;  and  from  the  point  of 
view  of  later  development,  the  acquisition  of  the  West  was, 
next  to  independence,  the  most  important  provision  of  the 
treaty.  To  Jay  belongs  the  chief  credit  for  putting  in 
motion  the  train  of  events  which  ended  in  the  attainment 
of  this  object.  He  deserves  to  be  called,  as  John  Adams 
called  him,  the  hero  of  the  negotiations.119  Of  Spanish 
designs  on  the  Mississippi,  Oswald,  and,  no  doubt,  Shel- 
burne,  believed  that  they  had  evidence,  and  the  premier 
probably  felt  that  a  separate  treaty  which  would  give  up 
the  West  to  the  United  States  was  preferable  to  a  general 
treaty  which  would  abandon  it  to  Spain. 

There  remains  another  consideration  to  explain  the  relin- 
quishment  of  Illinois  and  the  rest  of  the  West  by  Great 
Britain.  To  me  it  seems  the  decisive  factor  in  the  case. 
The  enjoyment  and  monopolization  of  the  peltry  trade  was 
the  leading  object  which  Great  Britain  sought  through  her 
possession  of  that  territory.  In  this  purpose  she  had  failed. 
Her  chief  motive  for  holding  the  country  no  longer 
existed.  In  a  debate  in  the  House  of  Lords  in  February, 
1783,  critics  of  the  peace  asserted  that  by  the  boundaries 
conceded  to  the  United  States  Great  Britain  had  lost  the 
fur  trade.120  Shelburne,  defending  the  treaty  which  his 
ministry  had  made,  pointed  out  that  the  fur  trade  was  not 
abandoned,  but  only  divided.  He  placed  the  annual  imports 
from  Canada  to  England  at  only  £50,000,  and  declared  that 
the  preservation  of  this  import  of  £50,000  had  cost  England 
£8oo,ooo.121  Secretary  Townshend  declared  in  the  Com 
mons  that  the  possession  of  the  Northwest  had  not  been 
profitable.122  "Suppose,"  said  Shelburne,  "the  entire  fur 
trade  sunk  into  the  sea,  where  is  the  detriment  to  this 


118  Sparks,  op.  tit.,  VI,  501. 

120  Par.  Hist,  of  Eng.,  XXIII,  377,  381. 

181     TT    •  J 


121  Ibid.,  409. 

122  Ibid.,  465. 


140  TRANSITION   IN    ILLINOIS. 

country?  Is  £50,000  a  year  imported  in  that  article 
any  object  for  Great  Britain  to  continue  a  war  of  which 
the  people  of  England  by  their  representatives  have  declared 
their  abhorrence?"  Great  Britain  abandoned  only  that 
which  it  was  unprofitable  for  her  to  retain. 


APPENDIX. 


A  LIST  OF  THE  SOURCES  AND  SECONDARY  WORKS 
CITED. 

NOTE:    No  attempt  has  been  made  to  prepare  an  exhaustive  bibliography. 

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American  Historical  Review. 

American  State  Papers,  Documents  Legislative  and  Executive  of 
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Annual  Register.     Sixth  edition,  London,  1810. 

BANCROFT,  GEORGE. — History  of  the  United  States,  6  vols.  Boston, 
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BENTON,  E.  J. — The  Wabash  Trade  Route  in  the  Development  of 
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142  APPENDIX. 

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CHITTENDEN,  H.  M. — The  American  Fur  Trade  of  the  Far  West, 
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Collections  of  the  Illinois  State  Historical  Library.     Springfield. 
Vol.    II    contains  the   recently    discovered    Cahokia   Records. 

Collections  of  the  Massachusetts  Historical  Society.  Fourth  Series. 
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Collections  of  the  Neiv  York  Historical  Society.     New  York. 

Collections  of  the  State  Historical  Society  of  Wisconsin.     Madison. 

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Contains    many    important    documents,    including    Clark's    Memoir    and    Letter 
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FARRAND,  M. — The  Indian  Boundary  Line.  American  Historical 
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APPENDIX.  143 

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144  APPENDIX. 

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